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John Changiz Vafai*
ABSTRACT
On January 17, 2016, in a statement following his signing
of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran,
President Obama addressed that country’s people, stating that
“yours is a great civilization, with a vibrant culture that has so
much to contribute to the world – in commerce, and in science
and the arts.” While the former U.S. President’s evaluation of
the Iranian people’s greatness is indisputable, there are
questions concerning doing business with Iran which transcend
conventional legal issues and commercial problems.
Given the juxtaposition of Iran’s duopolistic government
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structure and ideologically oriented decision-making processes,
questions arise as to what extent multinational corporations,
including U.S. companies, should reasonably expect to conduct
commercial transactions with that country. Specific issues arise
related to Iranian banks, international credit recognition, terms
of payment, and the conceptual legality of interest in Iran. In
addition, more practical issues arise related to the governing law
of contract and proper dispute resolution mechanisms.
Furthermore, U.S. regulatory constraints limit the efficacy of
certain contracts between Iran and U.S. companies. This article
attempts to illustrate the structural, legal and operational
issues concerning doing business with Iran and, where possible,
means for mitigating such issues.
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Introduction
After the lifting of some international sanctions against
Iran in the beginning of 2016,1 President Hasan Rohani of Iran
embarked on a commercial offensive to major Western European
countries.2 In a tour that was unprecedented in Iran’s postrevolutionary history, Rohani peddled across Europe for trade
deals in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, and opened new
cultural communications with the Vatican.3 On March 23, 2016,
as Iranians celebrated their time-honored ancient tradition of
Nowruz,4 the exuberance of some international companies,
zealously expecting to resume their business with Iran, was
floating the halls of commerce.
The media have generally trumpeted the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),5 the agreement
between Iran and its negotiating E3/EU+3 countries (China,
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, with the High Representative of the European Union for
Affairs and Security Policy), as a great success concerning the
lifting of sanctions “in their entireties” against the Islamic
See Rick Gladstone, With Iran Nuclear Deal Implemented, What Happens Next?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2016, at A12.
2 Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Hassan Rouhani in first Europe visit by Iranian president in 16 years, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2016, 2:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/25/hassan-rouhani-in-first-europe-visit-by-iranian-president-in-16-years.
3 See id.; see also Elisabetta Povoledo, Pope Francis and Hassan Rouhani
of Iran Discuss Mideast Unrest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2016, at A10.
4 Nowruz is a spring festival that “plays a significant role in strengthening the ties among peoples based on mutual respect and the ideals of peace and
good-neighbourliness.” See G.A. Res. 64/253, at 2 (May 10, 2010) (recognizing
March 21 as “the International Day of Nowruz”).
5 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization /245317.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA]; see also JCPOA
Annex I – Nuclear-related measures, July 14, 2015, http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/245318.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA Annex I]; JCPOA Annex
II - Sanctions Related Commitments, July 14, 2015, http://www.state. gov/documents/organization/245320.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA Annex II]; JCPOA Annex
II – Attachments, July 14, 2015, http:// www.state.gov/ documents/organization/245319.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA Annex II Attachments]; JCPOA Annex III
– Civil Nuclear Cooperation, July 14, 2015, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization /245322.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA Annex III]; JCPOA Annex
IV – Joint Commission, July 14, 2015, http://www. state.gov/documents/organization/ 245323.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA Annex IV]; JCPOA Annex V – Implementation Plan, July 14, 2015, http://www.state.gov/ documents/ organization/245324.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA Annex V].
1
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Republic of Iran.6 The JCPOA has been “billed as a once in a
generation opportunity,” and proponents of the deal claim that
“Iran is the biggest new market to reenter the global economy in
decades.”7 In January 2016, President Obama stated that the
nuclear agreement with Iran “contains the most comprehensive
inspection and verification regime ever negotiated to monitor a
nuclear program.”8 As a result of this accord, Iran may obtain
access to billions of dollars of impounded funds.9 Some have
estimated the amount at $100 billion, resulting in a financial
windfall to Iran. In proportional terms, that would be equivalent
to the United States receiving $4.2 trillion.10 The amount of
money released to Iran, if measured in today’s dollars, would be
the approximate equivalent to the amount spent by the U.S.
government on the Marshall Plan, which covered 17 European
countries over a period of four years after World War II. 11
Similarly, in January of 2016, British trade officials were quick
to stretch their sense of economic exuberance, predicting more
than one trillion dollars of investment in Iran over the course of

6 See, e.g., A Safer World, Thanks to the Iran Deal, N.Y. TIMES, January
18, 2016, at A20; Don’t Let Iran’s Progress on the Nuclear Deal Go to Waste,
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2016 at A22; Tear up the Iran nuclear deal? Then what?,
CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/ editorials/ct-iran-nuclear-obama-trump-cruz-edit-0408-jm-20160407-story.html;
Iran deal is better than no deal at all, BOS. GLOBE (July 15, 2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2015/07/14/iran-deal-betterthan-deal-all/bvOdH4HaVOK2QqAUEnS9qM/story.html; Emily Ekins, Survey: 58% of Americans Favor Iran Nuclear Agreement, but Worry about Its Efficacy, CATO INST. (July 20, 2015), https://www.cato.org/blog/survey-58-americans-favor-iran-nuclear-agreement-worry-about-its-efficacy.
7 The Over-Promised Land, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 2016, at 57-58.
8 Gary Bauer, Reports Of The Iran Nuclear Deal’s Success Are Greatly
Exaggerated, DAILY CALLER, http://dailycaller.com/2016/07/18/reports-of-theiran-nuclear-deals-success-are-greatly-exaggerated/ (last visited Jan. 24,
2017).
9 See Rick Gladstone, Value of Iran Sanctions Relief is Hard to Measure,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2015, at A12 (reporting wide variances in the precise
amount: “Estimates of the sum that could become available to Iran range from
$29 billion to as much as $150 billion.”).
10 Ilan Berman, Trump and Iran: What the Next Administration Can Do,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/united-states/2016-11-15/trump-and-iran (published by the Council on
Foreign Relations).
11 Id.
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a decade, with at least one plutocrat heralding Iran as “a new
region to conquer.”12
This article will show that news of the “complete” demise of
sanctions against Iran is greatly exaggerated.13 Since the lifting
of international sanctions against Iran, there is mass confusion
in the United States—and particularly in Iran itself—as to the
particular kinds of trade deals into which Iran can enter.
Neither party distinguishes between the lifting of certain U.S.
nuclear-based sanctions pursuant to the JCPOA, and other
sanctions that still remain in place. What is underreported in
the media and other news coverage is the fact that U.S.
sanctions against Iran still exist related to human rights abuses,
missiles, and support for terrorism.14
In addition to the lack of clarity as to which sanctions were
lifted, there are two additional types of barriers to international
trade. First, there exist a number of significant policy barriers
to trade with Iran in the United States concerning the gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.15 Second,
there are potent ideological obstructions, extra-constitutional
institutions, and legal barriers within Iran itself. These forces
will likely continue to impede and obstruct commercial
development and business dealings with Iran.

12 Berman, supra note 10 (quoting “an imperial-minded boss of a French
luxury-goods firm”).
13 See Mark Twain, Chapters from My Autobiography, 1906 N. AMER. REV.
160 (relating that upon hearing of his demise, “[Twain] said – ‘Say the report
is greatly exaggerated.’”).
14 See Gladstone, supra note 1 (noting that certain American sanctions
“remain in force”); see also NIAC, Tyler Cullis, Iran Sanctions after the JCPOA:
Terrorism, Human Rights, Conventional Weapons and Ballistic Missiles Sanctions, NATIONAL IRANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL (July 22, 2015),
https://28d0so13ppai3ijpls45gl2s4gb-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/scorecard///Sanctions-After-JCPOA1.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
Eighteen years prior to signing the JCPOA, on December 10, 1998, President
Clinton issued the first Presidential Proclamation concerning the U.S. commitment to protect human rights in the international arena; See Exec. Order No.
13107, 3 C.F.R. § 234 (Dec. 10, 1998).
15 See 22 U.S.C. § 2340(d)(1) (defining the term “Gross Violations of Internationally Recognized Human Rights”). Eighteen years prior to signing the
JCPOA, on December 10, 1998, President Clinton issued the first Presidential
Proclamation concerning the U.S. commitment to protect human rights in the
international arena. See Proclamation 7158-Human Rights Day, Bill of Rights
Day, and Human Rights Week, 1998, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
/ws/?pid=55385.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/1

8

2017]

THE NEW ERA OF DOING BUSINESS WITH IRAN

9

The legal complexities of the new Iranian commercial
agreements with Europe and China, particularly in the field of
banking and international finance, remain unknown,
unresolved, or under-estimated. Such complexities are mainly
derived from three elements: (1) the ideological discourse within
Iran concerning money and banking (amongst other things); (2)
the financial policy of the Western banks, long established to
cope with the widespread perception of Iran’s ideologically
motivated conduct abroad; and (3) impediments created by the
United States laws, court decisions, and executive orders in
order to cope with acts of terrorism. In fact, while Iran was in
the midst of changing its previous public policy on international
trade and was actively seeking to utilize banking and other
financing facilities through international channels, the
Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”), a global standard-setting
financial organization for combating financing the acts of
terrorism and money laundering, issued a public statement
indicating that:
The FATF remains particularly and exceptionally concerned
about Iran’s failure to address the risk of terrorist financing
and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the
international financial system. . . The FATF continues to urge
jurisdictions to protect against correspondent relationships
being used to bypass or evade counter-measures and risk
mitigation practices and to take into account ML/FT risks
when considering requests by Iranian financial institutions to
open branches and subsidiaries in their jurisdiction. Due to the
continuing terrorist financing threat emerging from Iran,
jurisdictions should consider the steps already taken and
possible additional safeguards to strengthen existing ones.16

Here, the FATF’s purpose was to urge members of all
jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions of the Islamic
Republic of Iran’s policies regarding financing acts of terrorism
in the Middle East.17 In fact, since 2009, the Office of Foreign

Public Statement, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (Feb. 19, 2016),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/public-statement-february-2016.html [hereinafter FATF
Public Statement – 19 February 2016].
17 Mark Hosenball, Anti-money laundering body urges more scrutiny of
Iran, North Korea, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.reuters.com
/article/us-iran-economy-moneylaundering-idUSKCN0VS2LM.
16
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Assets Control (“OFAC”), the Treasury’s sanctions enforcement
office, has imposed fourteen billion dollars in fines to those
companies that have been dealing with Iran.18 Paradoxically, the
U.S. Treasury has been unable to define the benchmarks that
the Islamic Republic has to meet in order to regain access to the
American banking or financial system.19 It is because of such
issues that the Central Bank of Iran Governor Valiollah Seif has
contemptuously stated that “[t]he European banks do not have
the courage to work with Iran because of the financial penalties
the U.S. has imposed in the past.”20
In terms of Iran’s access to the international banking
system and global financial institutions, the more serious issue
has been Iran’s logistical difficulties in obtaining international
credit for various investment projects.21 In this respect, the most
important and globally adopted banking system is the Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
(“SWIFT”), a cooperative that runs the international financial
messaging system among the banks.22 Currently, SWIFT, a
member owned industry cooperative, manages the worldwide
cross-border payment instructions between banks.23 After the
imposition of the sanctions in Iran, SWIFT facilities were cut off
and some of the most powerful organizations, outside of the
official ministries that function as extra-constitutional
establishments in Iran, frequently resorted to money laundering
or bartered commodity trades with certain countries.24 Upon the
The Over-Promised Land, supra note 7, at 58.
See id.
20
Iran CBI chief visits US, complains of sanctions, IRAN OIL GAS
NETWORK (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.iranoilgas.com/news/details?id=15824&
title=Iran+CBI+chief+visits+US,%20+complains+of+sanctions.
21 KENNETH KATZMAN, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS
9, 57 (2016) (noting Iran’s investment needs, particularly in the petroleum sector, where “onshore oil fields are in need of substantial investment” due to
technology largely not upgraded since the 1990s; noting further that “[s]ome
experts estimated in 2015 that sanctions relief under the JCPOA might return
Iran to nearly double-digit growth in the first year if Iran uses the sanctions
relief mostly to try to rebuild its civilian economy”).
22
See About Us, SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/about-us (last visited
Jan. 24, 2017).
23 Katy Burne, Swift Finds Evidence of Second Malware Attack, WALL ST.
J. (May 12, 2016, 10:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/swift-finds-evidenceof-second-malware-attack-1463102215 (“On average, [SWIFT] handles 25 million messages each day.”).
24 Tom Arnold & Jonathan Saul, Iranians exasperated as U.S. sanctions
18
19
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rapprochement between Iran and the 5+1 countries, one
question remains unanswered – by loosening the sanctions, how
will the new commercial overtures towards Iran work vis-à-vis
the ideological and social impediments installed for decades in
that country?
Part I of this article discusses the JCPOA agreement
between Iran and the 5+1 countries, which has legitimized the
Islamic Republic of Iran’s undertaking of international
commercial transactions with certain European countries, and,
eventually, with the United States. Part I also discusses the
existing legal impediments in the United States concerning
doing business with Iran. These include, but are not limited to,
legal barriers that still exist with respect to doing business with
Iran, such as the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act [hereinafter
TRIA], the President’s executive order prohibiting business
interactions with certain countries that are on the list of aiding
and abetting terrorists or acts of terrorism, and Iran’s present
status as a terrorist aider and abettor under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act.25 In this respect, this article will
discuss the current U.S. policy concerning doing business with
countries perceived to be involved in acts of terrorism. In
particular, Part I will deal with the April 20, 2016 Supreme
Court decision concerning Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of
Iran.26
Part II discusses the issues related to the constraints and
limitations of banking in Iran as a financial conduit in
international business. This part will also discuss the ideological
impediments related to interest rates and a legal subterfuge to
overcome such impediments. Part III engages the post-sanctions
trade agreements concluded between the Islamic Republic of
Iran and international bodies on the one hand, and between it
and several European countries on the other. In this part, issues
concerning the international financial transactions affecting

frustrate deal making, REUTERS (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com /article/us-iran-trade-finance-idUSKCN0WO1Y3 (“In recent weeks SWIFT, the
global payments network, has reconnected several Iranian banks to its system,
allowing them to resume cross-border transactions with foreign banks four
years after they were cut off.”).
25 See 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (2016) (making certain assets subject to attachment in aid of execution on terrorism-related judgments against Iran).
26 See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (Ginsburg, J.).
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Iran’s trade with European countries will be discussed. Part IV
relates issues concerning Iranian international commercial
transactions and global security concerns, and the development
of quasi-banking institutions in Iran; in addition, Part IV
provides an overview of the standing of Iran’s banking system to
engage in international financial transactions. Part V discusses
Iran’s recent sanction-free investments and commercial
agreements with foreign companies. Part VI addresses the
dispute resolution mechanism between Iran and foreign
commercial companies. Part VII addresses the governmental
structure and unique decision-making processes in Iran that
affect foreign corporations that intend to undertake commercial
transactions in that country. Such issues relate to the role and
functions of the extra-constitutional institutions active within
Iran. Finally, Part VIII discusses Iran’s integration in the
international trade community and the impact of the regional
organizations concerning commercial transactions with Iran.
This article will show the impact of the extra-constitutional
institutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran as institutional
impediments that severely diminish Iran’s capability to
ostensibly participate in, and benefit from, its international
commercial
transactions.
The
extra-constitutional
institutions—a vestige of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in
Iran—are the non-governmental organizations that are
effectively nonfunctional: they do not function under the
auspices of the President or any other body recognized or
mandated by Iran’s Constitution to engage in economic,
business, administrative, or policy making activities. These
institutions are engaged in ideological, military, investment and
commercial activities throughout the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In this respect, one may say that Iran has a dual system of
government. 27 The post-sanction investment and commercial
agreements between Iran and several European countries,
particularly France and Italy, have significant commercial and
legal implications. These agreements, in the long run, will have

27
See EMANUELE OTTOLENGHI, THE PASDARAN, INSIDE IRAN’S ISLAMIC
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS 41-59 (2011); see also SAEID GOLKAR, CAPTIVE
SOCIETY: THE BASIJ MILITIA AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN IRAN 151-74 (2015).
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a pivotal impact not only on commercial policies, but also on the
ideological posture of the Islamic Republic in the Middle East.28
I. Demise of the Regime of Sanctions
Since the revolution of 1979, Iran’s transnational
investments and official commercial activities with Western
countries, especially the United States, have been sporadic at
best. Iran’s investments and assets continue to be subjected to
the utmost national and international judicial scrutiny.29
Various trade restrictions, particularly Congressional sanctions
enforced by the Department of the Treasury, rendered nearly all
commercial transactions with Iran to be in violation of U.S.
law.30 Furthermore, the Department of State, through the Office
of Economic Sanctions Policy Implementation (“OESPI”), has
enforced effective sanction programs that handicap access to the
U.S. for corporations engaging in commercial transactions in
Iran. While the act of lifting the sanctions against Iran has
abolished certain prohibitions concerning doing business with
the Islamic Republic, it also creates continued complexities in
the international community.31 These complexities fall into

28 In terms of modifying sanctions, this article addresses the issues related to Iran’s policy with respect to proliferation of nuclear energy. This article
does not discuss other issues affecting sanctions against the Islamic Republic,
i.e. Iran’s policy with respect to human rights as well as international terrorism.
29 For instance, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review certain issues related to Iran’s banking assets in the United
States. The writ of certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court on October
2015. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, No. 14-770, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 7643 (U.S. Nov.
30, 2015). On April 20, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its decision concerning
this case. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). Iran has instituted
proceedings before the International Court of Justice [“ICJ”] against the
United States concerning sanctions and the Bank Markazi decision. See generally Press Release, International Court of Justice, Iran Institutes Proceedings
Against the United States with Regard to a Dispute Concerning Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity (June 15, 2016) (on file with author),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/164/19032.pdf.
30
See generally CONGRESS AND THE NATION 2009–2012, VOLUME XIII:
POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE 111TH AND 112TH CONGRESSES (CQ Press 2014);
Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–44; International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.S. § 1701 (“IEEPA”); Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act of 2006 (“ILSA”). On September 30, 2006, the title of the Act was renamed
to the “Iran Sanctions Act” (“ISA”).
31 See infra Part IV and accompanying text.
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primarily two categories: (1) the convoluted division of powers in
Iran, mainly reflected in centers of decision-making (including
issues related to international commercial transactions); and (2)
the conflicting goals established by organizations—both
international and within the United States, that are concerned
with doing business with Iran.
A review of the investment and commercial agreements
between Iran and international commercial companies will be
perfunctory without a brief reference to the agreement reached
between the 5+1 countries and Iran, and the ideological point of
view of banking and interests in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
A. Parameters Concerning Iranian Sanctions Relief
On July 14, 2015, the 5+1 countries and the Islamic
Republic of Iran agreed on the JCPOA, which ensured the
signatory nations that the nuclear program of the Islamic
Republic will be exclusively peaceful.32 In terms of the timing of
the JCPOA accord, one scholar adroitly observed that “[w]hile
the United States and its allies must achieve their core goals —
effectively and dependably blocking Iran’s path to a nuclear
bomb — in any compromises they make, they need to remember,
too, that getting a deal itself could be a game-changer in Iranian
politics.”33 There was a general accord between Iran on the one
hand and the 5+1 countries on the other. Based on a verification
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”), Iran had
implemented the key nuclear-related obligations specified in the
JCPOA on July 14, 2015, when the 5+1 countries finally agreed
to lift the nuclear-related sanctions on the Islamic Republic of
Iran (“5+1 Agreement”). Consequently, the international
community marked January 16, 2016 as “Implementation
Day.”34 Following Implementation Day, the next crucial

32
See GUIDANCE RELATING TO THE LIFTING OF CERTAIN U.S. SANCTIONS
PURSUANT TO THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION ON IMPLEMENTATION
DAY, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/implement_guide_jcpoa.pdf [hereinafter U.S. TREASURY GUIDANCE REPORT] (noting that October 18, 2015 marked
the “Adoption Day” of the JCPOA, in which the agreement came into effect).
33 Vali R. Nasr, A Nuclear Deal, Now or Never, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/opinion/vali-nasr-a-nuclear-deal-now-ornever.html.
34 See Thomas Erdbrink, In Tehran, Iranians Play Down Milestone, N.Y.
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milestone in the JCPOA will be “Transition Day,” an event
scheduled to occur eight years from Adoption Day, or upon a
report from the Director General of the IAEA Board of
Governors, and parallel to the United Nations Security Council
(“UNSC”), stating that the IAEA has reached the conclusion that
“all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities,”
whichever date is earlier.35 The U.S. Government has sought to
terminate or modify certain statutory provisions and to remove
the individuals and corporations from the Treasury Department
OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons
List (“SDN List”) provided this process bears fruit.36 Iran’s
President Rohani considered the 5+1 agreement as evidence
that Iran “has a big power called the power of diplomacy.”37 In
reference to the conclusion of the nuclear deal, the Iranian
President stated that:
After 12 years of steadfastness and resistance as well as
patience and sacrifice and also martyrdom of a number of
nuclear scientists and on account of indefatigable efforts of our
nuclear scientists, diplomats, politicians, lawyers as well as the
economic officials of the country, today we are at a turning
point.38

As a result of the accord between the 5+1 countries and Iran,
the United States lifted nuclear-related sanctions on significant
Iranian products and services.39 However, it is important to
TIMES (Jan. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/world/
middleeast/iran-implementation-day-nuclear-sanctions.html (noting “[t]he
low-key reception given [to] ‘implementation day’” within Iran).
35
The White House, The Iran Nuclear Deal: What you need to know
about the JCPOA, at 88, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
/jcpoa_what_you_need_to_know.pdf [hereinafter “What you need to know
about the JCPOA”]; see also id. at Appendix, Key Excerpts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), at 4.
36 See U.S. TREASURY GUIDANCE REPORT, supra note 32.
37 See Barbara Slavin and Laura Rozen, Obama, Rouhani Hail Diplomacy as Americans Fly Home, AL-MONITOR (Jan. 17, 2016), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/01/obama-rouhani-praise-diplomacy-americansfreed-iran-us.html (contextualizing the statement and noting Rouhani’s concomitant assurances that Iran would not use the resources unfrozen from the
deal for hostile purposes).
38 See President Rouhani’s speech on the day of the conclusion of the 5+1
Agreement, ETTELA’AT, January 13, 2016, at P.1.
39
David E. Sanger, Iran Complies with Nuclear Deal; Sanctions Are
Lifted, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/world/
middleeast/iran-sanctions-lifted-nuclear-deal.html.
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indicate that the removal of the sanctions by the United States
was on a case-by-case basis and not categorical.40 This has been
the main cause of confusion in Iran and the major source of
complaint by the Iranian officials.41 These complaints are also
shared by the European and South American companies who
were under the impression that lifting the sanctions under the
JCPOA would result in “free trade” with Iran.
To understand the limits of free commercial transactions
between Iran and the U.S., it is important to distinguish
between nuclear-based and terrorism-based sanctions.
Generally, under the JCPOA, foreign banks and companies may
engage in commercial transactions with Iran without violating
the nuclear weapons-based sanction laws.42 However, the
United States’ primary embargo concerning terrorism-based
sanctions remains in place under existing statutory laws and
executive orders.43 The policies behind these sanctions largely
relate to Iran’s reputed activities involving state-sponsored
terrorism, disregard of basic human rights, extrajudicial
killings, aircraft sabotage, and torture. Several statutes address
these terrorist activities and their consequences.44 The JCPOA
exclusively addresses nuclear-based sanctions, and not those
sanctions based on claims as to Iran’s terrorism or human rights
violations. In commercial terms, the U.S. Department of State’s

See U.S. TREASURY GUIDANCE REPORT, supra note 32.
See The Over-promised Land, supra note 7 (“‘It was better when sanctions were still in place,’ grumbles a wheat merchant, who traded with American suppliers (OFAC approved) throughout the sanctions era. ‘At least the
banks then knew what they could and couldn’t do. Now the lawyers, not the
bankers, are making decisions, and nothing is moving.’”).
42 JCPOA, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 19(ii), 21(i); see also JCPOA Annex II, supra note 5.
43
See, e.g., Iran Threat Reduction and Syrian Human Rights Act, 22
U.S.C. § 8772 (2012); Blocking Property of the Government of Iran and Iranian
Financial Institutions, Exec. Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5,
2012). As of January 25, 2017, Executive Order 13,599 remains in effect.
44 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(A); Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107–297, 116 Stat. 2337 (amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). Throughout the past two decades, U.S. laws have facilitated the
means and ways of compensation for U.S. citizens damaged by the conduct of
terrorist groups, sponsored, or assisted, by a sovereign country. See, e.g., the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), 50 U.S.C §§ 17011707; Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 107–297, 116 Stat. 2322
(2002) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 248, 15 U.S.C. § 6701, and 28 U.S.C. §
1610).
40
41
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Office of Iran Nuclear Implementation clarified that “the United
States has no objection to foreign banks engaging with Iranian
banks and companies as long as those banks and companies are
not on our sanction list for non-nuclear reasons.”45 Most
importantly, in April 2016, in a case related to the attachment
of the Central Bank of Iran’s assets in the United States, the
U.S. Supreme Court approvingly put its judicial seal with
respect to the power of the U.S. President, in cases related to
terrorism.46
The confusion and frustration with respect to commercial
transactions with Iran, after lifting the JCPOA-related
sanctions, is not limited to Iran’s common marketplace,
colloquially referred to as the “bazaar.”47 The bazaar’s
frustration is also felt in the halls of large European companies
where executives anticipate the opportunity to do business with
Iran.48 In a statement addressed to the senior executives of some
of Europe’s largest banks, the U.S Secretary of State indicated
that “we want to make it clear that legitimate business which is
clear under the definition of the [JCPOA] agreement, is
available to banks as long as they do their normal due diligence
and know who they are dealing with. They are not going to be
held to some undefined and inappropriate standard.”49
Nevertheless, having been punished by the Treasury
Department’s OFAC office in the past, European banks have
been cautious in opening credit for Iran.50 For example, HSBC
45
Steve Mull, Letters to the Editor, ECONOMIST, May 7, 2016,
http://www.economist.com/news/letters/21698215-letters-editor.
46 See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1310.
47 See ARANG KESHAVARZIAN, BAZAAR AND STATE IN IRAN: THE POLITICS OF
THE TEHRAN MARKETPLACE 39-44 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
48 See Matthew Spivack, What to Know About Doing Business in Iran,
HARV. BUS. REV. (May 5, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/05/what-to-know-aboutdoing-business-in-iran (noting the hesitancy of European banks to provide capital for business ventures, despite strong European interest in business development in Iran); see also Ben Morris, Iran: Business Eyes New Opportunities,
BBC NEWS (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35344179.
49 Felicia Schwartz & Margot Patrick, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
Meets with European Bankers in Iran-Business Push, WALL ST. J., (May 12,
2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/kerry-meets-with-european-bankers-iniran-business-push-1463045793.
50 See e.g., Fabio Benedetti Valentini & Ladane Nasseri, Europe’s Banks
Are Staying Out of Iran, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2016, 11:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-03/europe-s-banks-hauntedby-u-s-fines-forgo-iran-deals-amid-boom (noting a record fine paid by BNP
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bank “has shunned business with Iran to meet its pledge to
follow U.S. standards on sanctions and anti-money-laundering
as part of its 2012 deferred prosecution agreement with the
Justice Department.”51
In an attempt to reduce the confusion concerning
determination as to which trade items are exempt from
sanctions restrictions, the classification below is a simple—
albeit incomplete—categorization of major items and activities
that are allowed for investment and commercial transactions,
services, and activities as a result of the lifting of sanctions:
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Banking and financial services;
Energy, petrochemical, shipping, shipbuilding;
Automotive sectors;
Iran’s port operations;
Commercial insurance, reinsurance, and underwriting
service;
Iran’s commercial activities in precious metals including
gold, raw, or semi-finished metals such as aluminum
and steel and coal; and
Software in connection with activities that are
consistent with JCPOA and the provision of associated
services for each of the above mentioned categories.52

The United States government removed individuals and
entities listed in the JCPOA from the SDN List, the so-called
FSE List (Foreign Sanctions Evaders), and the NS-ISA list (nonSDN Iran Sanctions Act List).53 Further, pursuant to its
commitments under the JCPOA, the U.S. terminated certain,

Paribas as a major factor); Standard Chartered hit by $300m in Iran fines, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-20669650 (reporting,
in 2012, that Standard Chartered agreed to pay a total of $670 million to settle
complaints brought by the U.S. federal government as well as New York State
authorities for commercial dealings with its Iranian clients); US fines Deutsche
Bank $258m for working with Iran, BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34726690. As a result of these
fines, international banks have expressed continuous caution in doing business
with Iran. See Jonathan Saul & Thomas Atkins, Global banks to steer clear of
Iran until sanctions finally go, REUTERS (July 16, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/iran-business-banks-idUSL5N0ZW3SC20150716.
51 Schwartz & Patrick, supra note 49.
52 See U.S. Treasury Guidance Report, supra note 32; 31 C.F.R. § 560
(2016); see also Morris, supra note 48.
53 See U.S. TREASURY GUIDANCE REPORT, supra note 32.
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but not all, executive orders which would preclude doing
business with Iran.54
With respect to investments and commercial transactions,
the following sanctions were lifted: (1) sanctions on Iran’s energy
and petrochemical sectors; (2) sanctions on transactions with
Iran’s shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators; (3)
sanctions on Iran’s trade in gold and other precious metals; (4)
sanctions on trade with Iran in graphic, raw or semi-finished
metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for
integrating industrial processes, in connection with activities
that are consistent with the JCPOA; and (5) sanctions on the
sale, supply, or transfer of goods and services used in connection
with Iran’s automotive sector.55
There were also certain commercial services and activities
allowed subject to special conditions. Three categories of
activities, which would otherwise be prohibited under the
Iranian Transactions and the Sanctions Regulations will be
treated as a special category.56 These transactions are allowed
provided that they do not involve individuals and entities on the
SDN List and are also consistent with the provisions of the
JCPOA as well as United States laws.
B. Iran’s Terrorism-Based Sanctions and U.S. Courts
Contrary to common belief, commercial and banking
sanctions adopted in the U.S. against Iran are not exclusively
derived from the perceived activities of Iran concerning
proliferation of nuclear products which could be used for
production of nuclear weapons. Following the aftermath of the
1983 bombing in Beirut, which killed 241 members of the U.S.
Marine Corps, and similar victims of terrorist attacks attributed
to Iran, the United States adopted various statutory laws and
executive orders imposing diverse economic (including banking)
sanctions against Iran.57 In particular, the Central Bank of Iran

54

¶ 17.1.

See JCPOA Annex II, supra note 5, ¶ 5; JCPOA Annex V, supra note 5,

JCPOA Annex II, supra note 5, ¶ 4.7.
31 C.F.R. § 560.210 (2016).
57 See Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853 (codifying criminal long-arm jurisdiction, including for inchoate acts, related to similar terrorist activities at 18 U.S.C. § 2331);
55
56
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has argued that seizure of the Bank’s assets under the
camouflage of the U.S. statutory laws or President’s executive
orders, are unconstitutional and in violation of the separation of
powers.58 In its April 2016 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
supported the position that the President’s act, concerning the
attachment of the assets belonging to the Central Bank of Iran,
was constitutional.59
Therefore, in the United States, unlike most European
countries, the justification for maintaining trade sanctions
against Iran primarily rests on Iran’s perceived policy in support
of terrorism. Such justification is delineated by statutory laws
and presidential executive orders.60 The Bank Markazi Court’s
majority opinion was clear in its support of the statutory
provision that permitted the executive branch to seize the
Central Bank of Iran’s assets, and rejected the argument that
such acts will be the usurpation of power by the executive in
violation of the separation of powers.61 The Supreme Court was
unequivocal that the President may adopt a policy for
prohibition of doing business with Iran. Further, the Bank
Markazi majority opinion unequivocally stated that, “American
nationals . . . may seek ‘money damages . . . against a foreign
state for personal injury or death that was caused by’ acts of

Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1326–27 (noting the historical background and
procedural interests giving rise to such legislation); Justin Jory, Anti-Terrorism Legislation: A Constitutional Problem, 17 BYU L. REV. 35, 36 (2006) (noting the enactment of a long-arm statute in the 1983 bombing’s aftermath). Iran
has vigorously denied awareness of, or participation in, the bombing or instigating Hezbollah to participate in aiding or abetting the acts of terrorism related to the 1983 bombing event. See Thomas Erdbrink, U.S. Ruling Over Compensation for ‘83 Beirut Bombing Riles Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2016, at A7
(“Iranian officials have repeatedly denied responsibility, however, and they accuse the United States of using the pretext of an attack to steal money that is
rightfully theirs.”). Other terrorist acts, such as the Lockerbie Bombing, have
contributed to jurisdiction over state-sponsored terrorist acts occurring abroad
applicable to the Bank Markazi case. See Flatow Amendment, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009-172 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605) (creating “Civil
Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism”).
58 Peterson v. the Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F. Supp.2d 25, 36 (D.D.C.
2007).
59 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1329.
60 See, e.g., Brett Stephens, Truth Catches the Iran Deal, WALL ST. J. (July
12,
2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/truth-catches-the-iran-deal1468278677.
61 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1329.
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terrorism, including ‘torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support’ to
terrorist activities.62“
Thus, the Supreme Court addressed two issues in its
sweeping opinion: first, with respect to the Act of State Doctrine,
the Court would maintain the validity of the suits against
foreign sovereigns (an exception to the doctrine) for the purpose
of “compelling Iran to abandon efforts to acquire a nuclear
weapons capability” that “can be effectively achieved through a
comprehensive policy that includes economic sanctions. . .”63
Moreover, courts have taken the position that the Act of State
Doctrine does not apply where the executive and legislative
branches grant express jurisdiction over terrorist acts or
attempted acts to the judiciary.64 Thus, in Bank Markazi, the
President’s seizure of the Central Bank’s assets was justifiable
because the funds were used in “support for terrorism,” and were
not under the negotiated terms of the 5+1 Agreement.65 The
statutory justification for the President’s authority was Section
8772 of the “Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act
of 2012.”66 In his vigorous and impassioned dissenting opinion,
Chief Justice John Roberts stated that Section 8772 “strips the
Bank [Markazi of Iran] of any protection that federal law,
international law, or New York State law might have offered
against respondents’ claims. That is without any analogue or
precedent.”67
The President’s executive order disrupts individuals and
corporations engaging in the financial support network for
Id. at 1317 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)).
See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, Pub. L. No.
112-158, 126 Stat. 1214, § 101 (2012) (the relevant language is codified at 22
U.S.C. § 8711).
64 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421-24,
superseded by statute on other grounds, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (Act of State
Doctrine derives from judicial concern that “passing on the validity of foreign
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s pursuit of goals both
for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international
sphere.”); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 55 (D.D.C. 2000)
(declining to apply the Act of State Doctrine where Congress and the Executive
use “the threat of legal action in the courts as an instrument of foreign policy”
by designating Iraq as a terrorist state).
65 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317, 1329.
66 22 U.S.C. § 8772.
67 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1336 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
62
63
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terrorists and terrorist organizations by “blocking property and
prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to
commit or support terrorism.”68 The order is derived from the
terrorism exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign
state statute in which “money damages are sought against a
foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an
act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage
taking, or the provision of material support” to terrorists
activities.69
As a result of Bank Markazi, Congress and the executive
branch can make legal and policy decisions concerning foreign
assets. As Chief Justice John Roberts stated, “hereafter, with
this court’s seal of approval, Congress can unabashedly pick the
winners and losers in particular pending cases. [The majority’s]
decision will indeed become a ‘blueprint for extensive expansion
of the legislative power’ at the judiciary’s expense.”70 The
Supreme Court does not directly discuss the question of
sanctions against Iran. However, it supports the authority
concerning the right of the victims of terrorist activities to sue a
foreign government and its political subdivision, particularly
where the executive branch acts in tandem with Congress.71
Therefore, Iranian assets, including commercial assets, could be
within the legal orbit of U.S. law.
Among the sanctions that remain in place are U.S. trade
embargoes against Iran concerning reputed acts of terrorism
and basic human rights violations; these sanctions persist even
after Iran’s acquiescence to the JCPOA Agreement and its
renunciation of activities related to nuclear weaponry.72 As a
Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sep. 23, 2001).
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (2008).
70 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
71 See Yishal Schwartz, Bank Markazi v. Peterson: Implications for Separation of Power, LAWFARE (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
bank-markazi-v-peterson-implications-separation-power (commenting that
“Bank Markazi . . . stands as an affirmation of Congressional power in foreign
policy. But the affirmation comes with a warning: without the President standing alongside Congress, the Court may not be so deferential.”).
72 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Lifting of Certain
U.S. Sanctions Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Implementation Day, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ jcpoa_faqs.pdf (last
updated June 8, 2016) [hereinafter U.S. Treasury JCPOA FAQ]; Katherine
Bauer, One Year Post-JCPOA, Not Post-Sanctions, WASH. INST. (July 13, 2016),
68
69
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result, U.S. corporations are subject to certain prohibitions that
enjoin them from engaging in business transactions with Iran or
its governmental subdivisions.73 Thus, the fundamental
question remains: To what extent will Iran be able to engage in
meaningful international trade on a global level?
Iran’s global commercial and investment relations must be
divided into two categories: Iran’s commercial relationship with
U.S. companies, and commercial transactions outside of the
United States. As to the first category, under Bank Markazi,
Iranian financial institutions remain persons whose property
and interests may be subject to executive order or legislative
decree.74 In the absence of an exemption or an authorization by
OFAC, sanctions blocking property and interests in property of
most Iranian individuals and corporate entities will continue.75
In addition, non-U.S. persons (corporate or actual) are most
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis /view/one-year-post-jcpoanot-post-sanctions (reporting on sanctions imposed on Iran related to its ballistic missile activities, trade with Iran, and private airline Mahan Air’s activities “on behalf of the Qods Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps.”).
73 50 U.S.C. § 4605(j); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2332d; 31 C.F.R. § 596.310;
U.S. Treasury JCPOA FAQ, supra note 72; see also generally Buhm Suk Baek,
Economic Sanctions Against Human Rights Violations, Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers. Paper 11 (2008),
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&
context=lps_clacp. These trade sanctions may be enforced on U.S. persons in case
of a foreign country’s association with acts of terror. Further, Iran could be
subject to sanctions on account of human rights violations. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, Treasury Sanctions Iranian Security Forces for
Human Rights Abuses (June 9, 2011), https://www.treasury.gov/ press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1204.aspx; Press Release, Fact Sheet: New Executive Order Targeting Iranian Officials Responsible for or Complicit in Serious
Human Rights Abuses (Sep. 30, 2010) (reporting U.S. imposition of sanctions
on Iran for “sustained and severe violation of human rights.”) The reference
was human rights abuses during the re-election campaign by Mr. Ahmadinejad
the former President of Iran. See Robin Wright, U.S. Sanctions for Human
Rights Abuses, Iran Primer, U.S. Inst. of Peace (Oct 11, 2010), http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/us-sanctions-human-rights-abuses (claiming that such
abuses included “arrest, killing, torture, blackmail and rape.”). See also Press
Release, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom,
USCIRF Applauds Obama Human Rights Sanctions on Iran (Sep. 29, 2010),
http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/uscirf-applauds-obama-human-rights-sanctions-iran. Under U.S. law, U.S. nationals may file suits
against state sponsors of terrorism in U.S. courts. See Bank Markazi, 136 S.
Ct. at 1317; see also 28 U.S.C § 1605A.
74 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317; see also 31 C.F.R. § 560.211 (2016).
75 See generally U.S. TREASURY GUIDANCE REPORT, supra note 32.
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likely also prohibited from knowingly engaging in conduct that
would seek to evade U.S. restrictions on transactions or dealings
with Iran, or that cause the export of products or services from
the United States to the Islamic Republic of Iran.76
Any U.S. prohibition concerning trade with Iran will not
apply as a sweeping generalization. It seems more likely that for
each transaction, a permit should be requested from the
regulatory agencies,77 such as post-Implementation Day OFACissued statements and licenses authorizing the conduct of
business with specific Iranian entities. Accordingly, OFAC has
implemented a case-by-case licensing and authorization system
for individuals and entities seeking to sell, export, re-export,
lease or transfer to Iran commercial passenger aircraft, and
related parts and services, for exclusively commercial passenger
aviation.78
The lifting of nuclear-related sanctions has removed some
of the conceptual and legal impediments to conducting business
with Iran. However, such a limited removal of sanctions serves
little practical benefit without legal and policy reforms in Iran’s
financial and banking fields. Moreover, Iran’s future adherence
to fundamental principles of conduct of business globally, as
provided by international organizations, such as the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(“OECD”), is another important requirement. In any
international transaction, joint venture, foreign investment, or
purchase agreement, the role of the host government concerning
its payment guarantees, depository functions, and credit
recognition by international banks is key to successful
integration into the global marketplace.
Finally, several other factors play a vital role in any
commercial agreement between a country and international
See Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Legal Alert, International Trade Law –
Sanctions on Iran Lifted – but not for Most U.S. Companies (Jan. 2016),
http://www.btlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/2016%20Alerts/Alert%20%20Sanctions%20on%20Iran%20Lifted%20%20But%20Not%20for%20Most%20U.S.%20Companies.pdf (last visited Jan.
24, 2017).
77 See id.
78 U.S. Treasury JCPOA FAQ, supra note 72; see also Maryam Jazini
Dorcheh, Status of U.S. Sanctions after Implementation of Iran Deal, N.Y. L.J.
(Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=120275106030 9/Status-of-US-Sanctions-After-Implementation-of-Iran-Deal.
76
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corporation, including the interest on the funds, inter-banking
financial communications, and the degree of recognition of the
host country’s national banks in the international community.
Bank Markazi is Iran’s central bank, and the largest in the
Middle East. In any investment and commercial transaction
between Iran and its American or European corporate partners,
participating Iranian banks, especially Bank Markazi, will play
a pivotal role. With respect to the post-sanction commercial
agreements that Iran has entered into, there are significant
legal issues and barriers in which the Central Bank of Iran is
directly involved.
The post-sanction investment and commercial agreements
between Iran and several European countries, especially France
and Italy, have significant commercial and legal implications. In
the long run, these agreements will have pivotal impact on
political posture and policy position of the Islamic Republic in
the Middle East. By signing sizeable commercial agreements
with international companies from France, Italy, China, and
(eventually) the United States, Iran has opened a gate for
provocative and intellectually challenging questions concerning
the Islamic Republic’s concept of interest and banking, the role
of the extra-constitutional economic institutions upon Iran’s
international trade, and the looming impediments caused by
institutional irregularities practiced by extra-constitutional
organizations in that country.

C. Iran’s Banking Assets in the United States and the
Opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court
1. Sovereign Immunity under U.S. Law
Contrary to the commonly accepted view, commercial
transactions between Iran and U.S. companies will be hampered
unless the current legal encumbrances facing the Islamic
government of Iran are resolved. Unlike the United States and
most of the Western European countries, the operation of the
banking system in Iran is highly centralized in the sense that
the banking system operates as part of a ministry or a
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government bureaucracy.79 Historically, Bank Melli was the
National Bank of Iran.80 Even now, it remains an integral part
of the executive branch and a de facto governmental
bureaucracy.81
Consistent with this tradition, Bank Markazi, now the
Central Bank of Iran, follows the Islamic Republic government’s
policies economically as well as in reflecting such policies upon
the banks throughout the world. At one point, the head of the
Central Bank of Iran, addressing the European Banking
Congress in reference to the nuclear deal, stated that “this is the
reason our government put forth such a substantial effort in
dialogue with the 5+1 [ostensibly a non-banking issue] in order
to reconstruct its relationship with the international
community.”82 Thus, as a governmental body, the Central Bank
often presents the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran with
respect to economic policy.
Considering the above structure and pattern of executive
operation, it is safe to say that the Central Bank of Iran is an
executive body of the Islamic government of Iran. Based on this
assumption, the Central Bank of Iran, pursuant to U.S. law,
should be treated as an integral system of the Islamic Republic
of Iran. This assumption places the Central Bank of Iran as a

79
See Ardalan Sayami, Iranian Banks Under Sanctions: Government
Looking Towards Foreign Banks, PAYVAND.COM (July 7, 2010), http://www.
payvand.com/news/10/jul/1063.html (“Ever since banks in Iran were nationalized by the government and brought under its direct control, the executive
branch sees it as its right to intervene in the most detailed aspects of banking
operations while those who deposit money into banks and constitute its main
donors, do not have any rights in electing bank managers. The result is the
absence of independence of the Central Bank from the executive branch of government.”).
80
History of Bank Melli Iran, BANK MELLI IRAN, http://www.bmi.
ir/En/BMIHistory.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2017) (reporting that Bank Melli,
as the first Iranian commercial bank, was established in 1928; it began to
gather momentum in strengthening the economic structure and development
of Iran and suspension of foreign banks’ licenses. Also reporting that Bank
Melli was instrumental in channeling credits for Iran’s productive activities).
81 Id.
82 Iranian and European Banks Prepared to Re-Establish Banking Relationships, Central Bank of The Islamic Republic Of Iran, CENTRAL BANK OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.cbi.ir/ showitem/13926.aspx, (speech by Dr. Seif, the Governor of the Central Bank of the
Islamic Republic of Iran addressing European Banking Congress).
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political instrumentality, subjecting it to customary policies and
conventional rules of international law.
Under international law, governments and other
international legal persons enjoy certain immunities from the
exercise of jurisdiction, including litigation, with respect to their
official acts.83 However, this type of immunity does not generally
apply in the event of domestic prosecutions of foreign officials for
most international crimes.84 The concept of sovereign immunity
has been traditionally established in U.S. courts.85 In the United
States, suits against the government by foreign entities require
the consent of the United States.86 Such consent, by statute, in
cases of tort or contract claims, would include suits concerning
violations of international obligations.87 Moreover, jurisdictional
requirements limit tribunals in cases involving sovereign
immunity.88 Chief Justice Marshall’s Supreme Court opinion in
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, rendered in 1812,
established that a foreign property that entered or otherwise
existed in the United States “must be considered as having come

83 See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J Rep. 3, ¶ 75 (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, and Buergenthal, noting that “. . . immunities are granted to high
State officials to guarantee the proper functioning of the network of mutual
inter-State relations, which is of paramount importance for a well-ordered and
harmonious international system.”); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14AR108, Objection to the Issue of Subpoena Duces Tecum, ¶ 38 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997), (noting the well-established customary norm that state officials “are mere instruments of a State and their official
action can only be attributed to the State. They cannot be the subject of sanctions or penalties for conduct that is not private but undertaken on behalf of
the State.”), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ blaskic/acdec/en/71029JT3.html.
84 See generally R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate et. al. [1999] 3
AC 97 (HL) (former head of state not immune with respect to acts committed
under his administration that violated the Convention Against Torture).
85 See e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
86 See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (“To sustain a claim that
the Government is liable for awards of monetary damages, the waiver of sovereign immunity must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims.”).
87 See Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 268 (D.D.C. 2004).
(“[N]ot only does precedent instruct that a waiver of sovereign immunity must
be explicit but it also teaches that such immunity cannot be implied unless a
government has “indicated its amenability to suit” even for the most heinous
of crimes against international law.”), (citing Princz v. Fed. Republic of Ger.,
26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
88 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 907, at n.2 (AM.
LAW INST. 1987); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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into the American territory, under an implied promise, that
while necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly
manner, she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the
country.”89 The denial of such immunity by another state may
create a claim for violation of international law.90
Under the original and classic international law,
jurisdictional immunity was regarded as absolute; a state could
invoke immunity irrespective of the nature of its sovereign
activities.91 At times, U.S. courts have refused to grant relief
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity even though such
sovereign may not have been recognized by the United States.92
In one case, the state court held, in part, that “our courts . . . may
not bring a foreign sovereign before our bar, not because of
comity, but because he has not submitted himself to our laws.
Without his consent he is not subject to them.”93 Justice
Marshall was an unwavering defender of sovereign immunity.
In McFaddon, he famously pronounced that “[t]he jurisdiction of
the nation, within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and

McFaddon, 11 U.S. at 147.
See id.; cf. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece
Intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J., ¶ ¶ 57-58 (Feb. 3) (while “[e]xceptions to
the immunity of the State represent a departure from the principle of sovereign
equality,” the denial of immunity itself is procedural, rather than substantive,
in nature).
91 See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, I.C.J. Reports 2012, ¶¶ 5657; cf. id. ¶ 59 (noting that “many States . . . now distinguish between acta jure
gestionis [commercial acts], in respect of which they have limited the immunity
which they claim for themselves and which they accord to others, and acta jure
imperii [public governmental acts].”). The United States has also adopted this
distinction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605; see also Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting
Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen., Dep’t of
Justice (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter] (“[T]he immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign
or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure
gestionis).”).
92 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964)
(recognizing Cuba as a foreign sovereign in U.S. courts despite the severance
of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba; ruling that “the act of state
doctrine proscribes a challenge to the validity of [a] Cuban expropriation decree” and thus precludes the exercise of jurisdiction over that decree).
93 Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372,
376 (1923); see also LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 262–263 (2d ed. 1987).
89
90
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absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by
itself.”94
Following this time-honored concept of foreign sovereign
immunity, the United States has (with certain exceptions
beyond the scope of this writing), traditionally adopted the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as the cornerstone of its
foreign policy concerning the treatment of the assets owned by,
or connected to, a foreign sovereign state.95
2. The Terrorism Exception to Sovereign Immunity
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States
passed TRIA, a significant amendment to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act.96 Under TRIA, victims of terrorism are allowed
to litigate against countries as designated by the U.S.
government to be State Sponsors of Terrorism.97 After Hezbollah
was reportedly involved in the 1983 bombing of the Beirut
Marine compound, President Reagan added Iran to the list of
state sponsors of terrorism.98 As such, the U.S. government
classifies the Islamic Republic of Iran as a sponsor of acts of
terrorism and subject to TRIA, which creates an exception to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Doctrine. TRIA’s exception is
codified as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as
provided [in this law], in every case in which a person has obtained
a judgment against a terrorist party is not immune . . . or for which
a terrorist party is not immune under [the law] . . . the blocked
assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any
agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party), shall be subject
to execution or attachment in aid of execution, in order to satisfy
such judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages for
which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable. 99

McFaddon, 11 U.S. at 136; see also Henkin, supra, note 85 at 891-979.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602 et seq. (1976).
96 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, supra note 44.
97 See id. at § 201; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7) (2012) (referencing the
terrorism exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A).
98 SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN: A GUIDE TO TARGETS, TERMS, AND TIMETABLES
3 (Gary Samore ed. 2015) [hereinafter Belfer Center Report].
99 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2)(A) (2012).
94
95
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Separately, Section 1610(g) of TRIA extends the exception
to the tradition of enforcing foreign sovereign immunity by
permitting attachment in aid of an execution of a judgment
entered. That exception provides that:
[T]he property of a foreign state against which a judgment is
entered under Section 1605A, and the property of an agency or
instrumentality of such a state, including property that is a
separate juridical entity or is an interest held directly or indirectly
in a separate juridical entity, is subject to attachment in aid of
execution, and execution upon that judgment as provided in this
section, regardless of the level of economic control over the
property by the government of the foreign state.100

This significant exception provides pivotal facilitation in
attaching specific foreign property, such as the real property in
which a member of a terrorist group has a fee simple ownership,
and restricts movement of any property in which Iran or its
instrumentalities have an interest. The only requirement for
courts to allow attachment or execution of property is evidence
that the property in question is held by a foreign entity that is
in fact an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state against
which the Court has entered judgment.101 Under this definition,
the Central Bank of Iran is an instrumentality of Iran, and its
transactions and assets in the United States are subject to the
TRIA exception to sovereign immunity.
II. U.S. Supreme Court v. Iran’s Nuclear Deal Accord
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bank
Markazi, JCPOA notwithstanding, commercial relations
between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic of Iran will remain
substantially limited. In its decision, the majority not only
endorsed the exceptions to the Act of State Doctrine, but also
enhanced the President’s power to limit commercial acts of a
foreign state’s financial and commercial agencies in the United
States.102
Specifically, the Supreme Court asserted, “the
28 U.S.C. § 1610 (g)(1)(A) (2012).
Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 807 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C.
2011); see also Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d. 1117, 1123, n. 2
(9th Cir. 2010).
102 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1310 (approving Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C. § 8772 concerning Sovereign
100
101
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Executive has historically made case specific sovereign
immunity determinations to which courts have deferred.”103
Therefore, considering the sweeping authorization granted to
the executive branch by the Supreme Court, the executive
branch (through the Department of the Treasury) may continue
to seize assets deposited with Citibank by the Central Bank of
Iran, and may distribute such assets among the victims of the
alleged acts of terrorism.104
So, what impact does the Supreme Court’s decision in Bank
Markazi have on the JCPOA accord? To answer this question,
we must first examine the relevant provision of the U.S. law
with respect to commercial transactions with Iran. The Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 makes
available a post-judgment execution of a set of banking assets
held ultimately by Citibank of New York on behalf of the Central
Bank of Iran for over 1,000 victims of terrorist acts allegedly
sponsored by Iran.105 In 2012, the President signed Executive
Order 13,599, which directly addressed the question of assets
claimed by the Central Bank of Iran.106 The order explicitly
states that:
[I]n light of the deceptive practices of [Bank Markazi] . . . To
conceal transactions of sanctioned parties . . . [a]ll property
and interests in property of the Government of Iran including
[Bank Markazi], that are in the United States . . . Or that are
or hereafter come within the possession or control of any
United States person . . . are blocked.107

In Bank Markazi, the Supreme Court was unequivocal that
based on Congressional authorization, American nationals “may
file suit against state sponsors of terrorism in the courts of the
United States.”108 The Supreme Court in Bank Markazi,
decidedly ascertained that the victims of terrorism are
authorized to, “seek money damages . . . against a foreign state
for personal injury or death that was caused by acts of terrorism
including torture, extra-judicial killing, aircraft sabotage,
Immunity determination).
103 Id. at 1317.
104 See id.
105 22 U.S.C § 8772 (2012).
106 Exec. Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012).
107 Exec. Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012).
108 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2008)).
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hostage taking, or the provision of material support to terrorist
activities.”109
The decision of the Supreme Court has resulted in blocking
$1.75 billion of the assets belonging to the Central Bank of Iran
in the United States. It is, however, estimated that the total
assets of the Central Bank of Iran in the United States may be
over $30 billion.110
In light of Bank Markazi, the TRIA exception to the
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine remains operative.111 Thus, the
Central Bank of Iran and its blocked assets in the United States
remain subject to restrictions imposed by TRIA.112 Under such
circumstances, the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, with respect
to Iran, remains non-operative in the United States.113
Therefore, future commercial agreements between Iran and U.S.
corporations will be hampered by the operation of the exception
to the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine or executive orders.
The Bank Markazi decision may have considerable impact
on another major Middle Eastern country – Saudi Arabia. That
country has a history of asserting the Act of State Doctrine as a
defense in civil litigation.114 A legislative transgression against
Saudi Arabia began on May 17, 2016, when the U.S. Senate
passed a bill authorizing the U.S. Government to sue Saudi

Id.
See Matt Pearce, Where are Iran’s billions in frozen assets, and how
soon will it get them back?, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.latimes.
com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-frozen-assets-20160120-story.html (reporting
that according to the estimates by Professor Nader Habibi of Brandeis University, the total Iranian bank assets in the United States are approximately $30
billion; further reporting that Iran’s Central Bank Chief, Valiollah Seif, has
indicated the Central Bank’s assets in the U.S. to be approximately $32 billion).
111 Id.
112 Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic
Republic of Iran v. Elahi, 556 U.S. 366, 374 (2009) (observing that TRIA permits “a person with a terrorism-related judgment to attach an asset . . . provided the asset [is] a ‘blocked asset’”).
113 See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a).
114 See, e.g., UNC Lear Servs., v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 581 F.3d 210,
214 (5th Cir. 2009) (contract-related claims); Spectrum Stores Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938, 956 (5th Cir. 2011) (claims of price-rigging by
OPEC nations, including Saudi Arabia, barred on both political question and
act of state doctrine theories); Peterson v. Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 332
F. Supp. 2d 189, 201 (D.D.C. 2004).
109
110
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Arabia in U.S. court regarding 9/11 acts of terrorism.115 In Bank
Markazi, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision
granting an exception to the Act of State Doctrine based on the
specific acts related to the claims of terrorism and abuse of
human rights by the government of Iran.116 However, other
legislative tools not exclusively limited to claims against Iran
exist, including the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (hereinafter “IEEPA”).117 Therefore, there is no justification
for the Senate’s legislative act based on seemingly political
grounds. The President has adequate ammunition to deal with
situations like these, such as the IEEPA or the President’s
executive orders. The overzealous Senate bill to abandon the
framework provided by the Act of State Doctrine has serious
political consequences. Saudi Arabia has various monetary
deposits in the United States of about $750 billion in treasury,
securities and other assets. Saudi Arabia has indicated that in
the event this bill becomes law, it might begin selling off these
assets.118
Immunity of foreign countries against judgments of
legislative powers is a facet of acta jure imperii, a principle that
foreign courts cannot judge the liability of a nation state for acts
and omissions in the exercise of the nation state’s authority.119
Thus, under international law, the U.S. Congress is operating in
a position of judgment with respect to the official governmental
acts of a foreign country.120 Such a position runs counter to

115 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 2040, 114th Cong. (2015)
(as introduced in the Senate, Sept. 16, 2015) [hereinafter JASTA].
116 See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1329.
117 91 Stat. 1625, 50 U.S.C. § 1570 (2015).
118 Mark Mazzetti, Senate Passes Bill Exposing Saudi Arabia to 9/11
Claims, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/us/
politics/senate-passes-bill-that-would-expose-saudi-arabia-to-legal-jeopardyover-9-11.html.
119 See Tate Letter, supra note 91.
120 See David Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors, OECD 18-27 (OECD Working Papers on International Investment No. 02, 2010) (noting the limitations on execution and adjudication that is the general practice of most states, and favors immunity from
jurisdiction and execution as a customary norm with respect to acta jure imperii). While immunity from jurisdiction is distinct from immunity from execution, an execution against State property generally requires a link between the
property and the original claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2).
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generally established norms of international law.121 Saudi
Arabia’s alleged involvement relates to 28 pages of the 9/11
Commission Report released by the House Intelligence
Committee.122 However, such allegations are far from clear and
this matter should not be treated haphazardly. As Lee Hamilton
and Thomas Kean, the authors of the 9/11 Commission Report,
have adroitly reacted to the news of the Senate’s bill,
“[a]ccusations of complicity in that mass murder from
responsible authorities are a grave matter . . . Such charges
should be levied with care.”123 Thus, the Bank Markazi decision
should not be interpreted by sweeping generalizations and
indiscriminate standards of judgment; in light of foreign policy
discretions, it may not prove to be universally applicable.
The extra-constitutional institutions under the present
system of social order in Iran are organizations which are not
part of the official body of the government.124 Nevertheless,
these organizations function as semi-governmental entities.125
Whether the extra-constitutional institutions of Iran should be
subject to the acts of foreign states such as the United States is
an important question. According to the late Professor
McDougal, “the competences over individuals achieved by states
under . . . [p]rimary principles of jurisdiction are not lessened by
certain secondary allocations of competence under such

See Gaukrodger, supra note 120.
Jim Sciutto, Ryan Browne & Deirdre Walsh, Congress releases secret
‘28 pages’ on alleged Saudi 9/11 ties, CNN (July 15, 2016, 10:44 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/15/politics/congress-releases-28-pages-saudis-911/.
123 See Thomas Kean & Lee Hamilton, Flashback - 28 pages reveal nothing new: 9/11 Commission chairmen, USA TODAY (Apr. 27, 2016),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/04/27/911-report-28-pagessaudi-arabia-kean-hamilton/83597386/; see also Carol Giacomo, A Warning
About the Secret 9/11 Pages, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE BLOG (Apr. 27, 2016),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/04/27/a-warning-about-the-secret911-pages/.
124 See Mehran Kamrava & Houchang Hassan-Yari, Suspended Equilibrium in Iran’s Political System, 94 MUSLIM WORLD 495, 508-512 (2004) (noting
the presence of “informal power centers” in Iran that are “under the control of
the Supreme Leader, that exert considerable power.” These include “Representatives of the Leader,” pervasive in state organs, including universities;
Bonyads, “powerful public enterprise foundations tasked with specific economic functions,” including charity or veterans’ affairs; Friday Prayer Imams;
and the Special Court for the Clergy).
125 Id.
121
122
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doctrines as those of act of state and sovereign immunity.”126 In
other words, the state courts will not, or should not, deny their
own jurisdiction with respect to the acts of foreign states
disregarding certain fundamental principles of international
law or state laws, i.e., laws concerning terrorism. It seems that
this view has been adopted where the targeted acts are within
the category of “state sponsored acts of terrorism.” According to
the Supreme Court,
American nationals may file suit against state sponsors of
terrorism in the courts of the United States . . . Specifically,
they may seek “money damages . . . against a foreign state for
personal injury or death that was caused by” acts of terrorism,
including “torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage,
hostage taking, or the provision of material support.”127

Thus, to qualify as acts by “state sponsors of terrorism”
under the prohibitive language of Bank Markazi, such acts must
be either undertaken directly by the state, or by state-sponsored
or state-directed organizations. As a result, the illicit acts
undertaken by an unaffiliated non-state party (e.g., private
corporate entities of Iran) would likely not be acts directed by
the government of Iran, and the terrorism exception statutes
would not apply.
It is conceivable that based on Bank Markazi (coupled with
the statutory laws and accompanying President’s executive
orders), the Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran (“IRGC,”
“Sepah Pasdaran Engelabeh Islami” or “Pasdaran”) may qualify
as a “state sponsored organization.”128 However, the extent to
which the Revolutionary Guards are constitutionally within the
orbit of the government of Iran is an open question. Under the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, organized in the
early days of the triumph of the Revolution, is to be maintained
so that it may continue its role of guarding the Revolution and

126
MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL, & LUNG-CHU CHEN,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 216 (Yale Univ. Press 1977).
127 See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317 (emphasis added).
128 RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI, [KASHF AL-ĀSRĀR] [UNVEILING OF SECRETS] 65,
(Sherkat Ketab 1943). Today the mission of charity is a comparatively insignificant part of the IRGC’s vast scheme of activities. See generally GOLKAR,
supra note 27.
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its achievements. The scope of the duties of these corps and
areas of its responsibility . . . to be determined by law. . .129

A strict textual reading does not indicate whether or not this
organization is part of a constitutional governmental branch in
the Islamic Republic of Iran. This question was not addressed in
the fact-finding District Court in Bank Markazi, and
consequently, it did not come under judicial inquiry or part of
the discussion in the appellate phase of the case in either the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States.130
The official activities of the IRGC could be divided into three
basic categories; military, economic, and ideological. It must be
noted that neither the vast military nor the extensive economic
institutions, functioning under the network of the IRGC, are
subject to any official government ministry or bureaucracy.131 In
terms of its military activities, the IRGC has its own Navy,
Army, and Air Force. These are separate military entities that
do not report to the President. In the past, the IRGC’s military,
when necessary, has entered into defense arrangements with
other countries. For example it has undertaken to acquire
vessels including military speedboats from Italy.132 The IRGC
also has a record of contacting other countries such as South
Africa, Austria, and Pakistan to bolster its military strength or
for social wellness such as combating drug epidemics.133
Moreover, the IRGC, through its Quds Force, maintains a
combination of militarily and ideologically related activities.134

129 ISLAHAT VA TAQYYRATI VA TATMIMAH QANUNI ASSASSI [AMENDMENT TO
THE CONSTITUTION] 1368 [1989] (Iran), art. 150. At present, the vast and inter-

twined network of the activities of the Revolutionary Guards far exceed the
targeted singular original constitutional mission as the “Guardians of the Revolution.”
130 See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10-CIV-4518, 2013 WL
1155576 (May 20, 2013).
131 See CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, art. 110 (delineating that the Leader shall appoint the Commander in Chief of the “Pasdaran,”
or Revolutionary Guards).
132 See Giulio Meotti, The Rome-Tehran Axis, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2010
4:27 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703510
304574625620914295450 (reporting Italian Boat Manufacturer FB Design’s
admission that it “regularly sold design and technology to the Iranian secret
services”).
133
See EMANUELE OTTOLENGHI, THE PASDARAN: INSIDE IRAN’S ISLAMIC
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS 50–53 (FDD Press 2011).
134 See Dexter Filkins, The Shadow Commander, NEW YORKER (Sept. 30,
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The military branch of the IRGC is a dynamic force driven by
transformative military technologies.135
The IRGC also has vast economic power, exemplified by its
active participation in economic activities throughout Iran.
Estimates suggest that the IRGC controls a total of 25% to 40%
of Iran’s gross domestic product (GDP).136 According to a report
by the Department of the Treasury to the U.S. Congress, the
IRGC has historically undertaken a coordinated campaign to sell
Iranian oil to evade international sanctions. In fact, the
Treasury Department reported that at one point, the IRGC was
“Iran’s most powerful economic actor dominating many sectors
of the economy including energy. . .”137 The Treasury Report
went to the extreme in that it called the National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC) “an agent or affiliate of Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps”. In order to coordinate Iran’s oil
policy during the sanction period, the IRGC has supervised the
management of Iran’s production and exports of petroleum and
petroleum product; according to the Department of the
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow- comman
der (reporting that the Quds force has become “an organization with extraordinary reach, with branches focused on intelligence, finance, politics, sabotage,
and special operations . . . divided between combatants and those who train
and oversee foreign assets”).
135 See Michael Knights, Rising to Iran’s Challenge: GCC Military Capability and U.S. Security Co-operation, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, at ix (June 2013), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/ Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus127_Knights.pdf. The IRGC’s military is a major
countervailing force in the Persian Gulf vis-à-vis the Gulf Co-operation Council
(GCC).
136 OTTOLENGHI, supra note 133, at 43; see also Entering the Iranian Market: Opportunities and Risks, KPMG, at 4 (Jan. 2016), https://home.kpmg.
com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/02/Entering-the-Iranian-Market-Opportunties-and-Risks-KPMG.pdf (“Some estimates suggest the IRGC controls a
third of the country’s GDP, using holding companies and ‘bonyads’, charitable
organisations that carry tax-exempt status and are involved in an array of consumer goods production.”). Based on the last available figures Iran’s GDP in
2014 was approximately $425.33 billion. In 2011 it reached $592 billion. See
World
Bank
–
Iran,
Islamic
Rep.,
WORLDBANK.ORG,
http://data.worldbank.org/country/iran-islamic-rep?view= chart (last visited
Jan. 24, 2017).
137 Press Release, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, Treasury Submits Report to Congress on NIOC and NITC (Sept. 24, 2012), https://www.treasury. gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/tg1718.aspx [hereinafter NIOC and NITC Press
Release]. The Department of the Treasury’s report was issued as a result of
requirements provided in The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights
Act of 2012 (ITRSHA). See 22 U.S.C. § 8773.
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Treasury, in one case Iran’s Islamic Assembly (the Parliament)
approved the appointment of a high-ranking military official of
the IRGC, Brigadier General Rostam Qasemi, to serve as Iran’s
Minister of Petroleum.138 One of the major activities of the IRGC
is to secure contractual bids for trade and development of Iran’s
infrastructure.139 The IRGC undertakes its bidding and
construction activities mainly through an organization called
Khatam-al-Anbia, both an engineering firm and one of Iran’s
leading industrial contractors.140 Khatam-al-Anbia has 812
subsidiaries throughout Iran and has about 40,000 employees.
It has reportedly 1/17,000 no-bid contracts primarily in the
energy sector, and has also won a $1.2 billion contract to build a
line on the Tehran Metro. 141 At times, there are no substantive
and genuine bidding for the sister companies of the IRGC.142
According to an expert writing in the United States Institute of
Peace, over the course of 25 years, “the Guards [have become]
Iran’s largest economic force.”143
The extra-constitutional organizations in Iran are not
limited to the IRGC. The ideological activities of the IRGC
include a vast umbrella of organizations. Under this
institutional umbrella, there is an expansive array of organized
groups covering charitable and ideological foundations.144 These
agencies function through subsidiary companies and enterprises
as diverse as spreading propagation of piety, combating against
See NIOC and NITC Press Release, supra note 137.
Id. (“Prior to his appointment, Qasemi was the commander of Khatam
Al-Anbia, a construction and development wing of the IRGC that generates
income and funds operations for the IRGC.”).
140
See IRGC Campaign, UNITED AGAINST NUCLEAR IRAN,
http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/irgc (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). The
name “Khatam-al-Anbia” references the “Seal of the Prophets.” In Islam, the
Prophet Mohammed is revered as the last prophet. See KORAN, Al-Ahzab,
33:40.
141 See UNITED AGAINST NUCLEAR IRAN, supra note 140.
142
See Parisa Hafezi, Iran’s Elite Guards to Gain Regional Economic
Power in Post-Sanction Era, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.reuters.com
/article/us-iran-sanctions-guards-insight-idUSKCN0UX2M3.
143 Alireza Nader, The Revolutionary Guards, THE IRAN PRIMER, United
States Institute of Peace, http://iranprimer.usip.org/sites/default/files/
Military_Nader_Revolutionary%20Guards.pdf (updated as of August 2015).
144 See FREDERIC WEHREY ET AL ., THE RISE OF THE PASDARAN: ASSESSING
THE DOMESTIC ROLES OF IRAN’S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS 56–64
(RAND Corp. 2009), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs
/2008/RAND_MG821.pdf.
138
139
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immoral decorum, blasphemous or sinful conducts, and holding
unethical gatherings and ceremonies in private homes. Their
activities also include policing the propriety of individuals’
appearance in public, and behavior against public pieties and
moral or Islamic virtues.145
There are several other entities in the same category,
although they are not a match to the IRGC in terms of their
economic power, political authority and social command.146
These extra-constitutional entities are not within the
jurisdiction of any ministry and act independent from the official
bureaucracy of the government. According to a study by the
RAND Corporation:
Rather than framing the IRGC as a purely military
organization marked by mafia-type economic tendencies and a
homogeneous ideological outlook, this monograph has
surveyed its broad ranging roles in Iranian society and its
emerging internal divisions. Our analysis underscores that the
twin poles of commonly held assumptions about the IRGC are
both incorrect.
The IRGC is neither a corrupt gang nor is it a firebrand
revolutionary vanguard with the aim of exporting Iran’s
revolution across the region.
Rather, its vested and increasing interests in the country’s
economy make it an increasingly conservative force rather
than a radical one.147

Bank Markazi does not address whether the plaintiffs’
§1605A claim may properly attach assets belonging to “nongovernmental” or extra-constitutional entities. Instead, the
main focus of the Supreme Court in Bank Markazi was the
constitutionality of the statutes and certain executive powers
concerning limitations to, and exceptions on, the sovereign

145 See id. The functions related to maintaining public morality and virtues are the responsibility of an associate organization called the Basij. See
GOLKAR, supra note 27, at 1-69 for a history of the Basij and its activities.
146 These organizations include the Office of the Great Leader, the Office
of the command of Imam Khomeini under the Supervision of the Leader, the
Council of Cultural Revolution and a few other establishments. See LAURA
SECOR, CHILDREN OF PARADISE THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF IRAN 35–36,109
(Riverhead Books 2016) for the factions in Revolutionary Guards during the
early days in the Islamic Revolution.
147 WEHREY ET AL., supra note 144, at 92.
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immunity derived from the Act of State Doctrine. 148 Therefore,
in a commercial agreement between a U.S. corporation and a
non-state Iranian corporate entity, certain assets under an
extra-constitutional entity’s control may be within a plaintiff’s
reach under Bank Markazi.
III. Ideological and Legal Constraints Related to
Banking in Iran
The post-sanction international commercial transactions
engaged in by Iran do not enjoy the same creditworthiness as is
customary in most transnational commercial transactions. Some
of these limitations are internal, and as time passes, they will be
curtailed, if not eliminated. Limitations with respect to
international commercial transactions facing Iran can be
divided into two parts: First, the ideological, structural and
operational issues concerning Iran’s banking policy, and second,
constraints as a matter of public policy.
With respect to the first limitation, the Central Bank of Iran
does not enjoy prerequisite independence in dealing with the
inflationary economy of the country. According to a report by the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), “While a decade of
financial and economic isolation has taken its toll on the
country’s banking system, populist policies under former
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad . . . have left the country
undercapitalized with a high percentage of non-performing
loans—as high as 20 percent, according to some estimates.”149
In a joint annual meeting between the IMF, the World Bank
Group, and Iranian representatives, Ali Tayyeb Nia, Iran’s
Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, indicated without
hesitation that as a result of President Rohani’s reformist
policies, the “inflation rate has decreased from 40% in
September 2013 to 21% in September 2014,” with less than 20%
inflation projected for subsequent years.150 In Iran, the most
See Bank Markazi, 136 S.Ct. at 1310.
Aaron Arnold, The Real Threat to the Iran Deal: Tehran’s Banking
System, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 22, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/thereal-threat-to-the-iran-deal-tehrans-banking-system/.
150
Dr. Ali Tayyeb Nia, Iran’s Minister of Economics, Governor of the
Bank for the Islamic Republic of Iran, Governor’s Statement No. 7 at the 2014
Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund World Bank Group (Oct.
10, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/am/2014/speeches/pr07e.pdf.
148
149
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significant categories in the consumer pricing index are
primarily housing, electricity, gas and other fuels, totaling 29%
of the consumer price index.151
Nevertheless, the overall fiscal deficit in 2015 declined from
2.25% of the GDP to 1.25% of the GDP, thanks to largely
eliminating the popular, but economically pernicious, subsidies
policy adopted during the presidency of Mr. Ahmadinejad.152
A. Islamic Ideology Concerning Interest
In a pure Islamic banking system, interest is categorically
forbidden.153 Therefore, capital enhancement through usury is a
strictly forbidden practice.154 Nevertheless, unlike engaging in
usury, it must be noted that trading has been permitted in
Islam.155 Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic
Revolution of Iran, has condemned usury as included in the
category of “[t]he lascivious and immoral acts including the
shameful act of unveiling women, dancing and swimming of
young girls and boys, drinking alcoholic beverages and engaging
in usurious business.”156

151
See Iranian Inflation Rate, TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.
tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
152 See IMF, 2015 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and
Statement by the Executive Director for the Islamic Republic of Iran, Annual
Report 2015, Report No. 15/349, at 6 (Dec. 2015), https://www.imf.org/ external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15349.pdf [hereinafter IMF 2015 Iran Report].
153 See KORAN, Al-Baqara, 2:276 (“God does not bless usury, and he causes
charitable deeds to prosper, and God does not love any ungrateful sinner”).
Based on the prohibitive Surat of the Koran, and various pronouncements of
the Islamic theologians, interest on money is categorically forbidden.
154 KORAN, Al-Baqara, 2:278 (“O, you who believed be careful of [your duty
to] God and relinquish what remains [due] from usury, if you are believers.”)
KORAN, Al-Emran, 4:130 (“O you who believed do not devour usury, making it
double and the readable and be careful of [your duty] to God that you may be
successful.”); KORAN, Al-Nisa, 4-161 (“Taking usury though indeed they were
forbidden and devouring the property of people falsely and we have prepared
for the unbelievers from among them a painful chastisement.”); KORAN, ArRom, 30:39 (“And whatever you lay out as usury, so that it may increase in the
property of man, it shall not increase [its value] with God.”).
155 KORAN, Al-Bagharah, 2: 275 (“Those who engage in Riba [interest] will
not stand on the Day of Resurrection . . . whoever receives an admonishment
from his Lord and then stops engaging in usury shall not be punished for the
past conduct . . . but whoever returns [to usury] are the dwellers of the fire.”).
156 KHOMEINI, supra note 128, at 65 (translated by the author).
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Some Iranian clerics have considered interest as merely an
exchange of money for money, selling the present cash to a long
term or predetermined time of calendar days.157 According to
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Leader of the Islamic Republic, if
parties to monetary transactions undertake such transactions in
order to escape the prohibited nature of the interest and, in
reality, the transaction is to gain interest, it would be considered
“haram” (forbidden).158 According to an Iranian professor from
Beheshti School of Law, “[t]he outcast nature of interest in Islam
is definitive and is not subject to doubt or debate.”159 In some
jurisdictions outside Iran, a 12% annual interest rate may be
acceptable. However, this view is rejected by Iranian clerics.
That is, no matter how small the rate of interest is, it would be
considered as an additional mandatory exchange and thus
becomes taboo.
B. Treatment of Interest under the Law of Iran
The prohibition of interest on banking and monetary
transactions in Iran is not confined to debates by the interested
groups, participants in Islamic mosques and seminaries, or
participants in meetings of ecclesiastical deliberations. The
issue of giving or taking interest in Iran has indeed more
temporal and serious consequences. Twenty-eight years after
the Islamic Revolution, the Criminal Code of Iran was amended
to reflect the clerical prohibition concerning interest. The
amended law squarely and directly addresses the issue of giving
or taking interest. The Criminal Code of Iran, under the title of
“Bribery, Interest and Fraudulent Conduct,” among other
actions punishable by law, addresses the question of giving or
taking interest. Article 595 of the Criminal Code, ratified by the
Islamic National Assembly is as follows:

157 See Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, Banking Transactions from the Perspective of the Shia Ayatollahs, Institute of Monetary Research of the Central
Bank of Iran, at 206 (2008).
158
See FAQ, THE OFFICE OF THE SUPREME LEADER, GRAND AYATOLLAH
SAYYID ALI HOSSENINI KHAMENEI, http://www.leader.ir/tree/index.php?catid
=38 (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
159 See MOHAMMED SOLTANY, BANKING LAW 2d Ed. 39 (Mizan Legal Foundation 2015).
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Any agreement between two, or among several, individuals
based on any agreement including purchase, borrowing money
or exchange of money, and alike, to buy, borrow, accept [money]
and alike, with the condition of receiving additional sums for
[re]payment, will be considered as usury and [therefore,] a
criminal conduct. Persons who commit such acts, whether the
receiver or the payer of such interest, shall be convicted to
between six months to three years’ incarceration and up to 74
lashes as well as payment of sums equal to the amount of
interest, as [his/her] financial punishment. 160

Thus, according to the Islamic Criminal Code of Iran, giving or
taking interest is statutorily a criminal offense and punishable
by law.
The
statutory
and
Sharia-based
prohibitions
notwithstanding, the banking business in Iran is thriving.
Presently in Iran, approximately 75% of adults have a bank
account, and some Iranian banks are considerably large.161 In
fact one study shows that five of the largest Iranian banks are
among the top 1,000 banks in the world. Further, Iran’s banks
hold over a third of the total Islamic banking assets globally.162
The middle class and the ordinary people, despite such pungent
and stern prohibition of interest-based transactions, are
routinely engaged in interest generating banking.
So how, despite the fierce and torrential religious and legal
prohibition on giving or taking interest, have the Iranian banks
been able to provide interest to depositors? Of course, both the
religious taboo and the legal prohibitions concerning
interest operate. Under the patrimonial system, such acts are
considered to be elements of corrupt behavior. However, the
answer to the interest bearing corrupt conduct, otherwise
forbidden by law, could also be found in the patrimonial code of
conduct.

MAJMUAHI QAVANINI JAZAI [CODE OF CRIMINAL LAWS], art. 595 [1996]
(Iran) (translated by the author).
161 MOHAMMAD R. JAHAN-PARVAR, THE PRACTICE OF CENTRAL BANKING IN
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: IS THERE ROOM FOR REFORM? 8 (2013),
http://www.li.com/docs/default-source/future-of-iran/the-future-of-iran-(economy)-the-practice-of-central-banking-in-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-is-thereroom-for-reform-pdf.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
162 See Top 1000 World Banks, THE BANKER, http://www.thebanker.com
(last visited Aug. 21, 2016).
160
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C. Judicial Accommodations Concerning Interest
To overcome the prohibitive position of the Islamic Criminal
Code of Iran, one might attempt to classify a banking
transaction as something else. The most common classification
for an Iranian banking transaction is a “partnership.” There is
no prohibition, religious or under the law, for a bank in Iran to
enter into a legitimate and lawful “partnership agreement” with
its client; the depositor. In a partnership, the bank will pay a
fixed amount of funds to the depositor (the partner). Classifying
transactions as a “partnership” provides a platform for ordinary
banking transactions, and the depositor will, theoretically
participate in a “partnership” scheme by depositing partnershipbased cash. The partnership scheme is best illustrated as
follows:
1. The depositor (D) provides funds in the bank and, thereby,
becomes a partner in a fictitious business project (such as
construction or investment, etc.).
2. The bank (B) collects capital (accumulation of funds
received from various depositors such as D) to the hypothetical
project. (It may be that the bank will provide a loan to a de
facto business entity or, alternatively, will wait until a suitable
business entity could be found).
3. The depositor (D), under the rubric of partnership, becomes
a de jure partner of the construction project.
4. Periodically, the depositor (D) receives a fixed amount of
funds from the bank as the depositor’s share of profit in such
partnership agreement.
5. The depositor’s right over the periodical payments is not,
(in theory only), based on the “percentage” of the interest to be
paid by the bank. Such pattern of payment would be: a) against
the principles of Islamic law; and b) in violation of the Islamic
Criminal Code of Iran.
6. The Bank will periodically pay a fixed amount of funds to
the depositor. In reality, however, such fixed amount will be
equal to the otherwise pre-arranged percentage that the
Government of Iran and the Central Bank of Iran have
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determined at the time to be the monetary interest for the
country.163

In applying the above-mentioned scheme, banks can engage
normal interest paying financial institutions without exposing
themselves to religious constraints or the punitive action as
provided in the Criminal Code. According to Business Monitor
International, “[t]heoretically, the Iranian banks are Islamic
institutions. In practice, earnings rates and other metrics are
dictated by the government – and not necessarily according to
commercial needs. The Iranian banks are not generally regarded
as Islamic institutions by the rest of the Islamic world.”164
In the above scenario, the payment to the depositor of the
funds by the bank is based on a perceived profit received by the
customer of the bank in a de jure partnership. Unlike genuine
partnerships, however, such income is fixed. Therefore, the
parties (the bank and the depositor) effectively designate the
depositor as a de jure partner who shares in the profits
associated with the perceived partnership.
It must be noted that due to a hyper-inflationary economy,
interest rates in Iran in the recent past have reached 16.2% to
19.7% annually.165 Depositors use the high interest rate as an
attempt to escape from the diminishing value, and purchasing
power, of the Iranian Riyal. According to one observer, “Iran is
one of a handful of countries that have sustained double-digit
inflation for over three decades. Zimbabwe and Venezuela are
among the other members of this group.”166 Despite the high
returns on deposited funds with de facto interest rates, it has not
worked well. According to a Coface report issued in March 2016,
a European economic research group, the Iranian banking sector
is primarily dominated by state-owned banks.167
MAJMUAHI QAVANINI JAZAI [CODE OF CRIMINAL LAWS], art. 595 (translated by the author).
164 Business Monitor International, Iran Commercial Banking Report, Q1
2014, at 9 (on file with the author).
165 See IMF 2015 Iran Report, supra note 152, at 10.
166 JAHAN-PARVAR, supra note 161, at 3.
167 The Group Mediterranean and Africa Economists, Iran: Sharp Turn
Ahead, Drive Carefully, COFACE, 9 (Mar. 2016), http://www.coface.com/NewsPublications/Publications/Iran-sharp-turn-ahead-drive-carefully [hereinafter
Coface 2016 Iran Report] (stating that “[t]he Iranian banking sector is dominated by state-owned banks. Six of the largest are commercial banks (the main
one being Bank Melli) and five are specialised banks. Iranian banks operate
163
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Another problem with the Iranian banking operation is that
it competes with unlicensed individuals (Havaleh) and financial
institutions. These individuals and businesses act on the basis
of mutual trust, and can absorb up to 16% of deposits in some
cases. However, the ability of the banking system in Iran to meet
the rising post-sanction financial needs associated with the
expected growth is questionable. The contribution made by the
financial institutions to the economy’s growth via banking credit
“is not efficient and is heavily controlled by the authorities.”168
As one expert has observed, “[r]eal interest rates that remain
negative for extended periods typically herald flight of capital, a
perennial feature. Capital owners are reluctant to commit to
long term investment. In short, it [has resulted] in the
misallocation of resources and loss in economic efficiency.”169
D. Customary Requirements for Commercial Transactions
with Iran
Considering the above, as will be seen later, despite the
relative and moderate resumption of certain transactions
between Iran and a few countries, the channels of credit in the
United States will not be readily available to Iran. According to
the U.S. Export-Import Bank (“U.S. Exim Bank”), “Iran is still
closed to [U.S.] companies. President Obama [had] made
enormous progress but in terms of trade, it’s still closed. I don’t
know what the future is but they’re still registered as statesponsored terrorism.”170
In many cases, the sources of credit for international
commercial transactions are not different from credit for
national transactions. They involve the prerequisite banking
credit and security similar to those normally found in

according to Islamic principles. The strengthening of sanctions and 2012 and
the exclusion of Iranian banks from the international trading system have enfeebled the banking sector. Their profitability remains low and the return on
assets was estimated at only 1% in 2012/2013.”).
168 Id.
169 JAHAN-PARVAR, supra note 161, at 8.
170 Melodie Michel, Who will finance Iran’s €40bn of deals with Europe?,
GLOBAL TRADE REVIEW (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.gtreview.com/news/mena
/who-will-finance-irans-e40bn-of-deals-with-europe/ (statement of Fred
Hochberg, Chairman of the U.S. Exim Bank). The U.S. Exim Bank has also
been a longtime supporter of Boeing, a U.S. Company. See id.
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transactions that do not cross-national borders. Commercial
transactions with Iran will require various forms of contractual
arrangements, credit facilities and financial security. Many of
these instrumentalities are normally operative and available in
transnational commercial agreements as well as in transactions
that do not cross-national borders.
A commercial or investment transaction with Iran will
require the basic sales agreement between the seller country and
Iran, and Iran’s application for letter of credit with its
corresponding bank in Iran. Any transaction with Iran will
involve the following:
a)
The letter of credit whereby the Iranian bank will
commit itself to the European or American company on
certain conditions. The letter of credit will probably be
forwarded through the seller’s bank which will act as agent.
b)
The contract for shipping the products to Iran (usually
in the form of a bill of lading).
c)
The contract for insurance of the cargo.
d)
The security interests in the products Iran is buying (in
case the Iranian buyer is borrowing from the domestic bank
to pay for the products).
e)
A bill of exchange forwarded by the seller with the bill
of lading.
In any transnational commercial transaction, the seller
performing such a transaction would rely on the buyer’s
creditworthiness, as established by the respective banks. Due to
the absence of any active commercial relationship between Iran
and European or American sellers in recent memory, such
sellers may prefer to use their own financing arrangements
related to the commercial transaction. For example, a French
seller may borrow money on the strength of its own financial and
credit history. To add to the complexity of the transaction, there
are a number of legal requirements and regulatory regimes on
the part of the Western European companies concerning tariffs
and customs, shipping contracts, the power of the banks to issue
letters of credit, and parameters for financing international
commercial transactions. Significant issues related to conflict of
laws may emerge between the Western corporate partners and
entities operating within the Islamic Republic of Iran.
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IV. Iran’s International Commercial Transactions
and Global Security Issues
As a result of the JCPOA, Iran is permitted to engage in
limited commercial transactions with the international
community.171 Further, European banks are able to release at
least 100 billion dollars of Iranian funds.172 Iranian banks will
have access to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (“SWIFT”) network. Access to SWIFT will
enable Iran to transfer funds across the global electronic
banking system.173 Despite the post-JCPOA facilities available
to the Islamic Republic, however, Iran could still face problems
and difficulties in the conduct of its international commercial
transactions.
A. Iran’s Position with Respect to International Financial
Organizations.
The main impediments to Iran’s international banking
transactions are not because of the prohibition of money interest
under the laws of Iran,174 nor are they due to the strict Islamic
treatment of interest.175 Rather, Iran’s main obstructions with
See JCPOA, supra note 5, ¶¶ 19, 21.
Matt Pearce, Iran’s Frozen Money has Begun to Thaw, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-frozen-assets-20160120-story.html (reporting a statement made to the U.S. Congress by
David S. Cohen, former Undersecretary of Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence).
173 Patrick M Connorton, Tracking Terrorist Financing Through Swift:
When U.S. Subpoenas and Forgery Privacy Law Collide 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
283, 287 (reporting that SWIFT was founded in 1973 with a group of 239 banks
from 15 countries, and that the founding banks hoped to create “a shared
worldwide data processing and communications link and a common language
for international financial transactions.”). SWIFT is an internationally recognized identification code used by banks for global funds transfers, and is used
for international financial transactions among the member banks worldwide.
Without the membership in SWIFT, financial messages by banks could not be
transferred promptly and securely. With thousands of member organizations
all over the globe, Swift provides instructions to financial institutions. Virtually “every major commercial bank, as well as brokerage houses, fund messages
and the stock exchanges, use its services.” See Eric Lichtblau and James Risen,
Bank Data Shifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006,
at A1.
174 MAJMUAHI QAVANINI JAZAI [CODE OF CRIMINAL LAWS], art. 595 [1996]
(Iran).
175 See KORAN, Al-Baqara, 2:276.
171
172
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respect to international banking operations are derived from its
pursuit of two-dimensional policy concerning international
banking transactions.176 While making a considerable effort to
establish customary financial relations with a global banking
system, the Central Bank of Iran is simultaneously constrained
with the pursuit of ideologically oriented financial policies
started since the 1979 Revolution.177 These policies primarily
relate to claims concerning money laundering and terrorist
financing. On May 17, 2016, for the first time after the Islamic
Revolution of 1979, and in an overall and on-the-scene
examination of the banking policy and operation of Iran, the IMF
Deputy made the following announcement concerning Iran’s
international banking policy:
Two important priorities for the short term relate to the
banking system. First, it will be critical to begin restructuring
banks – both at their operational level and their high level of
non-performing loans . . . Second, given the difficulties for
Iranian banks in reintegrating to the international financial
system, the authorities should persevere with strengthening
the framework for anti-money laundering and combating the
financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), which should be critical to
facilitate such reintegration.178

Thus, in order for Iran to conduct international trade with the
help of the international banking system, there is a crucial need
to reform those policies concerning money laundering and
Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Iran’s ‘outdated’ banks hamper efforts to rejoin
global economy, FT.COM (Jan. 19, 2016), http://on.ft.com/1ZK0ko0 (reporting
that “Iran’s lenders — most of which are nominally private but affiliated to
state bodies — have long operated with low capital adequacy requirements and
inadequate regulatory and supervisory mechanisms. They were further weakened by the policies of [Mahmoud Ahmadinejad], who forced them to provide
cheap loans to small businesses and the poor, as well as the sanctions.”).
177 See Ebrahim Hosseini-Nasab & Yousef Shabbani Balanchi, Government Banking and Economic Growth in Iran, 8 IRANIAN ECON. REV. 23, 26-30
(2003) (providing an overview of the Central Bank’s efforts and Iranian government policies with respect to banking); see also Sima Motamen-Samadian,
The Role of Government in the Iranian Banking System, 2001-11, in IRAN AND
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: PETRO POPULISM, ISLAM AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
(Parvin Alizadeh & Hassan Hakimian eds., 2014).
178 Press Release, Statement by Mr. David Lipton, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, at the Conclusion of his Visit to Iran, No. 16/224 (May
17, 2016), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/ 14/01/49/ pr16224.
Mr. Lipton was the first senior IMF official to visit Iran since the 1979 Islamic
Revolution.
176
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financing international groups that Western states consider to
be security risks.179 Established in 1989 by the G7 Heads of the
States or governments and the President of the European
Commission, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) is a
global anti-terrorism and anti-money-laundering financial
watchdog that observes the financial activities of various
countries with respect to their contribution to terrorism
degrading global security.180 The Islamic Republic of Iran is a
member state of the FATF. However, a major banking and
credit-related problem facing the Islamic Republic of Iran
concerns its international transactions with the world
community in general, and the FATF in particular, such as the
periodical policy declarations that the FATF requires.
The FATF issued a public statement in early 2016
concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran:
The FATF reaffirms its call on members and urges all
jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give
special attention to business relationships and transactions
with Iran, including Iranian companies and financial
institutions. . . . The FATF urges Iran to immediately and
meaningfully address its . . . deficiencies, in particular by
criminalising terrorist financing and effectively implementing
suspicious transaction reporting requirements. 181

Thus, a major impediment to Iran’s international trade is
political in nature. Although Iranian oil—and, to a lesser extent,
agricultural goods—will return to the global market, and foreign
financial institutions, banks, and corporations will legally be
able to renew business with the Islamic Republic of Iran, several
key restrictions, which started in 1983, remain potent. These
restrictions are associated with Iran’s reported state-sponsored
acts of terrorism, its weapons program, and its human rights

179 See Stuart Levey, Kerry’s Peculiar Message about Iran for European
Banks, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/kerrys-peculiar-message-about-iran-for-european-banks-1463093348. Mr. Levey was the
former Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of Treasury.
180 The G7 Heads of State is an informal block of industrialized democracies composed of the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, the
United Kingdom and Japan. Until 2014 Russia was a member of the Group
(then termed the G8). However, after the annexation of Crimea in March 1998
Russia’s membership was suspended.
181 FATF Public Statement – 19 February 2016, supra note 16.
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violations.182 Further, embargo-related restrictions prohibiting
the export of arms and missiles to Iran for a period of five years
and eight years, respectively, will remain operative, and must
be enforced by all members of the United Nations.183
The main issue concerning Iran’s standing in gaining the
trust of the international community regards the perception of
international financial organizations concerning Iran’s
perspectives on global security. Iran’s perception with respect to
global security is substantially different from—and at times
opposes—the notions generally accepted in the U.S. and
Western European countries. Further, from the perspective of
Western
corporations,
Iran’s
extra-constitutional
establishments, associated with its vast and constraining
domestic financial network, add to the complexity of conducting
trade with Iran.184
For these reasons, international financial organizations
have taken a cautionary approach in advising their members
concerning the Islamic Republic’s policies in obtaining credit to
engage in commercial transactions with Western banks.
Particularly, the FATF’s strategy towards Iran has been
incremental in a manner befitting its nature as an international
182 See Jay Solomon, Shift Clouds Iran Nuclear Deal, June 26, 2015, WALL
ST. J., at A9. In 1995, the United States ended all U.S. investments in Iran,
including investments related to oil and gas, and exporting U.S goods to Iran.
These sanctions are expected to survive, the JCPOA notwithstanding. See Iran
Sanctions and the Implementation of the JCPOA: Lots of Changes, but Little
Impact on U.S. Businesses?, MCGUIREWOODS (Jan. 20, 2016),
https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2016/1/Iran-Sanctions-Implementation-JCPOA.aspx (“notwithstanding the news stories describing the lifting of sanctions, very little has changed for most U.S. businesses.”). Exceptions to such sanctions include sale of civilian aircraft to, and
import of goods including pistachios, rugs, and caviar from Iran. See U.S.
Treasury JCPOA FAQ, supra note 72.
183 See The Implications of Sanctions Relief Under the Iran Agreement:
Statement before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 3 (2015) (statement from the Hon. Juan Zarate, Senior Adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies), https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/attachments/ts150805_
Zarate.pdf. See www.Chamber-International.com.
184 See generally OTTOLENGHI, supra note 27, at 41-59. The extra-constitutional establishments in Iran are entities that are independent of, and separate from, the governmental bureaucracy. The most powerful of such organizations is the Islamic Revolutionary Corps (IRGC) which was created during
the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and received its constitutional legitimacy under
Article 150 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.
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financial police watchdog. The FATF has urged its members “to
monitor their financial institutions such as the banks to give
special attention to their business relationships and
transactions with Iran,” including Iranian companies and
financial institutions.185
Following the agreement between Iran and the 5+1
countries, the Islamic Republic has undertaken a commitment
to an “Action Plan” concerning anti-money laundering in
international trade, as well as financing entities engaged in
international terrorism.186 As a result, on June 24, 2016, the
FATF announced that it would welcome Iran’s adoption of “highlevel political commitment” to a plan to address “its strategic
AML/CFT deficiencies.”187 Thus, the Paris-based organization
amended its previous restrictions on Iran’s international
banking and issued the following recommendations:
The FATF . . . has suspended counter measures for 12 months in
order to monitor Iran’s progress in implementing the Action Plan.
If the FATF determines that Iran has not demonstrated sufficient
progress in implementing the action plan at the end of that period,
FATF’s call for counter-measures will be reimposed. If Iran meets
its commitments under the Action Plan in that time period, the
FATF will consider next steps in this regard. 188

B. Quasi-Banking Institutions in Iran
Traditionally, Iran’s quasi-banking organizations were
small financial companies that engaged in lending money to the
demanding market.189 The individuals and financial institutions
engaged in the business of lending money have developed a
considerable network of quasi-banking activities for two
FATF Public Statement – 19 February 2016, supra note 16.
See Iran: six months after sanctions relief – a briefing for financial
institution clients, ASHURST LLP, (July 29, 2016), https://www.ashurst.
com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/iran-six-months-after-sanctions relief/.
187
Public Statement, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (June 24, 2016),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/public-statement-june-2016.html.
188 Id.
189 See IMF, Islamic Republic of Iran—Selected Issues Paper, Country Report No. 04/308, at ¶ 61 (Sept. 2004), https://www.imf.org/external
/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04308.pdf (detailing certain quasi-banking practices in
Iran, including those engaged in by Bonyads).
185
186
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reasons. The first reason was the impact of sanctions, coupled
with an inability of Iranian institutions engaged in traditional
banking business to utilize financial connections, such as
SWIFT, that were associated with Western banks.190 The second
reason was related to the financial need for a banking system by
the extra-constitutional organizations in Iran. The extraconstitutional entities in Iran have the clout of both companies
and agencies, and “their release from financial curbs could of
itself help ease return of swathes of the economy to the
mainstream of world trade.”191 These extra-constitutional
organizations have developed a vast network of business
throughout the country. Doing business in capital-incentive
activities such as imports/exports, building infrastructure, and
developing ports and airports would, inevitably, require banking
services by traditional banks. These organizations, in the
absence of a traditional banking system, or in order to expand
their economic activities to yet another sector, engaged in the
banking business, or quasi-banking activities.192 Although
sanctions imposed on Iran’s economy were not the only reason
for the development of the quasi-banking system in Iran,
sanctions played a considerable role in their expansion.
It is unclear if these Iranian extra-constitutional
organizations will be allowed to do business with U.S. and
Western European countries in the wake of the JCPOA
agreement. One example of such an organization is Mehr Bank.
Mehr was an umbrella firm, which included Mehr Housing
Development and Investment Company, Mehr Ayandeh-e
Neghar Commerce and Services Company, and Tadbirgaran-e
Atiyeh Iranian Investment Company. These subsidiaries
originally operated as somewhat separate entities, but later
ballooned into a holding conglomerate that engaged in buying
and selling ship, truck, and industrial equipment.193
190
See ABDELALI JBILI, VITALI KRAMARENKO & JOSÉ BAILÉN, ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN: MANAGING THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY 21 (2007)
(“Informal finance [in Iran] is common with high rates of return, reflecting lack
of access to bank financing by small and medium-size enterprises.”).
191 Babak Dehghanpisheh and Yeganeh Torbani, Firms linked to Revolutionary Guards to win sanctions relief under Iran deal, REUTERS
(Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/iran-nuclear-sanctions-idUSL
5N10G1TD20150809.
192 See JBILI, KRAMARENKO, & BAILÉN, supra note 190, at 20–21.
193 GOLKAR, supra note 27, at 163.
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Tadbirgaran-e-Atiyeh was initially involved primarily in
accounting and financial services.194 Following an annual
growth of 70% to 80% within a period of five years, Mehr Finance
and Credit Institution was upgraded to Mehr Bank. Today,
Mehr Bank has an expansive network of reportedly 700
branches throughout Iran.195
As a result of their association with organizations such as
the IRGC, and through a systematic financial modus operandi,
these corporate entities have organized a virtual and highvolume banking operation within Iran.196 However, these
institutions did not have any legitimate global banking
qualifications and were not recognized by the major banking
associations, credit organizations, or credit-setting institutions
of the world.197 The FATF was unequivocal that “[i]f Iran fails
to take concrete steps to continue to improve its CFT regime, the
FATF will consider calling on its members and urging all
jurisdictions to strengthen counter measures in June 2016.”198
As a result, the FATF has given a window of opportunity to Iran,
its banks and its financial organizations to perform within the
norms established by the international financial community.
This will enable Iran to conduct banking and financial
transactions at an international level. As a result, in conducting
its international commercial transactions, Iran’s banks and
financial institutions will have access to credit, and will use such
credit to enable Iran to attract investment and conduct trade at
a global level. Presently, however, the suspension of the FATF’s
banking and credit recognition counter measures against Iran is
temporary, and their continuation will depend on Iran’s
business conduct within those spheres. That means adherence
to international norms concerning money laundering, unofficial
banking transactions, and cash transfers of money across
international borders to finance ideologically oriented clienteles.

Id.
GOLKAR, supra note 27, at 163; see also The Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Establish Own Bank, RADIO ZAMANEH (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www. zamaaneh.com/enzam/2009/09/ iran-revotutionary-guards.html.
196 GOLKAR, supra note 27, at 163 (noting that “Mehr Bank has an expansive network of more than seven hundred branches throughout the country.”).
197 See FATF Public Statement – 19 February 2016, supra note 16.
198 Id.
194
195
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C.Money Laundering Act of Iran
The FATF has major concerns with respect to moneylaundering across international banking borders. Every year
since 2007, the Basel Institute, a Geneva-based non-profit
organization, has evaluated the money-laundering activities of
various countries around the globe.199 Iran remains one of the
highest money-laundering countries in the region and beyond.200
Nevertheless, Iran has anti-money-laundering legislation which
precludes money laundering among individuals and financial
corporate entities. That legislation defines money laundering as:
a) Acquisition, possession, keeping or using the proceeds from
illegal activities with the knowledge that they have been
acquired . . . through a criminal offence.
b) Change, exchange or transfer of proceeds with the intention
of hiding their illegal origin . . .
c) Hiding or covering up the real nature, origin, source,
location, movement, displacement, or possession of proceeds
obtained . . . as a result of an offence.201

Violators of the Money Laundering Act will “be sentenced to
a fine of one fourth of the value of the proceeds of the crime which
should be deposited into the public Revenues Account with the
Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”202 Further, the
violator must return assets of the original money, “and the
proceeds derived from the crime comprising the original assets
and the profits thereof.”203

199
See Annual Reports, BASEL INST., https://www.baselgovernance.org/
about_us/annual_reports (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
200 Basel AML Index 2016 Report, BASEL INST. 4 (July 27, 2016), https://index.baselgovernance.org/sites/index/documents/Basel_AML_Index_Report_2016.pdf (including Iran among the “10 highest risk
countries in the 2016 Basel AML Index”); see also Samuel Rubenfeld, Iran Remains Atop Money-laundering Index, WALL ST. J.: RISK AND COMPLIANCE J.
(Aug.
18,
2015,
12:01
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/08/18/iran-remains-atop-money-laundering-index/.
201 QANUNI SHSTSHWI POOL [Anti-Money Laundering Act of the Islamic
Republic
of
Iran],
1386
[Jan.
22,
2008],
art.
2
(Iran),
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Islamic_Republic_of_Iran_Anti-money_ Laundering_Law.pdf.
202 Id. art. 9.
203 Id.
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D.Standing of Iran’s Banking System to Engage in
International Financial Transactions
Despite Iran’s seemingly reasonable anti-money-laundering
legislation, the money-laundering activities in Iran have been
among the highest in the world. According to the 2015 edition of
the money-laundering index, Iran was amongst the highest risk
countries with respect to money-laundering along with
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Mozambique, Ethiopia and a few
others.204 The sources for such findings consist of the World
Bank, the World Economic Forum, and FATF.205 In light of a
fairly progressive anti-money-laundering legislation in Iran,
why does the Islamic Republic retain a high score of moneylaundering and violations in international banking transactions
comparable to Afghanistan, Uganda, and Cambodia?
One reason for such classification is the existence of the
Unlicensed Financial Institutions (“UFI”), vastly active in Iran.
According to a report by the IMF, the use of UFI in Iran is highly
prevalent to a point that enforcing agreements between the
Central Bank of Iran and commercial banks has been difficult
“due to weak bank balance sheets and competition from
unlicensed financial institutions.”206 According to the IMF, “[s]ix
UFIs reportedly represent 15% of deposits” in Iran.207 Thus,
Iran’s UFIs are a reason for its prevalent high domestic interest
rates. Further, the UFIs are the cause of high money-laundering
and non-performing loans.208
Iran’s efforts to expand domestic and international trade
could be hampered if it fails to eliminate these prevalent UFIs.
However, despite the inhospitable financial environment
prevailing in Iran throughout the past decade and prior to the
JCPOA, the Central Bank of Iran reasonably cooperated with

See Basel AML Index 2016 Report, supra note 200, at 4.
Basel AML Index 2016 Report, supra note 200, at 12-13. To assess a
country’s money-laundering risk the AML index assigns each country a score
on a 0 to 10 scale based on a framework that aggregates and weighs data received from the international organizations.
206 IMF 2015 Iran Report, supra note 152, at 6.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 26.
204
205
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the Swiss International Finance with respect to the repayment
of its loans.209 In fact, Swiss banking authorities have indicated
that Switzerland is “keen to expand its banking relations with
Iran in post-sanction era and provide the Iranian banking
system with consultations in the areas of training, technical and
legal issues as well as finance.”210
E. Organizational Constraints on the Central Bank of
Iran, Impeding Banking Transactions in International
Trade
One of the main problems that U.S. companies transacting
with Iran may face in the future is identifying Iran as a
sovereign government with the Central Bank of Iran. The U.S.
may have to determine the identity of the Iranian bank as an
alter ego of the Islamic government of Iran. Therefore, it is
important to know to what extent, if at all, the Central Bank of
Iran is an institutionally independent agency (e.g. similar to the
Federal Reserve Bank in the U.S.), separate and independent
from the government of Iran in terms of its fiscal policy.
The seemingly independent commercial banks in Iran do
not enjoy the relative independence that their counterpart
Western banking institutions do. In fact, the Central Bank of
Iran, like a state-owned organization, is institutionally subject
to constraints by the executive branch.211 Thus, in terms of
administrative hierarchy, the Central Bank of Iran functions
more like the U.S. Treasury Department. As an expert in
Iranian banks has stated, “[t]he chairman of the BMI (the
Central Bank of Iran) serves at the pleasure of the Iranian
President. Administratively, BMI is an extension of the office of

209 Press Release, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran and
Switzerland to Cooperate in AML and Combating Financing Terrorism (Mar.
1, 2016), http://www.cbi.ir/showitem/14403.aspx.
210 Id.
211
BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, BTI 2014 - IRAN COUNTRY REPORT (2014),
https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2014/pdf/
BTI_2014_Iran.pdf (“the central bank is not an independent institution, as the
banking interest rate is often set by the government”); see also JACOB ENGWERD
ET AL., GOVERNMENT AND CENTRAL BANK INTERACTION UNDER UNCERTAINTY: A
DIFFERENTIAL GAMES APPROACH (2016), https://pure.uvt .nl/ws/files/
11022577/2016_012.pdf (concluding that “in the Iranian economy . . . [the] government acts as leader and central bank acts as follower”).
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the President and largely subservient to the Ministry of
Treasury and Economic affairs. . .”212
Organizationally, the Monetary Committee of the Central
Bank of Iran is the highest body in the Central Bank to decide
on monetary policies of Iran. One of the members of this highranking committee is in fact the General Prosecutor (Attorney
General) of the Islamic Republic of Iran who must, by
constitutional mandate, be a member of the clergy.213
As a result of the structural composition of the banks and
the state control of the Central Bank, the executive branch of the
government could directly and unabashedly exert its monetary,
banking and fiscal policies on the Central Bank. Because of the
state controlled nature of Iran’s Central Bank, the U.S. plaintiffs
in Bank Markazi were able to successfully argue that the
Central Bank of Iran was an instrumentality of the executive
branch of Iran. Therefore, the assets of the Central Bank could
be used as a partial redemption of plaintiffs’ damages.214 In the
case, Bank Markazi conceded, and the Supreme Court did not
dispute, that the bank holds equitable title over the amount it
deposited with Citibank.215
There are a number of powerful monetary organizations in
Iran that are affiliated with extra-constitutional organizations
in that country.216 In practice, these organizations act like
banking institutions.217 Their corporate charters enlist such
institutions as banks.218 It was partially because of these issues
that Jack Lew, the U.S. Secretary of Treasury during the Obama
JAHAN-PARVAR, supra note 161.
Monetary and Banking Law of Iran, approved Tir 18, 1351 (July 9,
1972), at art. 18, www.cbi.ir/page/2234.aspx. Under the current Constitution
of Iran, the Chief Justice of Iran, who is appointed by the Leader, would retain
his office for five years. While in office, the Chief Justice is also able to sit on
the Board of the Central Bank of Iran. See GISBERT H.FLANZ, NICHOLAS M.
NIKAZMERAD, & CHANGIZ VAFAI, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (Oceana Publications 1980).
214 Peterson, 627 F.3d. at 1123, n. 2.
215 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1321.
216 See Jennifer Rubin, How Obama’s deal would make the West complicit
in funding terrorism, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www. washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2015/08/11/how-obamas-deal-would-makethe-west-complicit-in-funding-terrorism/.
217 Id.
218 GOLKAR, supra note 27, at 163-64 (“Different forms of the Basij’s Involvement in the Economy.”).
212
213
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Administration, was asked by the Senate Financial Services
Committee, “are you considering permitting Iranian banks to
clear transactions in dollars with the U.S. banks or foreign
financial institutions including offshore clearing houses?”219 The
Treasury Secretary was relentless that “the Iranian banks will
not be able to clear U.S. dollars through New York . . . [or] hold
correspondent account relationships with U.S. financial
institutions or enter into financing arrangements with U.S.
banks.”220 Nevertheless, as a result of the JCPOA agreement, 23
major Iranian banks formerly designated as financing the
proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missiles and related
activities are no longer under any international restriction in
their financial transactions.221 The funds of many Iranian banks
that are languishing in banks outside of Iran, unable to be used
because of the global sanctions, can now successfully transfer
billions worth of their assets from one banking jurisdiction to
another. For example, after the demise of the sanctions, Iran
successfully transferred “billions worth of assets from banks in
South Korea and Japan to banks in Germany and the United
Arab Emirates.” According to one expert, the lifting of nuclear
sanctions “will probably free up only about $30 billion worth of
assets.”222
However,
Iranian
banks
require
significant
recapitalization. The IMF has made the following
recommendations concerning strengthening the Iranian banks:
1. The reintegration of the domestic financial system into the
global economy, lowering transaction costs and reducing the
size of the informal sector.
2. Better detection of illegal proceeds, including those related
to tax evasion and corruption.
3. Adoption of a comprehensive CFT law that properly
criminalizes terrorist financing (TF), and contains mechanisms

219 Mark Dubowitz & Jonathan Schanzer, More Dollars for the Ayatollahs, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/more-dollarsfor-the-ayatollahs-1459551754.
220 Id.
221 See JCPOA Annex II Attachments, supra note 5. Bank Saderat was
the only major Iranian bank that, because of its facilitation of financing terrorist groups, remained on the prohibitive list. See Rubin, supra note 216 (noting
that Bank Saderat will also be de-listed in eight years under the JCPOA).
222 Pearce, supra note 110.
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for the implementation of United Nations Security Council
resolutions related to terrorism and (TF). 223

The capability or willingness of Middle Eastern banks to
monitor terrorist financing is of particular concern to Western
banking and security authorities.224 The Paris-based Financial
Action Task Force has indicated that it “remains particularly
and exceptionally concerned” about, what it called, the Islamic
Republic of Iran’s “failure to address the risk of terrorist
financing and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the
international financial system.”225 The government of Iran has a
direct position in policing monetary transactions in that
country.226 Nevertheless, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury
during the Obama Administration announced, based on the
authority of Section 311 of the Patriot Act, that he found
“reasonable grounds exist for concluding that the Islamic
Republic of Iran’s account is of ‘primary money laundering
concern’ which would require the domestic financial institutions
and agencies in the United States to take certain ‘special
measures’ against the primary money laundering concern.”227
Under the JCPOA, on Implementation Day, foreign banks
can engage with Iranian banks and companies.228 However, as
far as the U.S. government is concerned, it lifted nuclear-related
secondary sanctions against Iran and certain non-U.S.
persons.229 In order to meet the requirements of the Department

See IMF 2015 Iran Report, supra note 152, at 18.
See TOM KEATINGE, IDENTIFYING FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS: THE
ROLE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP, INFORMATION SHARING AND FINANCIAL
INTELLIGENCE ix-x (2015), https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 07/OP
-FININT_web_low-res.pdf (recommending enhancement of cooperation between governmental agencies and banks to enhance monitoring of terrorist financing activities); ELIAS BLUM, MARTEN LINDBERG & FLORIAN SCHAURER,
OSINT Report 2/2011, 9 (2011), http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/ special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/OSINT-Report-22011.pdf (“Because of the lack of regulation and monitoring in most Arab
states, it is difficult to trace money flows and detect illegal movements if the
funds are transferred through the Islamic banking system.”).
225 FATF Public Statement – 19 February 2016, supra note 16.
226 Anti-money laundering body urges more scrutiny of Iran, North Korea,
REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-economymoneylaundering-idUSKCN0VS2LM.
227 31 U.S.C. § 5318A.
228 See JCPOA, supra note 5, ¶¶ 19(ii), 21(i).
229 See U.S. TREASURY GUIDANCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 4 n.7. (“For
223
224
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of State, the Central Bank of Iran, as an ombudsman for the
private banks in that country, must ensure that client
organizations are not engaged in transfer of money to or from
terrorist organizations. However, given the organizational
structure and work pattern of the some of the Iranian banks, it
is highly unlikely that the Central Bank of Iran would easily be
in a position to monitor the nature of the activities of each bank
and police its financial transactions.
F. Iran’s Access to SWIFT and Related Developments
SWIFT is a globally recognized banking communication
system.230 With over 11,000 financial companies worldwide, it
allows the member companies to communicate and transfer
finance.231 From March of 2012 through February of 2016, the
Central Bank of Iran and fifteen other major banks in that
country were banned from using SWIFT’s inter-banking
communication system.232
Throughout the regime of the economic sanctions, Iran’s
government has had a problem with communication and
creditworthiness with respect to its banks. The practical
problem that Iranian banks faced was accepting the credibility
of these banks by the international banking community. After
the purpose of this guidance, the term ‘non-U.S. person’ means any individual
or entity excluding any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity
organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the
United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United
States.”). However, an entity that is owned or controlled by a real or corporate
U.S. person, and established or maintained outside of the United States is eligible to participate in transactions or activities subject to the sanctions removed under the JCPOA, provided that such person is authorized by the OFAC
to engage in transactions with Iran. See id.; see also U.S. Treasury JCPOA
FAQ, supra note 72.
230
Discover SWIFT: Messaging and Standards, SWIFT.COM, https://
www.swift.com/about-us/discover-swift/messaging-standards (last visited Jan.
24, 2017) (SWIFT’s messaging services are trusted and used by more than
11,000 financial institutions in nearly 200 countries and territories around the
world.).
231 Id.
232 See Rick Gladstone & Stephen Castle, Global Network Expels as Many
as 30 of Iran’s Banks in Move to Isolate Its Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/world/middleeast/crucial-comm
unication-network-expelling-iranian-banks.html; Iranian banks reconnected to
SWIFT network after four-year hiatus, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-banks-swift-idUSKCN0VQ1FD.
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2012, Iranian banks were almost entirely deprived of, and
disconnected from, the Belgium-based SWIFT.233 A SWIFT, also
known as a Bank Identifier Code (“BIC”), is an international
bank code that identifies particular banks worldwide.234
Approved by the International Organization for Standardization
(“IOS”), the network of SWIFT related organizations do not
require a specific format for commercial transactions.235 The
identification of accounts and the type of transaction is based on
the agreement between the contractual parties.236 Thus, in any
transnational commercial transaction, the role of the banks
associated with such transactions is vital. The SWIFT code is
also applied when banks engage in transferring money between
their sister-institutions.237 For example, in order for a bank in
the purchasing company of Iran to transfer funds to a seller in a
European country, the respective banks of the contracting
parties must have a credible SWIFT account.238 At times, some
buyers of Iranian crude oil, such as China, reportedly resorted
to paying for its Iranian oil in Chinese currency, the Yuan.239 In
some cases, Iran and its buyer of the crude oil have bypassed the
banking system by surreptitiously selling oil for gold.240 In
international oil transactions, attempting to use gold or apply
barter procedures is inefficient and does not meet the
requirements of modern banking transactions.241 Using precious

Gladstone & Castle, supra note 232.
See Discover SWIFT: Messaging and Standards, supra note 230.
235 Discover SWIFT: Messaging and Standards, supra note 230.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238
See Charles Recknagel, Explainer: How Does A SWIFT Ban Hurt
Iran?, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.
rferl.org/content/explainer_how_does_swift_ban_hurt_iran/24518153.html.
239
Dan Collins, Rise of the Petro Yuan, FIN. SENSE (Apr. 15, 2012),
http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/dan-collins/rise-petro-yuan.
240 Dollar Power: America is using the dollar to hurt Iran, would it work?,
ECONOMIST, June 23, 2012, at 76; see also Alfred Adask, Iran to Sell Crude Oil
for Gold, ADASK’S LAW (Jan. 24, 2012), https://adask.Wordpress .com/2012/01/
24/iran-to-sell-crude-oil-for-gold/.
241 See JONATHAN ETON AND MARK GERSOVITZ, POOR-COUNTRY BORROWING
IN PRIVATE FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE REPUDIATION ISSUE 12 (Princeton
Univ. 1981), https://www.princeton.edu/~ies/IES_Studies/S47.pdf (noting that
“[d]espite these alternatives, it is still probably true that smoothing through
international borrowing has benefits and that exclusion from this option represents a penalty”).
233
234
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metal also lends itself to significant corrupt practices by the
governments as well as outside institutions.242
As a result of the JCPOA, major Iranian banks have
reconnected to the SWIFT network. The SWIFT country
manager, Onur Ozan, announced that “Swift has completed the
on-boarding process for [the Iranian] banks” and that, “[w]e will
continue to work with the remainder of the entities that have
applied rejoin SWIFT to ensure their smooth reconnection.”
Iranian banks reconnected to the SWIFT network after a four
year hiatus.243 The SWIFT limitation on the Iranian banks,
though considerably improved, is not complete, since the JCPOA
does not repeal all EU sanctions on Iranian banks; as a result,
those banks are unable to use SWIFT, which otherwise provides
financial facilitation to those Iranian banks that remain listed
under EU regulations.244 The major reason for such disconnect
is that SWIFT is incorporated under the laws of Belgium and
has to comply with related EU codes.245 On their own, neither
SWIFT nor the IOS could claim authority to make decisions
concerning sanctions or lifting a banking embargo.246 Further,
decisions on the legitimacy of financial transactions, such as
reinstalling sanctions, rest within the financial institutions
handling them and national authorities legally in control of
banking transactions. Nevertheless, SWIFT’s global transaction
network has reconnected a number of Iranian banks to its
system, allowing these delisted banks to resume transactions
with foreign financial organizations.247
Considering the tumultuous nature of the recent interbanking financial transactions, the vast majority of countries
active in international financial transactions have adopted some
Id.
Iranian banks reconnected to SWIFT network after four-year hiatus,
supra note 232.
244 Press Release, SWIFT, Update: Iran Sanctions Agreement (Jan. 17,
2016), https://www.swift.com/insights/press-releases/update_iran-sanctionsagreement.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. As soon as the use of SWIFT by Iran started, Germany’s Henkek,
one of the largest household and personnel care manufacturing companies in
the world, purchased 30% of the detergent producing Iranian company for a
value of around 51 million Euros. See 51 Million Euro of Iranian Firm’s Shares
Sold Via SWIFT, PAYVAND (May 5, 2016), http://www.payvand.com /news/16/
may/1025.html.
242
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form of anti-terrorism policies. Until early 2016, Iran did not
have such laws in its books. Such legislative omission indicated
the lack of seriousness and resolve on the part of Iran’s decision
makers to combat terrorism. Whatever the reason, it resulted in
the denial of Iran’s access to SWIFT and consequently to active
transnational banking transactions commensurable with Iran’s
substantial needs for economic development.
On March 5, 2016, Iran’s Council of Guardians, which
has the authority for judicial review, approved the earlier
legislative draft passed by the Islamic National Assembly,
entitled “Combating the Financing of Terrorism” (“CFT”).248 The
Central Bank of Iran played a major role in drafting and
presenting this bill with the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Affairs.249
G. Agreement Between the Central Bank of Iran and
Coface State Guarantees
The Coface Group is a global credit insurance system
operating throughout the world.250 The primary function of
Coface is to provide insurance to companies engaged in
international transactions against the possible risk of financial
default by their clients.251 With the support of approximately
248 See Press Release, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ratification of the Law of Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) (Mar. 8,
2016), http://www.cbi.ir/showitem/14423.aspx.
249 The Central Bank of Iran has played a major role in drafting this Act
as well as the Anti-Money Laundering Act and their ratification by the Islamic
Assembly, as well as the Council of Guardians (COG). Iran’s original antimoney laundering bill was drafted by the government in 2010 but underwent
a torturous path. In 2011, it was rejected by the Council of Guardians. See
Mohammed Affianian, Anti-money Laundering Law Passed, FIN. TRIB. (Mar. 9,
2016),
https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-business-and-markets/37983/anti-money-laundering-law-passed. The Council of Guardians is
constitutionally authorized to exercise judicial review over the acts approved
by the Islamic Assembly. QANUNI ASSAASSI IRAN [IRANIAN CONSTITUTION] 1906,
art. 91.
250 See Liz Alderman, Wary Foreign Businesses Step Back From Greece,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at B1 (naming Coface as one of “the world’s largest
import-export insurers”); Fabio Benedetti-Valentini, Coface Warns 2016 Profit
Dented by Higher Emerging-Market Claims, BLOOMBERG (July 5, 2016),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-04/coface-warns-2016
profit-dented-by-higher-emerging-market-claims.
251 See Alderman, supra note 250; Paul Sullivan, Protecting Your Business, and Your Bank Account, in Case Clients Don’t Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
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4500 employees, 252 Coface functions in both developed and
developing countries; as of 2014, the company had a direct
presence in 67 countries, with delivery guarantees in nearly 200
countries.253 Periodically, Coface makes assessments of a
country’s risk for about 160 countries in the world.254
Considering the importance of a reliable insurance system,
it would have been extremely difficult for Iran and its corporate
contractual partners, both in Europe and elsewhere, to embark
on a new phase of international commercial transactions
without having reliable insurance coverage for commercial risks.
Thus, in transatlantic commercial transactions of late January
2016 by President Hasan Rohani, a contractual agreement was
reached between the parties. The Central Bank of Iran and
Coface State Guarantees acting on behalf of the government of
France, entered into the export credit insurance agreement.255
More importantly, this agreement encompassed fees due by
Iran, and Coface State Guarantees on behalf of the government
of France received dues in the field of export credit insurance.256
The Coface agreement was an effective way for restoring
commercial transactions between France and Iran. In
particular, French companies will be able to negotiate with Iran,
knowing that the contractual obligations of the parties will be
guaranteed for the medium and long-term projects in compliance
with the customary rules of international commercial
transactions.257

2016, at B4 (quoting a Coface executive: “We can say we know this buyer and
you shouldn’t ship, or we know this buyer and, yes, you can ship $500,000.”).
252 Our Organisation, COFACE, http://coface.com/Group/Our-organisation
(last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
253 Our History, COFACE, http://coface.com/Group/Our-history (last visited
Jan. 24, 2017).
254 Economic Studies, COFACE, http://www.coface.com/Economic-Studiesand-Country-Risks (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
255
Iran Central Bank, French Credit Insurer Agree on Debt Settling,
SPUTNIK (Jan. 30, 2016, 3:17 PM), http://sptnkne.ws/cH6W.
256 Iran Central Bank, supra note 255; (during the sanctions period, the
government of France blocked these assets).
257 Id. (noting that “France and Iran signed a batch of 20 trade and construction agreements on Thursday during Rouhani’s visit”).
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V. Iran’s Sanction-Free Investments and
Commercial Agreements with Foreign Companies
A. Investment and Commercial Agreements with French
Companies
France and Iran opened a new chapter in their relations as
France’s President Hollande pronounced: “I want this
relationship to be useful, useful to our two countries, useful to
the region . . . [and] to the world.”258 These pronouncements
were made during the two-day visit of his guest, President
Hasan Rohani, to France. Some 30 agreements were signed
between the government of Iran and French companies.259 The
French export bank, Companies Francoise d’ Assurance pour le
Commerce Exte’rieur, agreed that, if necessary, it would
guarantee French investments in Iran.
The agreements between France and the Islamic Republic
of Iran encompass various commercial fields including the: (1)
purchase of petroleum; (2) purchase of civil aviation fleet; (3)
purchase of passenger cars and buses; and (4) expansion or
renovation of Iranian airports. Of these commercial
transactions, the agreement between Iran and Total, the French
international oil company, may be the most consequential in
terms of its overall impact in Iran’s future global transactions
with the Western world. According to the Minister of Oil of Iran,
this agreement encompasses exploration and exploitation of
Iran’s South Azadeghan oilfield, which it shares with Iraq.260
Total would be “studying its participation in the (development
of) the oilfield.”261 The main question concerning Iran’s
agreement with Total is what is the nature of the French
company’s commercial transaction with Iran?

258 Iran and France Sign Major Trade Deals, VOA NEWS (Jan. 28, 2016,
4:18 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/iran-president-hails-turn-in-frenc
h-iranian-relations/3166571.html.
259 Lara Marlowe, ‘New Chapter’ as France and Iran Reach Trade Agreements, IRISH TIMES (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ world/europe/new-chapter-as-france-and-iran-reach-trade-agreements-1.2514274.
260 Total and Iran Sign South Azadegan Agreement - Press TV, REUTERS
(Mar. 24, 2016), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-total-iran-agreement-idU
KKCN0WQ2E1.
261 Id.
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The highlights of the Memorandum of Understanding
(“MOU”) between Total and the National Iranian Oil Company
(“NIOC”) most likely include the following:
1. Preliminarily, Total will purchase up to 200,000 barrels of
crude oil per day from Iran.262
2. Upon Iran’s request, these sales will be in Euros. This
request follows an Iranian policy that promotes the reduction
of the Islamic Republic’s obligations to, and financial
dependence on, the U.S. dollar with respect to its international
creditors.263
3. The French party may, if needed, provide the NIOC with
technical assistance.264

The details of the MOU between Total and NIOC have not
yet been publicly announced.265 Nevertheless, it is clear that
Iran seeks to gain access to the European market demand for
crude oil.266 In this respect Iran, in a relatively short period of
time, would be able to successfully compete with both Saudi
Arabian and Russian crude oil. Further, Iran would have access
to the modern Western European oil technology to mend its
petrochemical industry such as Nouri Petrochemical

Matthew Dalton & Inti Landauro, Iran to Sign Oil Deal With France’s
Total, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-to-sign-oildeal-with-frances-total-1453988040.
263 Charles Kennedy, Iran Signs Oil Deal With Total, Deal Done In Euros,
OILPRICE.COM (Feb. 8, 2016), http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/IranSigns-Oil-Deal-With-Total-Deal-Done-In-Euros.html; see also Nidhi Verma,
Exclusive - Iran Wants Euro Payment for New and Outstanding Oil Sales –
Source, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2016), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-oil-iran-exclusive-idUKKCN0VE1P9 (reporting that “Iran wants to recover tens of billions
of dollars it is owed by India and other buyers of its oil in euros and is billing
new crude sales in euros, too, looking to reduce its dependence on the U.S.
dollar following . . . sanctions relief.”).
264 See Iran-France oil contract to take effect Feb 16, PRESSTV (Feb. 6,
2016), http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/02/06/448917/Iran-France-Italy-Total-Eni-NIOC-Zangeneh (reporting Oil and Gas Minister Bijan Zangeneh’s
statement that “Iran plans to provide this French company with necessary
data for studies.”).
265 Iran, France’s Total Sign Confidential Oil Deal: Zangeneh, PRESSTV
(Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2016/03/24/457396/IranFrance-Total-Bijan-Zangeneh-South-Azadegan-Oilfield.
266 See Anthony Dipaola & Angelina Rascouet, Iran Seeks Oil Barter as
European Buyers Face Banking Hurdles, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 25, 2016), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-25/iran-seeks-oil-barter-deals-aseuropean-buyers-face-bank-hurdles.
262
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Complex.267 The MOU is also important because it shows Iran’s
willingness to invite U.S. international oil companies for
cooperation with the NIOC, and it is an indirect reference for
U.S. international companies to enter into business
rapprochement
with
various
Iranian
governmental
corporations. In fact, Iran’s Minister of Oil reportedly stated that
the Iranian government has “no problem with the presence of
American companies in Iran. But it is the American government
which is creating restrictions for these companies.”268
In addition to Total, the car manufacturer PSA PeugeotCitroën has entered into various agreements with the Islamic
Republic of Iran.269 Prior to the sanctions, both companies were
trading partners with Iran. Peugeot-Citroën has agreed to invest
$450 million with its counterpart in Iran, Iran’s Khodro
Corporation, to modernize an automobile factory in Iran.270
According to the joint venture agreement, the two companies
plan to contractually cooperate in modernizing Iran’s largest car
factory.271 The new products of this factory will enter into the
Iranian market by mid-2017.272 The initial production target of
the joint venture company is planned to be 200,000 vehicles a
year.273 The PSA has indicated that it would sign a final
agreement with SAIPA, Citroen’s partner in Iran, before the
imposition of sanctions.274

267
See Maryam Rahmanian, Nouri Petrochemical Complex in Assalouyeh, Iran, UPI (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.upi.com/News_Photos/view
/upi/a66837a26fb834094509223c86c4385c/Nouri-Petrochemical-Complex-inAssalouyeh-Iran/ (noting that the complex, “founded in 1964, is the second
largest producer and exporter of petrochemicals in the Middle East”).
268 Iran Open to Oil Output Freeze in the Future, PRESSTV (Nov. 15, 2015,
6:30 AM), http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2016/03/13/455426/Iran-oil-exportssanctions.
269 Jason Chow, Peugeot Signs Car Deal With Iran Khodro, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 28, 2016, 8:11 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/peugeot-signs-car-dealwith-iran-khodro-1453972892; Matthew Dalton, Peugeot Signs Joint Venture
to Make Citroëns in Iran, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2016, 11:46 AM), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/peugeotsigns-joint-venture-to-makecitroens-in-iran1469115995.
270 Chow, supra note 269.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.; see also Dalton, supra note 269 (reporting that a “substantial part
of the Citroen models is expected to be launched in Iran in 2018”).
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The Iran–France joint venture is planned to produce
modern Peugeot models with estimated investment of $436
million over five years. Moreover, Airbus has agreed to sell
approximately 127 aircraft to Iran Air, and Alstom will complete
the Tehran metro lines. Iran’s government also intends to build
a second terminal at Imam Khomeini Airport by entering into a
planning agreement with the French companies of Bouygues
and Aero Ports de Paris (“ADP”).275
As for the aviation fleet, Iran has concluded a major
agreement to purchase over 100 airliners from Airbus Group in
a deal totaling approximately $27 billion.276 This includes 45
medium haul planes, as well as the world’s largest passenger
plane, the A380. The deal also covers new aircraft orders, and
according to Airbus, “a complete package of cooperation in the
civil aviation sector.”277 In early 2017, the Airbus agreement
with Iran finally materialized.278 Iran’s agreement with France’s
Airbus Group is one of the major post-JCPOA success stories in
international commercial agreements between the Islamic
Republic and its European trade partners.
The agreements between Iran and respective French
companies are intended to renovate the severely dilapidated
industries in certain areas such as air and surface
transportation systems. For example, Iran’s civil aviation fleet
numbers 140 aircraft with an average age of approximately 25
years, and Iran reportedly has “one of the world’s worst air
safety records.”279 Finally, after approximately four decades,

Marlowe, supra note 259.
See Iran to buy 118 Airbus aircraft worth $25 billion, DAILY MAIL (Jan.
28, 2016, 1:15 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3421382/Iranbuy-118-Airbus-aircraft-worth-25-billion.html.
277 Id.
278 See Tim Hepher, Iran Air takes delivery of first Airbus jet post-sanctions, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 2017), http://in.reuters.com/article/iran-aircraft-idINKBN14V1LX; see also Press Release, Iran Air takes delivery of its first of 100
Airbus aircraft, Airbus (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.airbus.com /presscentre/pressreleases/press-release-detail/detail/iran-air-takes-delivery-of-itsfirst-of-100-airbus-aircraft/; Iran Accepts First Airbus Passenger Jet, RADIO
FREE EUROPE (Jan. 8, 2017), http://www.rferl.org/a/iran-acceps-first-airbusairliner/28220058.html (reporting that Iran has ordered approximately 200
commercial airliners, including 80 from U.S. producer Boeing).
279
Airbus Says Iran Has Capacity for its Largest Aircraft, THE IRAN
PROJECT (Jan. 31, 2016), http://theiranproject.com/blog/2016/01/31/airbussays-iran-has-capacity-for-its-largest-aircraft/.
275
276
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from the Islamic Revolution of Iran, on January 8, 2017, Airbus
announced that “technical acceptance” of the first plane to Iran’s
flagship state-owned carrier, Iran Air, was completed thus
effectively marking the transfer of ownership of the planes to the
Islamic Republic of Iran.280 Because the international financial
channels between Iran and various European countries are not
yet completely normalized, the contractual parties have agreed
to use a different source of financing transactions that enjoy
priorities.281 That is, until the reopening of export credit
agencies’ credit coverage to the Islamic Republic of Iran, certain
banks in Italy and the Netherlands will likely reopen letters of
credit with non-designated Iranian banks. In the long run, and
as a more reliable financial solution, Coface will likely be
working with Iran and European financial institutions involved
in Iranian–European transactions.282
B. Investment and Commercial Agreements with Italian
Companies
Italy has actively sought negotiations with Iran in order to
initiate the expansion of the commercial and investment
agreements in that country.283 Almost immediately after the
JCPOA agreement was signed, the Italian investment
development mission composed of 57 Italian oil and gas
companies, active in the fields of engineering, equipment supply,
refining, and extraction are “ready for investment agreements
with Iranian partners.”284 Further, the Italian food producing
280 Asa Fitch & Robert Wall, Tehran Begins to Revamp Air Fleet, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 9, 2017, January 9, 2017, A6, Col.6. According to an Iranian official,
the Iran-France commercial agreement was “a first step towards restoring the
prestige of the civil aviation sector in the region.” Chris Johnston, Airbus signs
$25bn deal to sell 118 planes to Iran, BBC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35434483 (statement of Farhad Parvaresh,
the CEO of Iran Air).
281 Bozorgmehr Sharafedin & Tim Hepher, Iran says reaches deal to acquire Boeing planes, REUTERS (Jun 14, 2016), http://www.reuters. com/article/us-iran-transportation-boeing-idUSKCN0Z01QZ.
282 See Iran Central Bank, French Credit Insurer Agree on Debt Settling,
supra note 255.
283 Mirren Gidda, Iranian President Rouhani Visits Italy, France to Boost
Economic Ties, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 25, 2016, 4:29 AM), http://www.
newsweek.com/iran-president-rouhani-visits-italy-france-business-ties419027.
284 Iran, Italy ink agreements on transportation, energy, XINHUA NEWS
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companies announced that they might be willing to undertake
direct investments in the Islamic Republic of Iran.285 On
January 2016, Danieli, a major European steel company,
entered into a total of four major agreements with Iranian
commercial entities, worth approximately $18.4 billion. The
main agreements between the two contractual parties included
the following: (1) a pipeline contract with Saipem, Italian oil
services group, worth approximately $4–5 billion; (2) various
contractual agreements between Iran and Italian steel firm
Danieli, amounting to $6.1 billion; and (3) an agreement
between Iran and infrastructure firm Condotte d’Acqa worth
approximately $4.3 billion. These agreements are primarily
related to developments in steel and the mineral sector.286 The
overture by President Rohani was enthusiastically positive as he
stressed that Iran’s market “offers Italian and European
investors the opportunity to establish themselves in the entire
region.”287
Iran’s major agreement with the Italian partners was in the
area of oil and gas.288 In a memorandum of understanding signed
between the Italian ENI Oil Company and National Iranian Gas
Export Company, the parties agreed to work on exploration,
exploitation, and development of natural gas resources in
Iran.289 However, Matteo Renzi, the former Prime Minister of
Italy, whose country was a major European beneficiary of the
JCPOA accord, acknowledged during his post-JCPOA visit to

(Feb. 10, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-02/10/c_135087227.
htm.
285 Id.
286 Steve Scherer & Massimiliano Di Giorgio, Italy’s Danieli to sign $4
billion in agreements with Iran: government source, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-europe-danieli-c-idUSKC N0V3128.
287 Iran, Italy sign up to $18.4bn contracts, IRAN PROJECT (Jan. 26, 2016),
http://theiranproject.com/blog/2016/01/26/iran-italy-sign-up-to-18-4bn-contracts/.
288 See Nasser Karimi, Iran and Italy Sign Several Deals During Visit by
PM Renzi, AP: THE BIG STORY (Apr. 12, 2016, 2:40 PM), http://bigstory.
ap.org/article/0a37f20a0a0045dd9ca74196456d68cf/iran-and-italy-sign-several-deals-during-visit-pm-renzi.
289 See Iran, Italy ink 6 MoUs, Agreements, IRAN-BUSINESS NEWS (Apr. 13,
2016), http://www.iran-bn.com/2016/04/13/iran-italy-ink-6-mous-agreeme nts/;
Iran and Italy sign cooperation agreements on energy, ENERDATA (Apr. 14,
2016), http://www.enerdata.net/enerdatauk/press-and-publication /energy news-001/iran-and-italy-sign-cooperation-agreements-energy_36818.html.
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Iran that the main issue would be bank credits.290 These bank
credits, consisting of establishing banking links and opening
credit lines, were emphasized by the Italian party as “key to
strong economic and trade flourishing.”291
C. Investment and Commercial Agreements with German
Companies
Since Iran started its industrial modernization program
over 100 years ago, German companies have been the traditional
investment and commercial partners of Iran in various business
transactions. After the JCPOA, a representative of Siemens
indicated: “We have a close dialogue with the Iranian
government and local partners in the area of infrastructure,
energy and technology. We have been active in Iran for 150
years . . . and we have never left the country.”292 Thus postJCPOA, Iran has sought various German companies’
cooperation with the Islamic Republic. There are also reports
that Iran’s National Petrochemical Company (“NPC”) is
negotiating with investors from Germany who “have expressed
their readiness to invest €4 to €8 billion in petrochemical
projects” in Iran.293
D. Iran’s Transactions with the United States
1. Iran’s Commercial Transactions with U.S.
Corporations
With a population of approximately 80 million, including a
large generation composed of educated, middle class young
people with a vigorous demand for travel after decades of
isolation, Iran represents one of the few remaining untapped
world markets for multinational corporations, such as Boeing,

290 Iran, Italy ink 7 agreements as Renzi visits Tehran, TEHRAN TIMES
(Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/300555/Iran-Italy-ink-7agreements-as-Renzi-visits-Tehran.
291 Id.
292 See Andrew Ward, Iran opens talks with Siemens and Rolls-Royce on
energy investment, FT.COM (July 17, 2016), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/270
ada6c-4a87-11e6-b387-64ab0a67014c.html#axzz4HzbWIjvr.
293 German Chemical Firms First to Fund Iran Petchem Projects, IRAN
DAILY (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.iran-daily.com/News/136083.html.
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Royal Dutch Shell, and Airbus.294 Historically, the U.S.–Iranian
commercial relationship has been vibrant.295 Prior to the Islamic
Revolution, American exporters sold annually $3.7 billion worth
of products to Iran.296 Iran also exported annually $2.9 billion
worth of Iranian products to the United States.297 In general,
exports from the United States to a foreign country are subject
to, and governed by, Export Administration Regulations
(EAR).298 The EAR are issued by the Department of Commerce’s
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).299
After the JCPOA accord, some U.S. companies began taking
preliminary steps toward engagement with Iran. The Boeing
Company, a Delaware corporation, is one of the most noteworthy
U.S. companies engaged in such negotiations.300 In early 2016,
Iran expressed interest in purchasing 737 jets and 777 longrange planes from the Chicago-based manufacturer.301
Commercial aircraft sales to Iran currently fall into a special
permitted category of post–JCPOA regulations. The U.S.
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has
provided a “Statement of Licensing Policy” (“SLP”), under which
U.S. and non-U.S. persons, including corporate entities, may
request specific authorization from OFAC to engage in
transactions “for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and

294 See Iran, with an educated populace of 80 million, becomes a potentially major aviation force, CAPA (June 1, 2016), http://www. centreforaviation.com/analysis/iata-iran-with-an-educated-populace-of-80-million-becomes-a-potentially-major-aviation-force-282989. For more on Iran’s
agreement with Royal Dutch Shell, see Monavar Khalaj, Andrew Ward, & Anjli
Raval, Shell signs provisional oil and gas deal with Iran, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 7,
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/fa879b24-bc8c-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080.
295
See Iran, the United States and a Political Seesaw, NYTIMES.COM,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/04/07/world/middleeast/iran-timeline.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2017) (“Far from a monolithic relationship, Iran
and the United States have spent as many decades as friends as they have as
enemies.”).
296 Kenneth Gilpin, Iran-U.S. Trade Up from 1980 Plunge, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 1983, at D4.
297 Id.
298 See 15 C.F.R. § 730.1.
299 Id.
300 Jon Ostrower & Robert Wall, Boeing Meets with Iranian Airlines to
Discuss Jets, Aircraft Services, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2016, at A2.
301 Id.
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related parts and services to Iran.”302 According to the special
licensing provision:
As of Implementation Day of the JCPOA, specific licenses may
be issued on a case-by-case basis to authorize U.S. persons and,
where there is a nexus to U.S. jurisdiction, non-U.S. persons to
(1) export, re-export, sell, lease, or transfer to Iran commercial
passenger aircraft for exclusively civil aviation end-use, (2)
export, re-export, sell, lease, or transfer to Iran spare parts and
components for commercial passenger aircraft, and (3) provide
associated services, including warranty, maintenance, and
repair services and safety-related inspections, for all the
foregoing, provided that licensed items and services are used
exclusively for commercial passenger aviation. 303

Licenses issued under the SLP are designed to ensure that
aircraft sold to Iran will not be resold to any person on the
Treasury Department’s sanctions list.304 Prior to leaving office,
the Obama Administration reportedly agreed that Boeing could
enter into negotiations with select Iranian carriers.305 Under
present conditions, however, the Boeing deal may be highly
complex for a number of reasons, including questions regarding
potential dual-use of commercial equipment sold under the
agreement, the potential impact that dual-use could have on
U.S. national security, intellectual property concerns, and the
deal’s conformity with the JCPOA accord.
2. The Dual Use Contractual Agreements- Sale of
Aircraft to Iran
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), any U.S. license application to sell dual use items to
Iran is reviewed under a presumption of denial.306 Accordingly,
Office of Foreign Asset Control, Statement of licensing policy for activities related to the export or re-export to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Jan. 16, 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
Documents/lic_pol_statement_aircraft_jcpoa.pdf.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Ostrower & Wall, supra note 300.
306 22 C.F.R. § 126.1; see also KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 4 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp /crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf (noting that the Export Administration Act, continued by
IEEPA, requires “a presumption of denial of any license applications to sell
302
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any licenses to sell aircraft to Iran will be contingent on their
exclusive use for commercial aviation purposes. Therefore, in
any commercial agreement, such as the sale of aircraft to Iran,
significant operational issues concerning surveillance and
reliability will arise. Such operational issues are not per se
related to enforcement of the Boeing contract, and may only
become apparent during or after the contract’s implementation.
This is because some of Iran’s extra-constitutional institutions
may have aided and abetted acts of terrorism while
camouflaging as commercial or charity organizations.
One such company is Mahan Air, a private Iranian airline
company which is engaged in the customary commercial airline
business of transporting passengers, but has also reportedly
participated in operations to carry weapons and paramilitaries
through various Iranian cities to a suspected IRGC hub in
Abadan, Iran, and from there to their ultimate destination:
Damascus.307 Mahan Air is owned by a ‘charity’ establishment,
Mol-Al-Movahedin Charity Institute, which the U.S. has linked
to the IRGC.308 Predictably, the U.S. Treasury Department has
designated Mahan Air as a Specially Designated National
(“SDN”) on account of its “providing financial, material and
technological support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps’-Quds Force.”309 Specifically, the Treasury Department

dual use items to Iran.”).
307 Armin Rosen, This Iranian airline is one of the Assad regime’s lifelines,
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 13, 2015). http://www.businessinsider.com/this-iranian-airline-is-one-of-the-assad-regimes-lifelines-2015-10 (last visited Jan. 24, 2017)
(reporting the statement of Emanuele Ottolenghi, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, that at times the flights take place unannounced, and do not broadcast their actual destination).
308 Press Release, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, Treasury Sanctions Supporters
of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program and Terrorism-Designated Mahan Air (Mar.
24, 2016) https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
jl0395.aspx [hereinafter Mahan Air Sanctions Press Release] (reporting that
“Mahan Air was previously designated in October 2011 pursuant to E.O. 13224
for providing financial, material, and technological support to the IRGC-Qods
Force (IRGC-QF). The IRGC-QF was previously designated on October 25,
2007 pursuant to E.O. 13224 for its support to numerous terrorist groups.”);
Anna Mahjar-Barducci, Terror Air: Airlines Providing Material Support for
Terrorists, GATESTONE INST. (Dec. 7, 2011), https://www.gatestone institute.org/2563/airlines-support-terrorists.
309
Press Release, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, Treasury Designates Iranian
Commercial Airline Linked to Iran’s Support for Terrorism, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg 1322.aspx; see also Omar S. Bahir

75

76

PACE INT’L L. REV.

[Vol. 29:1

sanctioned nine aircraft associated with Mahan Air in March of
2015 on the grounds that the airline company helped the IRGC
to “ferry operatives, weapons, and funds in support of the
[Syrian President] Asad regime,” an identification which would
presumably make it “more difficult for Iran to use receptive
practices to try to evade sanctions.”310
These dual-use issues create additional complexities with
respect to day-to-day operational issues; it is difficult to make a
clear distinction between the usual operations of a traditional
‘state-owned’ company and a ‘private’ company when each is
engaged in the same line of commercial activities. On March 24,
2016, OFAC designated Mahan Air as an entity in support of
Iran’s ballistic missile program.311 Shortly thereafter, a bill was
submitted in Congress “[t]o prohibit the Secretary of the
Treasury from authorizing certain transactions by a U.S.
financial institution in connection with the export or re-export of
a commercial passenger aircraft to the Islamic Republic of
Iran.”312 This bill attempted to “prohibit U.S. financial
institutions from facilitating the sale of commercial aircraft to
Iran,” thereby preventing planes from falling into the wrong
hands, and would provide conditions for engaging in such
transactions with Iranian entities.313 However, once Boeing sells
its planes to Iran, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for
the U.S.-based company to engage in effective and workable
surveillance with respect to any relationship between stateowned Iran Air and privately owned carriers that may
conceivably employ their aircraft for a dual-use purpose.
These security hazards concerning Boeing’s transactions
with Iran are compounded by the fact that even if the Trump
Administration and the Treasury Department were able to undo
the Boeing deal, there would nevertheless be similar
and Eric Lorber, Boeing’s Art of the Iran Deal: How to Use Civilian Aircraft to
Pressure the Regime, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Aug. 28, 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2016-08-28/boeings-art-iran-deal; see also Paul Bucala,
Here’s How Iranian Airlines Are Violating Sanctions, NAT’L INTEREST (July 14,
2016),
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/heres-how-iranian-airlinesare-violating-sanctions-16958.
310 Sohrab Ahmari, The Mullahs’ Syrian Airlift Gets a Boost, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 17, 2016, at A15 (quoting the U.S. Treasury Department).
311 Mahan Air Sanctions Press Release, supra note 308.
312 H.R. 5711, 114th Cong. (2016).
313 Id.
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outstanding transactions between Iran and the French aircraft
manufacturing company Airbus. Airbus, the world’s second
largest plane maker after Boeing, has entered into an agreement
with the Islamic Republic of Iran to deliver 100 planes to Iran
Air.314 This contract is valued at over $18 billion. In mid-January
of 2017, the first of 100 planes that Iran expected to receive
through its landmark deal with Airbus landed in Iran’s
airport.315 The introductory French deliveries of the aircraft to
Iran notwithstanding, the United States could use its leverage
in order to contain the Airbus contract to complete the
transaction. Even though Airbus is a European company, it
could be subject to, and impacted by, U.S. regulatory
restrictions.316 For example, OFAC regulations concerning
transactions with Iran could easily be reapplied or
reinterpreted. 317 In addition, the Treasury Department could
choose to broaden the SDN list.318 These regulations could
somewhat restrict foreign corporate entities doing business with
Iran.
Further, in a practical sense, Airbus needs to cooperate with
Boeing. Airbus jets contain many American parts and
technology that are subject to American export controls.319 In
fact, prior to entering into its agreement with Iran, Airbus

314 Robert Wall, Jet Deals with Iran to Test Trump Policies, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 23, 2016, at B1.
315
“Historic Day” as Iran’s first Airbus jet lands in Tehran, PRESSTV
http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2017/01/12/505915/Historic-Day-as-Iran-landsfirst-Airbus-jet (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
316 See John P. Barker & Michael E. Ginsberg, Managing Compliance
with U.S. Treasury Department OFAC Obligations: Even If Your Business Is
Exclusively Outside the U.S., 5 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J 183 (2010),
http://files.arnoldporter.com/kluwer%20—%20ofac.pdf (“The regulations define the term ‘‘subject to U.S. jurisdiction’’ to include U.S. citizens, U.S. residents, corporations and other organizations organized under the laws of the
U.S., and corporations or other organizations owned or controlled by U.S. citizens or corporations and other organizations organized under the laws of the
U.S.”).
317 See 31 C.F.R. § 560.101 (“Differing foreign policy and national security
circumstances may result in differing interpretations of similar language
among the parts of this chapter.”).
318 Barker & Ginsberg, supra note 316, at 184 (“OFAC can and will impose sanctions on non-U.S. companies, including, if the violations are sufficiently severe, adding a company to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs)
list and thereby severely limiting trade with the U.S.”).
319 See Wall, supra note 314.
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received a general approval from the U.S. Treasury.320
Therefore, in the event that Iran Air did not, or could not, adhere
to the strict commercial terms of the agreement between Iran
Air and Airbus, OFAC could review the original permit of Airbus
and decide whether or not American suppliers could continue
delivering parts or technical equipment to Airbus. Admittedly,
this is not a perfect solution, and it is conceivable that after
Airbus and/or Boeing effectuate delivery, Iran’s extraconstitutional entities could use a number of American or
French planes (or available local aircraft) for restricted noncommercial purposes.
3. The Iran-Boeing Contract and U.S. National Security
Considerations
Despite the inclusion of Treasury Department provisions
concerned with preventing major Iranian companies from using
Western aircraft for anything other than strictly commercial
activities, enforcement or policing of such provisions once the
aircraft reach Iran will prove a complex task. The Iran-Boeing
deal and similar contracts create three issues related to the U.S.
national security: First, it is not clear how a U.S. company, such
as Boeing, could reasonably or reliably surveil operational
activities within Iran to ensure that an impermissible
commingling of finances will not take place during or after a
given subject transaction. Second, given the nature of the airline
business, it would not be practical— much less possible—for an
American company, such as Boeing, to monitor activities taking
place in a foreign country, much less the day-to-day operations
of ordinary passengers and persons potentially subject to OFAC
controls. Third, it would be impossible for a U.S. company to
engage in systematic monitoring, intelligence surveillance, or
classifications with respect to cargo—much less passengers’
luggage—to determine intent to engage in activities that are
illegal under U.S. law.
Iran’s perceived reputation in the United States as a state
sponsor of terrorism has resulted in the creation of substantial
obstacles to financial investment and trade with it or its alter
ego entities. As long as this perception exists, Iran will be subject

320

Id.
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to intermittent restrictions to international credit facilities and
financing for products and services that international financial
organizations could otherwise provide. For example, the U.S.
Exim Bank is unlikely to make financial guarantees for any sale
of U.S. export products to Iran while Iran is listed as a state
sponsor of terrorism.321
4. Intellectual Property Protection Issues
Another issue of concern in contemporary international
transactions is the protection of intellectual property.322 Iran has
enacted the “Patents, Industrial Designs and Trademarks
Registration Act” to provide such protections.323 However, this
law provides rather weak oversight for intellectual property.
According to one study by U.S. based advocacy group “Property
Rights Alliance,” Iran ranked 111th out of 131 countries for
intellectual property safeguards.324
Under the “Patents,
Industrial Designs and Trademarks Registration Act”, the
owner of intellectual property has the privilege to certain rights
against infringement, including the following:
a) The exploitation of the patented invention in Iran by persons
other than the owner of the patent shall require the agreement
of the latter. Exploitation of a patented invention includes any
of the following acts:
1) If the patent has been granted for a product:
i)making, exporting and importing, offering for sale,
selling or using;
ii)stocking such product for the purpose of offering for
sale, selling or using;
2) If the patent has been granted with respect of a process:
i)using the process;

321 Wall, supra note 314 (reporting that even while representatives of
Boeing were negotiating with Iran, Fred Hochberg, the Chairman of the Exim
Bank stated that: “we are not stepping into Iran.”).
322 See Gerald J Mossinghoff, The Importance of Intellectual Property Protection in International Trade, 7 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 235 (1984).
323
QANUNEH SABT EKHTERA’AT, TARHHAYEH SAN’ATI VA ‘ALAEM TEJARI
[Patents, Industrial Designs and Trademarks Registration Act] 1386 [2008]
(Iran), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=197776.
324 See Cyrus Amir Mokri and Hamid Biglari, A Windfall for Iran? The
End of Sanctions and the Iranian Economy, 94 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 25, 28 (2015).
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ii) doing any of the acts referred to in paragraph (a) (1) of the
present Article in respect of a product obtained directly by
means of the process.
b) The owner of the patent shall, subject to subsection c) thereof
and Article 17 [of this Act], have the right to institute court
proceedings against any person who performs any of the acts
referred to in paragraph (a) above and infringes the patent
rights or performs any other acts which will result in
infringement of his rights.325

As to Iran’s commercial transactions abroad, U.S. concerns
with the concept of intellectual property are broadly twodimensional; they concern both national security issues and the
value of the intellectual property, in the traditional legal sense,
to the owner (e.g. a corporate entity). Challenges to the valuation
of aircraft transactions will be of great significance with respect
to not only the sale of aircraft or other manufactured products to
Iran, but also to technical procedures employed in exploration,
exploitation, and production of oil and natural gas with the
assistance of foreign companies. In this respect, Iran has laws
that may reasonably protect relevant intellectual property. For
instance, the “Act for Protection of Authors’, Composers’ and
Artists’ Rights” protects “any technical work, innovation and
initiation.”326
In terms of its international obligations
concerning intellectual property, Iran has signed and ratified
the Stockholm Convention Establishing the World Intellectual
Property Organization of July 1967.327 Moreover, Iran has
included the WIPO Convention in its compilation of the articles
of its civil code.328

325
QANUNEH SABT EKHTERA’AT, TARHHAYEH SAN’ATI VA ‘ALAEM TEJARI
[Patents, Industrial Designs and Trademarks Registration Act] 1386 [2008],
art. 15 (Iran), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=197776.
326
See QANUNI HEMAYAT HUQUQ MUALEFYN VA MUSENEFAN W
HONARMANDAN [Act for Protection of Authors’, Composers’ and Artists’ Rights]
1348 [1970], art. 10 (Iran), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp? file_id
=197798.
327 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1770, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WIPO
Convention]. The WIPO Convention was amended on October 2, 1979, and entered into force on June 1, 1984.
328
See Golamreza Hojati Ashrafi, Complete Compilation of Laws and
Regulations of Civil Law.
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For purposes of the Iran-Boeing deal, Iran’s most relevant
international intellectual property obligations could be derived
from its indirect relationship with the World Trade Organization
(WTO).329 Iran is not a member of the WTO, partly as a result of
U.S. objections and veto power.330 Nevertheless, in the absence
of Iran’s accession to an effective internationally bonded
intellectual property obligation, a somewhat viable alternative
for Boeing and Airbus could be:
1.

Conducting independent investigations for the purpose of
collecting intelligence that will ensure that Iran Air is
engaged exclusively in the business of commercial
transportation;
Conducting periodic intellectual property audits;
Limiting disclosures by Boeing or Airbus concerning
intellectual property rights;
Ensuring, to the extent possible, that state-owned Iran Air
will not sell or lease its aircraft to privately owned Mahan Air,
or other private airlines, such as Iran Aseman Airline
Company, without adequate security surveillance;
Ensuring that Iran Air will not fly its aircraft to politically or
strategically volatile regions (such as Syria, Yemen, Libya,
certain parts of Iraq, and North Korea);
Ensuring in the contract that Iran will not transfer or allow a
real or corporate person to have access to the intellectual
property owned by Boeing; and
Ensuring that Iran Air will not allow other airlines such as
Mahan Air or Iran Aseman Airlines to use Iran Air’s aircraft,
parts, or equipment.331

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

Boeing and Airbus could also provide contractual
stipulations for snap inspections or remote real-time
surveillance in various cities in which Iran Air provides
passenger, flight, or cargo services.
For the role of the WTO as to the member countries’ obligations on
intellectual property see: Frank X Curci, Protecting Your Intellectual Property
Rights Overseas, 15 Transnat’ Law 15, 28 (2002).
330
See Maysam Bizaer, Long road ahead for Iran’s bid to join World
Trade Organization, AL-MONITOR (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/iran-world-trade-organization-wto-acce ssionbid.html.
331 Omar S. Bahir and Eric Lorber, Boeing’s Art of the Iran Deal: How to
Use Civilian Aircraft to Pressure the Regime, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Aug. 28, at 16.
329
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Considering the vastly different Iranian and U.S.
governmental structures and division of governmental powers
with respect to the enforcement of contractual obligations, these
measures are admittedly difficult to enforce.332 Further, there is
no reference in the JCPOA accord that would compel Iran to
follow specific principles with respect to signatory countries’
patent and intellectual property laws in effectuating its
investment and commercial agreements with the 5+1 countries.
Moreover, there is no provision granting JCPOA signatories
the right of inspection with respect to any technology transferred
to Iran based on signatory states’ commercial agreements with
Iran. Nevertheless, in the absence of a viable alternative with
respect to intellectual property protection by the 5+1 countries,
the provisions, as indicated above, are the only viable
requirements which could probably be monitored to any degree
through remote legal control. In addition, Boeing and Airbus
could contractually stipulate that they will provide services,
spare parts, know-how, and training to Iran Air, if Iran Air
reciprocates with certain contractual and security assurances.
Another issue concerning post-sanction trade with Iran that
could attenuate some of these security issues relates to the use
of U.S. currency in the international market. The dominant
status of the U.S. dollar in global commercial transactions
makes it a medium of exchange between bartered commodities
among nations.333 Thus, the U.S. dollar is frequently used in
transactions between two countries to set a price-evaluation for

332 See Wagdy Sawahel, Iran’s New Law On IP Protection Moves It Onto
International Stage, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 13, 2008), http://www.ipwatch.org/2008/06/13/irans-new-law-on-ip-protection-moves-it-onto-international-stage/ (relating key provisions of Iran’s 2008 intellectual property law;
reporting that “[t]he Iranian law has attempted to harmonise itself with existing laws and practices to the extent possible . . . But there are some fundamental differences that cannot be removed, such as nullifying IPR protection when
a public interest matter arises.”). An important problem for a foreign contractual party in Iran may be the pressures that the foreign company might sustain
from extra-constitutional institutions or on account of corrupt practices.
333 See Bradley Klapper and Matthew Lee, Officials: US considers easing
ban on dollars to help Iran, AP (Mar. 31, 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/ article/d527c4f64b464801a2ed4573a13b4627/officials-us-mulls-new-rules-dollarshelp-iran.
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products or services.334 In this respect, the availability of the
dollar to Iranian banks is of vital interest.335
The influence and enforcement power of the United States
government lies in its predominance in the world financial
system. Thus, in the event that an unforeseeable security issue
appears on the horizon, a congressional act could conceivably
prevent U.S. banks from providing credit for the Iran-Boeing
deal. These contingencies are not ordinary commercial
provisions, and should only be used as a last resort. Further, as
noted above, OFAC could revoke Boeing’s license to sell aircraft
to Iran.336
5. U.S. Aspirations Under the JCPOA Accord
The JCPOA accord does not deal with questions other than
Iran’s obligations with respect to production of nuclear
substances at the weaponry level. Nevertheless, the accord was
intended to be a prelude for a broader rapprochement between
Iran on the one hand and major political and economic powers of
the world on the other. For the Western signatories to the
accord, this meant (or so they hoped) that Iran would review its
policies with respect to two major complaints on part of the
United States and other major Western powers: First, the
question of Iran’s policies on human rights and second the
question as to claims by the European countries and specifically
the U.S. with respect to perceived acts of extrajudicial killings.
The parties to the JCPOA accord understood that Iran and other
negotiating partners of that accord, would live up to their
international commitments. The Department of State has
emphasized that “the government of Iran’s actions beyond the
nuclear issue, including its destabilizing activities in the Middle
East and its human rights abuses at home [including] Iran’s
support for terrorist groups like Hizballah, . . . are at odds with
U.S. interests, and pose fundamental threats to the region and
beyond.”337 However, in the United States the defensive policies

See id.
Id.
336 See Bart Jansen, House to debate blocking loans for Boeing sale to
Iran, USA TODAY (Nov. 10, 2016, 3:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/2016/11/10/house-debate-boeing-plane-sale-iran/93601314/.
337 Iran’s Recent Actions and Implementation of the JCPOA, Testimony
334
335
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adopted through courts and judicial proceedings have been more
effective than the forces expressed through other means. Under
the current law, and the Supreme Court decision, U.S.-based
assets owned by the Iranian government, including those owned
by the Central Bank of Iran, are likely to be available to U.S.
judgment creditors for post-judgment execution.338 This could
include any assets present in the U.S. for the purchase of
manufactured items, such as aircraft.
6. Iran’s Security-Based Transactions with the United
States—The Saga of the Heavy Water Trade
Unlike the commercial transactions between Iran and a
number of European countries, the U.S–Iran post- sanction
rapprochement started with primarily a security based
agreement. Iran and the U.S. entered into a seemingly
commercial transaction with a different goal far from
commercial motif. On April 22, 2016, the Obama Administration
entered into an agreement in Vienna whereby the U.S. agreed
to purchase 32 tons of heavy water (a material that is used to
cool uranium) from Iran.339 The fundamental question is what
was the reason for the United States to volunteer in purchasing
the heavy water from Iran?
The justification for such
transaction was, “to aid Iranian trade internationally by
allowing Iran to do business normally conducted in dollars while
abiding by U.S. laws that block Tehran’s use of the American
financial system.”340
of Thomas A. Shannon Jr., Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington D.C., U.S. DEP’T STATE (Apr. 5,
2016), https://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2016/255510.htm. The United States relaxed restrictions on commercial aircraft sales to Iran Air, which remains a
state-owned company. See Seyed Fatemeh Alaei and Annette Andersson, Masters’ Thesis, Privatization: What we learn from failure - A case study of Iran
Air (2014), hv.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2: 732837/fulltext01.pdf. Iran
Air’s “de-listing” by the U.S. Treasury Department, and the ensuing sale of the
aircraft to Iran, would otherwise be subject to Iran Air’s activities within the
framework of the existing U.S. laws. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.206(a)(1).
338 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1329.
339 Jay Solomon, U.S. to Buy Material Used in Iran Nuclear Program,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2016, 7:16 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-buymaterial-used-in-iran-nuclear-program-1461319381. Heavy water is a material that can be used to cool uranium in a process to produce plutonium and
mass-destruction substances.
340 Id.
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The heavy water transaction policy of the Obama
Administration was ill-advised at best and otherwise misguided.
Based on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, with respect
to the generation of the heavy water substance, the Islamic
Republic of Iran agreed that:
Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international and
technological achievement relying on light water for its future
power and research with enhanced international cooperation
including assurance of supply of necessary fuel. There will be
no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy
water in Iran for 15 years.341

Based on the JCPOA accord, Iran agreed to cap its stockpile
of uranium at a maximum of 300 kilograms (661 pounds) for a
period of 15 years.342 Further, the JCPOA caps Iran’s stockpile
of heavy water at 130 metric tons (143.3 U.S. tons).343 However,
any purchase of this heavy water stockpile by another state
would be tantamount to creating a market for Iran’s heavy water
as an ordinary commodity. By purchasing this material, the
United States has effectively encouraged Iran, as a supplier, to
entertain future offers, for profit, of its heavy water in the
international market.344 By purchasing heavy water, and
thereby creating market demand for it, the United States has
enabled the creation of a market price mechanism for the very
substance—plutonium—that the 5+1 countries were trying to
curtail. This directly contradicts an avowed purpose of the
nuclear deal, namely, “to prevent Iran from producing sufficient
fissile material for a nuclear weapon.”345 Therefore, by
purchasing heavy water from Iran, the Obama Administration
provided recurring market demand for such material. If
purchasing heavy water from Iran was a prudent policy, then

The White House, Key Excerpts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/keyexcerpts-joint-comprehensive-plan-action-jcpoa.
342 JCPOA Annex I, supra note 5, at ¶ 14.
343 JCPOA Annex I, supra note 5, at ¶ 14.
344
Solomon, supra note 339 (quoting U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest
Moniz: “That will be a statement to the world: You want to buy heavy water
from Iran, you can buy heavy water from Iran. It’s been done. Even the United
States did it.”).
345 What you need to know about the JCPOA, supra note 35, at 26.
341
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the Obama Administration should have applied the same policy
by purchasing weaponry level uranium from Iran.
Further, under the rules established by the International
Atomic Energy Agency, “the government [of Iran] shall establish
and maintain a governmental, legal and regulatory framework
within which all aspects of decommissioning . . . can be planned
and carried out safely.”346 The purpose of such de-commissioning
of the facilities was to eliminate the possibilities of violation of
the United Nations rules concerning nuclear energy including
radioactive waste and heavy water emanating from
unsupervised facilities.
Nevertheless, the “heavy water” transaction with Iran was
not based on commercial considerations on the part of the United
States. It was a strategically based exchange to protect a broad
accord reached during the negotiations with Iran. It meant to
legalistically, and within the framework of the JCPOA, enable
Iran to enter into investment and trade agreements with
Western countries. Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran should
maintain supplies of heavy water tons to a particular degree.347
Thus, the U.S. agreed on purchasing the “surplus” heavy water
from Iran for $8.6 million. It was agreed that within a few weeks
from the signing of the agreement, the heavy water would be
shipped, under the supervision of the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in
Tennessee.
Therefore, the heavy water deal was not a genuine
commercial arm’s length transaction. The United States entered
into the heavy water agreement for ostensibly security reasons.
That is, not finding a purchaser that might be acceptable to the
United States, the government of Iran may undertake to sell the
heavy water to unreliable buyers. However, there was a clear
signal on part of the Obama Administration that the interested

346 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], IAEA Safety Standards, Decommissioning of Facilities, No. GSR Part 6 (2014), http://www-pub. iaea.org
/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1652web-83896570.pdf.
347 Solomon, supra note 339 (reporting that under the agreement reached
between the 5+1 countries and Iran, the Islamic Republic agreed to maintain
its heavy water below 130 tons during the initial years of the agreement, and
under 90 tons thereafter).
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American companies could purchase heavy water from Iran on a
regular basis.348
The heavy water deal was a state-to-state strategic
transaction with a very heavy political overtone. The U.S.
Government undertook to facilitate the purchase of heavy water,
out of fear that Iran will make the product available to the wrong
people. Historically, Iran has undertaken transactions related to
atomic energy products.349 The purchase of heavy water by the
United States from Iran was a defensive strategy rather than a
deal based on commercial interest.350 There is yet another view
for the heavy water transaction. That is, for the United States
to use Iran’s heavy water substance as an item of commerce.
According to one observer, the Obama Administration’s strategy
with respect to the nuclear agreement with Iran was an
“effective investment in Tehran’s nuclear program through the
purchase of excess heavy water from Iranian reactors.”351 The
Obama Administration’s decision to purchase heavy water from
Iran was a failed strategy. It made the purchase of heavy water
from Iran into an authentic arm’s length transaction in a
competitive market. Worse, the fact is that buying heavy water
from Iran encourages it to supply more heavy water as an
ordinary commodity, reproducing heavy water in significant
quantities and continuing to sell it to foreign markets.
The “commercial” transaction between the United States
and Iran with respect to heavy water was a failed strategy. A
few months after the completion of the first heavy water sale and
shipment of the substance to the United States, the Chairman
of the IAEA’s Board of Directors, on November 9, 2016,
announced that Iran’s inventory of heavy water exceeded 130
348 Solomon, supra note 339, at A7 (reporting that Secretary Moniz had
indicated that the U.S. government would make only one purchase of the heavy
water which could be used to stimulate fissile reactions inside nuclear reactors.
However, the Secretary indicated that “American companies could emerge as
regular buyers of the material in the future.”).
349 For example, in the past, the Islamic Republic has sold low-enriched
uranium to Kazakhstan and Russia. See David Sanger and Andrew Kramer,
Iran Hands Over Stockpile of Enriched Uranium to Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 2015, at A4.
350 Solomon, supra note 339 (reporting that Republican leaders criticized
the Department of Energy’s purchase of the Iranian heavy water and accused
the Obama Administration that it was essentially subsidizing Iranian nuclear
program).
351 Berman, supra note 10.
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metric tons.352 In his report, the Director General of the IAEA
announced on October 25, 2016 that “the Agency verified that
Iran’s stock of heavy water had reached 130 metric tons [and
that] the Director General expressed concerns related to Iran’s
stock of heavy water to the Vice President of Iran and President
of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran, HE Ali Akbar Salehi.”353
Moreover, On November 8, 2016, the IAEA verified that Iran’s
stock of heavy water had reached 130.1 metric tons.354
The original heavy water deal was intended to be a one-time
arrangement in order to lift the remaining barrier on the way to
reaching the JCPOA agreement with Iran. Apparently, such
view was a misconceived notion by the United States and its
European allies. As the subsequent events indicated, after the
discovery of the production by Iran of the heavy water substance
for the second time, the Iranian representative at the
International Atomic Energy Agency expressed the view that “as
far as the additional quantity of heavy water is concerned, Iran’s
sole obligation, based on the JCPOA accord, was to offer the
[additional] substance in international markets.”355 The Director
of the IAEA has stated that it’s important that in the future Iran
would refrain from such transactions so that the confidence of
the international community as to the enforcement of the
JCPOA, which is the test of truthfulness of Iran, shall
maintain.356
Another problem with the heavy water issue is that neither
Iran, the United States, the IAEA, nor the European Union,
which oversees the implementation of the JCPOA accord, had
clearly defined what they count as “unrecoverable” material uranium that is genuinely impossible to separate out and
redeploy.357 The heavy water buyback would also lengthen Iran’s
352 See Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Verification and Monitoring
in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2231, at 2, IAEA Doc. GOV/2016/55 (Nov. 9, 2016), https://
www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/16/11/gov2016-55.pdf (Report by Director General Yukia Amano).
353 Id. at 2.
354 Id.
355
Statement by Reza Najafi, Representative of Iran in the IAEA,
www.ParsTV.com, Nov. 18, 2016. [hereinafter Najafi Statement] (translated
from Farsi by the author).
356 Najafi Statement, supra note 355.
357 Lawrence Norman, West Attempts to Fortify Iran Deal, WALL ST. J.,
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so-called “breakout” time that is the time that would be needed
to accumulate enough material to produce one nuclear weapon
were it to quit or violate the deal.358 Nevertheless, it is highly
improbable that, in the absence of any judicial recourse, the
United States and other signatory countries of the JCPOA could
maintain a reliable surveillance of, or self-restraint by, Iran with
respect to commercial transactions on heavy water substance.
According to Yokio Amono of the IAEA, Iran has indicated a
willingness to reduce its heavy water stockpile.359
7. U.S. Commercial Transactions with Iran that
Remain Prohibited
Contrary to the general impression prevailing in Iran, U.S.
sanctions against public and private corporations in Iran are
still largely in place. As far as the U.S. is concerned, there may
be investment or trade activities in the future between U.S.
companies and Iranian corporations, but these will be subject to
the limitations established by the U.S. Department of the
Treasury.
The first of these limitations comes in the form of banking
restrictions. Sanction control applies to major Iranian banks
including the Central Bank of Iran and important private banks,
and joint ventures with foreign banks are restricted in their
international banking transactions. For over a decade the
United States has forced foreign banks to refrain from doing
business with Iran and has cut off Iranian banks’ activities with
the United States.360 The restrictive list also includes banks that

Nov. 25, 2016, at 1.
358 Id.
359 Lawrence Norman, U.N. Presses Iran to Follow Accord, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 18, 2016, at A9.
360 Harvard Kennedy School, Belffer Center for Science and International
Affairs, Sanctions Against Iran: a Guide to Targets, Terms and Timetables.
Addendum to Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal, at 18 (June 2015), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Iran%20Sanctions.pdf. The major Iranian banks
sanctioned by the United States include: Bank Markazi, (the Central Bank of
Iran) Bank Mellat, Bank Saderat , Bank Melli; the Housing Bank of Iran (Bank
Maskan); Export Bank (Bank Saderat);Agricultural Bank (Bank Keshavarzi);
Army Bank (Bank Sepah); and the Bank of Commerce (Bank Tejarat). Iran,
What You Need to Know About U.S. Economic Sanctions: An overview of
O.F.A.C. Regulations involving Sanctions against Iran, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY
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were originally established to assist groups with ideological
purposes but are presently engaged in primarily normal banking
business. Banks that are on the sanction list include ones
established as a result of a joint venture between Iranian and
foreign banks.361 The second limitation consists of oil companies
including the National Iranian Oil Company (“NIOC”), Naft Iran
(the “Iran Oil”), NAFT Iran Inter-trade Company (“Naft-Iran”),
NICO, Iran Petrochemical Commercial Company, Iran
Petrochemical Trading Company, and Iran Petrochemical
Commercial Company.
The third limitation consists of mining companies including
Iranian Mines and Mining Industries Development and
Renovation Organization. The fourth limitation is steel
companies and companies engaged in heavy industrial activities
such as Ahvaz Steel Commercial and Technical Service GMBHASCOTEC, and Metal & Mineral Trade. The fifth limitation is
the service companies, including Iran Insurance Company
(“Bimeh Iran”). Finally, the sixth limitation consists of the
Iranian companies with branches abroad including Iranian Oil
Company (UK).362
E. U.S. Sanctions Against Iran—A Misguided Policy
After the U.S. rapprochement with Iran concerning
Iran’s adherence to the nuclear-based weapons restrictions,
continuation of strictly commercial sanctions against Iran is

(Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.pdf(cataloguing “persons determined to be the Government of Iran” and clarifying financial activities related to Iran that are prohibited by the Department of the Treasury).
361 See, e.g., Tom Arnold & Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, Small Banks Help
Iran Slowly Restore Foreign Financial Ties, REUTERS (June 15, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/iran-banks-idUSL8N19637F (reporting on
German Iranian Trade Bank, Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG). Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG is a joint venture between Iranian and
German banks.
362 This is only a sample list naming a few, though significant, companies
in Iran. For a comprehensive list of Iranian companies sanctioned by the U.S
Government: See JCPOA-related Designation Removals, JCPOA Designation
Updates, Foreign Sanctions Evaders Removals, NS-ISA List Removals; 13599
List Changes, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www .treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/updated_names.aspx.
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confusing and, at times, an exercise in futility. Consider the
following examples.
1. U.S. Shares in Foreign Companies
There are numerous foreign companies in which U.S.
persons, real or juridical, own corporate or partnership shares.
It is unclear whether such foreign corporations will be subject to
the Treasury Department’s regulatory rules.
Consider Alibaba Group Holding, Ltd., a China-based
international telecommunications company. Originally, Yahoo,
an American computer company, owned an approximately 20%
share of Alibaba. Under the strict interpretation of the U.S.
Treasury guidelines, Yahoo was unable to enter into any
business agreement with an Iranian corporation. Yahoo could,
however, have achieved the same goal through Alibaba by
providing the necessary manpower and capital to its corporate
partner in China and thus, through the Chinese partner, could
have participated vicariously in business with Iranian
companies.
2. Internal Transactions and Opaque Deals among
Commercial Entities in Iran
The post-Islamic revolution business atmosphere in Iran,
personified by the customary process of decision-making at the
vertical level, has made policy decisions for large companies a
part of Iran’s governmental strategy. Under such a scheme,
profits made by Company A, as a result of an international
commercial agreement, may be shared by Company B. It must
be added that there are no antitrust laws or per se illegality
concerning price-fixing or market division in Iran. Thus, an
accord between a U.S. corporation and a non-sanctioned Iranian
company may indeed benefit the sanctioned Iranian company as
well. The following example shows the inter-company
transactions that could obfuscate the internal transactional deal
between two companies, defeating the very purpose of the
sanction applied to a target company. As indicated earlier in
mid-2016, Iran Air, the largest Iranian air passenger company,
requested to purchase 80 new commercial planes from Boeing to
rejuvenate its aging aircraft. According to the Department of the
Treasury, another Iranian airline company, “Mahan Air,” has
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been on the sanction list of the Treasury Department’s OFAC for
a number of years for air lifting terrorist groups or participation
in terrorist activities. Thus, in addition to the Iranian company,
on March 24, 2016 the Treasury Department sanctioned those
companies who were accomplices to Iranian Mahan Air.363
The proposed Boeing-Iran Air deal has been sharply
criticized on the grounds that “once the planes are in Iran, there
would be no way to prevent the regime’s Revolutionary Guards
[IRGC] from using them for airlifts to support Syria’s President
Bashar Assad and Lebanese Hezbollah.”364 As a result, a
transaction which is meant to be strictly commercial, might lead
into a non-commercial activity, prohibited by the U.S. laws and
regulations.
It is frequently said that if Iran violates main conditions of
the JCPOA, the U.S. will be able to “snapback” sanctions. This
is not a realistic observation. Snapping back the past sanctions
could “jeopardize billions of dollars of unpaid contracts to
American and European companies and banks.”365

3. The U.S. Tax Policy vis-à-vis the Treasury’s Sanctions
Policy
The 35% U.S. federal corporate tax is the highest among the
developed countries of the world. There is a natural incentive on
the part of the U.S. global companies against repatriation of
capital and profits to the U.S. One of the implications of the U.S.
punitive tax policy is for the U.S. companies to sell their
interests to foreign corporations to do business abroad. For
example, according to a report by Ernst and Young’s Business
Roundtable, a 25% U.S. corporate tax rate “would have
prevented foreign purchases of 1300 U.S. companies.”366
363 See Press Release, Treasury Sanctions Supporters of Iran’s Ballistic
Missile Program and Terrorism-Designated Mahan Air, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY
(Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
jl0395.aspx.
364 See Emanuele Ottolenghi & Mark Dubowitz, The Boeing Sale to Iran
Runs into Turbulence, WALL ST. J. (July 13, 2016), http://www.wsj.com /articles/ the-boeing-sale-to-iran-runs-into-turbulence-1468363087. See also notes
307, 308 and accompanying text.
365 Id.
366 James Carter & Ernest Christian, Why Foreign Buyers are snapping
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Further, the high U.S. tax of large corporations has resulted
in an increase in the so-called corporate tax inversions, creating
incentives for U.S. firms to buy foreign companies and transfer
capital abroad where rates are lower “and the territorial system
is employed.”367 Some of this money, directly or indirectly, will
end up in business transactions with emerging countries like
Iran which is in dire need of expanding its commerce and
repairing its long neglected infrastructure.
U.S. corporations, as a partner or shareholder in foreign
corporations, may be liable pursuant to the punitive sanction
regulations of the Treasury Department. Liability will depend
on the degree of the U.S. person’s participation in the foreign
corporation. If the U.S. person (real or juridical) has a controlling
share of the foreign corporate entity, then the U.S. partner will
be subject to the sanction-related restrictions provided by the
Department of the Treasury. In this situation, the Treasury
Department’s rules apply not only to U.S. corporations, but also
to those foreign corporations in which the U.S. person (corporate
or real) has a controlling interest. Furthermore, the prohibition
will include any transfer of funds through the U.S. financial
system or activities that would require special license under the
U.S. Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”).
F. Transactions with Asian and African Countries
1. China
Iran has announced a “new era” of cooperation with China,
and has signed a number of large contracts with that country.
One of these contracts includes the construction of two nuclear
plants in southern Iran. The trading volume between Iran and
China is expected to rise to $600 billion within the next decade
(this is over a tenfold increase from the $55 billion trade in
recent years).368
Iran also has an ambitious plan to expand its railroad. The
expansion would include building the “silk rail” which is aimed
at reaching China by the railroad connection. Iran’s grandiose
up U.S. Companies, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
why-foreign-buyers-are-snapping-up-u-s-companies-1463345130.
367 Id.
368 See Coface 2016 Iran Report, supra note 167.
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plan would cost the Islamic Republic $28 billion. Further, Iran
is planning “to spend $20 billion on roads and $50 billion on
upgrading the country’s Shah-era air fleet and $7 billion on
airports.”369
Ambitiously, China has reportedly agreed to contribute to
the construction of an internal rail from the capital city of
Tehran to the city of Mashhad – a $2 million loan.370 Mashhad
is the city in which the eighth Shia Imam is buried, and many
devout Iranians go there for pilgrimage. Nevertheless, the
nature of the relationship between China and Iran is primarily
business.
2. Japan
Iran has proposed to purchase a total of 25 planes,
Mitsubishi Regional Jets, from Mitsubishi Company. The value
of this contract is estimated to be $500 million. Most of the
planes are to be provided to Iran Aseman Airlines. Mitsubishi
aircraft is also planning to provide Iran with its regional
passenger jets that are currently under development. Iran Air
may also purchase 80-70 seat Mitsubishi Regional Jets for
domestic routes.371
3. South Africa
South Africa was the first African country with a plan to
embark upon the post-JCPOA commercial agreements with
Iran. Iran and South Africa both seek relative commercial
freedom in doing business with African and Asian countries.
Thus, South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma and President
Rohani entered into a trade agreement worth $8 billion to be
carried out by 2020.372
369 Joining the Dots: Some Treats Ahead for Railway Enthusiasts, THE
ECONOMIST (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-andafrica/21695765-some-treats-ahead-railway-enthusiasts-iranu2019s-new-continent-spanning.
370 Joining the Dots, supra note 369.
371 Iran’s Aseman Airline to get Mitsubishi Planes, PAYVAND NEWS (July
21, 2016), http://www.payvand.com/news/16/jul/1118.html.
372 This is a substantial increase in trade between two countries which
stood at about $350 million in 2015. There were reportedly 180 members of the
delegations of South Africa accompanying President Zuma. South Africa’s
Trade with Iran to Rise to $8B: President Zuma, PAYVAND NEWS (Apr. 24,
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G. Availability of Credit for Investment and Commercial
Transactions with Iran, an Environment of Relative
Credibility
Iran’s recourse to the international credit system is a sine
qua non condition for the implementation of its international
commercial and investment agreements with Western countries.
In particular, Iran’s access to SWIFT was vital to enable that
country’s banks and other financial institutions to establish a
credible financial communication with the Western financial
world. Further, the cooperation of a few companies to open credit
with non-member Iranian banks is also significant.
Nevertheless, several factors precipitated the provision of direct
credit to Iran including: (1) the substantial need of Iran to repair
and expand its infrastructure; (2) Iran’s requirements to renew
its commercial activities in the international world market; (3)
Iran’s political stability represented by a relatively moderate
government; (4) Iran’s relatively protective statutory laws
supporting trade and eventually investment; and (5) willingness
of the European companies to enter a market that until now has
been practically closed to them (except through extraconstitutional commercial practices).
However, the availability of SWIFT and Coface banking
instruments would only facilitate financial transactions among
the banks and financial institutions involved in doing business
between foreign companies and Iran. Such facilities would not
per se create credit. As a result, some governments in Europe
initiated providing credit directly to Iran. Availability of such
credit will enable the Islamic Republic, or its state corporations,
to purchase directly from a given source.
Thus, in early April 2016, the Cassa Depsiti e Prestiti,
Italy’s state financing agency, has agreed to issue €4 billion in
credit lines to Iranian public entities in order to enable the
Iranian partners to fund certain infrastructure projects such as
highways and railways. However, this credit is not directly and
exclusively available to Iran. The Italian corporations, in
partnership with Iran, will be involved in the project’s
development and receive a certain portion of such credit from
the creditor. There will also be an additional 800 million pounds

2016), http://www.payvand.com/news/16/apr/1119.html.
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in funding which will be allocated among the Italian companies
doing business in Iran.373 Cassa Depositi e Prestiti is one of the
largest European state financing agencies and controls more
than 350 billion pounds of assets.374 The significance of
providing credit to Iran cannot be underestimated. When
sanctions were the governing policy of Western countries, a
substantial portion of Iran’s foreign commercial transactions
were in cash. There were also bartered transactions between
Iran and countries such as China, Pakistan and a few others. It
is for the first time that Iran, through the provision of financial
allowance by the Italian Sace, is able to have access to an
advance credit. As an Iranian banker commented on the Italian
deal, this could be the most substantial development in
resuming trade between Iran and Europe after the JCPOA.375
It is highly likely that, given the competitive nature of
international commercial banking in Western Europe, Italy’s
initiative in offering credit directly to Iran could be emulated by
other banks in Europe. Iran has a long history of doing business
with Germany, Belgium and Austria. Therefore, it is conceivable
that Belgium’s KBC Group, NV, Germany’s DZ Bank, and
Austria’s Erste Group Bank AG, may soon join Iran’s small
group of creditors. Until the international financing
organizations’ complete resumption of the credit system,
relatively small regional banks located in Italy, the Netherlands
and Germany have reopened letters of credit with nondesignated Iranian banks. The reopening of export credit
agencies’ coverage for Iran will assist facilitating the necessary
credits in which the corresponding banks in Iran will be
involved. Particularly, for products which Iran needs immediate
replacement, the selling companies have agreed to cooperate
with Iran until the credit channels become functional. For
example, in regard to the purchase of a large number of new
airplanes to renew its fleet, Airbus has agreed to accept the
Iranian credit.376

373 Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Italy Extends $5 Billion Credit Line and Export
Guarantees to Iran, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/
aac121ae-00c2-11e6-99cb-83242733f755.
374 Id.
375 Najmeh Bozorgmehr, supra note 373.
376 See Ostrower & Wall, supra note 300 (reporting that enforcement of a
substantial number of these airplanes would be “the biggest signal yet that the
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The line of credit opened by a few European banks does not
mean the end of credit restrictions to Iran. As noted earlier,
certain international credit evaluation organizations, such as
the FATF, as well as the U.S. laws and the President’s executive
orders concerning the threat of terrorism from Iran are still valid
laws of the land. The immediate past history shows that the
violation of the international rules or non-adherence to banking
conventions, or terrorism laws, might result in heavy penalties
for the recalcitrant banks. In 2014, BNP Paribas, a French bank,
had to pay a fine of $8.97 billion for transmitting $30 billion
dollars in transactions mainly to Iran (and a few other countries)
in violation of the laws governing sanctions.377 Further, the
prohibitive statutory provisions in France or Italy, as to the
injunction of doing business with Iran, do not exist or operate
the way they do in the U.S. French or Italian banks could be
more flexible in their banking transactions with Iran. There is
still the nonexistence of export guarantees that threaten the
expansion of trade with Iran. The German government has
expressed its concern that “[b]ecause of high penalties German
banks had to pay in the past due to sanction violations, all
participants are very reluctant. . . . Without any state export
guarantees for deals with Iran, nothing will happen on our
side.”378

U.S. and Iran are moving toward normalized trade relations.”). One of the major reasons for the air travel corporations to enter into an agreement of commercially significant size is in fact the deteriorating financial position of the
major air companies. For example, in its negotiations with Iran to sell reportedly $25 billion worth of aircraft and various related facilities, it was agreed
that Iran would be paying substantially below the catalog price given the scale
of the order. According to one report, “[f]or Airbus, the sale of [the aircraft] is
a significant milestone in securing the future of a program whose survival was
called into question just 12 months ago by the group’s own finance director.
The world’s largest passenger jet has not won in new customer in almost 3
years. . .. [In fact] investors have questioned whether Airbus can recover more
than €10 billion spent on development although it has pledged to break even
on current running costs.” Peggy Hollinger & Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Iran Air to
Buy 118 Airbus Jets, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content
/ac4189d8-c5da-11e5-b3b1-7b2481276e45.
377 Tiffany Kary, Del Quentin Wilber, & Patricia Hurtado, BNP to Pay
Almost $9 Billion to End U.S. Sanctions Probe, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2014, 3:21
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-01/bnp-to-pay-almost9-billion-to-end-u-s-sanctions-probe.
378 Gernot Heller, Balazs Koranyi & Andrew Heavens, German Business
Lobby Says Obstacles Remain to Iran Deals, REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2016),
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The extent of credibility of doing business with Iran using
the banking facilities is relative. Under the JCPOA, the
European banks, which have been holding $55 billion in
repatriated wealth, could allow Iran to have access to such
restricted funds.379 The only exception to that are banks and
companies that are blacklisted by the U.S. However, the
European banks were cautious in letting Iran have access to
such funds.380 Current U.S. policy bars foreign banks from
clearing dollar-based commercial transactions with Iran
through U.S. banks.381 Despite President Obama’s side deals
with Iran concerning lifting sanctions from two Iranian banks,
Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International, such restrictions
are likely to continue during the administration of President
Trump.382

http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-trade-germany-idUKKCN0XP22D (quoting a statement by Anton Boemer, head of the Federation of German Wholesale, Foreign Trade and Services).
379 See Dave Clark, US says European banks should feel free to deal with
Iran, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Apr. 23, 2016, 3:28 AM) (reporting that as of the end of
April 2016, Iran had received only $3 billion of the estimated $50 to 55 billion);
see also AFP, US insists European banks can deal with Iran, DAILY MAIL (Apr.
22, 2016, 5:57 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3554045/USbuy-32-tonnes-heavy-water-Iran.html.
380 See Josh Lederman, U.S. says Iran open for business, but Europe’s
banks disagree, AP (May 12, 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/73fd6c11
e9b6474896cf59a4fc3ba108/us-says-banks-wont-be-punished-lawful-businessiran; see also Remarks Before Meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad
Zarif, U.S. DEP’T STATE (April 22, 2016), https://www.state.gov/secretary /remarks/2016/04/256536.htm
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170118160649/https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/04/256536.htm] (last visited Jan. 5, 2017) (statement of Secretary
of State John Kerry: “the United States is not standing in the way and will not
stand in the way of business that is permitted with Iran since the JCPOA took
effect . . . and there are now opportunities for foreign banks to do business with
Iran. Unfortunately, there seems to be some confusion among some foreign
banks.”). As of January 24, 2017, the page containing Secretary Kerry’s statement has been removed from the Department of State website. It can be accessed via the Internet Archive web address listed above, and is also on file
with the author.
381
See Lesley Wroughton, UPDATE 2-U.S. not against foreign banks
dealing with Iran -Kerry, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/ article/iran-nuclear-kerry-idUSL2N17P1U6.
382 See Jay Solomon & Carol E. Lee, U.S. Signed Secret Document to Lift
U.N. Sanctions on Iranian Banks, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 29, 2016), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-signed-secret-document-to-lift-u-n-sanctions-on-iranian-banks-1475193723 (reporting on secret bank documents signed by the
U.S. during the Obama Administration). During his term, President Obama
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VI. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms between Iran
and Foreign Commercial Companies
An important question concerning the post-JCPOA
international trade agreements, is what kind of forum would be
acceptable for international corporations and Iran in case of any
disagreements between the parties? Under the Constitution of
the Islamic Republic, granting concessions to foreign persons on
commercial, industrial, agricultural, and mineral developments
is absolutely forbidden.383 However, the Iranian Constitution
refers to the duty of the President or his legal representative “to
sign . . . contracts and agreements between the government of
Iran and any other governments . . . after such contracts have
been approved by the Islamic Assembly.”384
Iran has a long history of participating in bilateral treaties
and commercial or non-commercial agreements. In over 170
years, the U.S. Courts have generally applied a strong
presumption with respect to the validity of the treaties. On the
other hand, U.S. precedent indicates an unquestionably high
regard and consideration of U.S. treaty obligations. Even when
there is an apparent inconsistency between the treaty
obligations of the United States and the act of Congress, the
courts have tried to construe the statute to minimize
inconsistencies with the treaty provisions. The U.S. Supreme
Court has followed this tradition since 1801 under the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, where a U.S.
statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international
law or with an international agreement of the United States.385
On August 15, 1955, the United States and Iran entered into
the “Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
between the United States of America and Iran.” The purpose of
this treaty was:

also extended Executive Order 12170 to curb transactions with the Iranian
banks. See Press TV, President Obama extends national emergency against
Iran (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/11/04/492062/ USObama-Iran-national-emergency-.
383
QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHIRI ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 81.
384
QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHIRI ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 125.
385 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 (1987).
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[T]o enter and remain in the territories of the other High
Contracting Party for the purpose of carrying on trade between
their own country and the territories of such other High
Contracting Party and engaging in related commercial
activities . . . [Article 2.] Property of nationals . . . of either
High Contracting Party shall receive the most constant
protection and security within the territories of the other High
Contracting Party. [Article 4.] Each High Contracting Party,
shall accord to the nationals, companies, and commerce of the
other High Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment, as
compared with that accorded to the nationals, companies, and
commerce of any third country. . . [Article 11.]386

The U.S.–Iran Treaty of Amity is an agreement of
commercial nature and was signed for the purpose of developing
commerce and protecting the commercial safety and interest of
the two governments. The Treaty deals with each country’s
interest in protecting that country’s products and preventing
deceptive or unfair trade practices.387 The Treaty of Amity
specifically indicates that, “[b]etween the territories of the two
High Contracting Parties there shall be freedom of commerce
and navigation.”388 Despite the Islamic Revolution of 1979, The
Treaty of Amity has never been abrogated by either signatory
government. Under international law, both Iran and the U.S.
are subject to their treaty obligations.
Iran has strongly endorsed and has effectively employed the
Treaty of Amity. Iran’s policy reaction to Bank Markazi is a case
in point. In Bank Markazi, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
Central Bank of Iran’s claims that it had equitable title to—or
beneficial interest in—assets deposited with Citibank in New
York that totaled over $1.75 billion.389 Shortly thereafter, Iran
instituted a claim against the United States before the ICJ.390 It

386 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the
United States of America and Iran, U.S.-Iran, (Aug. 15, 1955),
http://www.parstimes.com/law/iran_us_treaty.html [hereinafter Treaty of Amity].
387 Treaty of Amity, supra note 386, at art. 8.
388 Id. at art. 10.
389 See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1320-22.
390 See Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, Iran institutes proceedings
against the United States with regard to a dispute concerning alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity (June 15, 2016), http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/164/19032.pdf.
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is likely that in a commercial dispute between Iran and U.S.
corporations, (where the U.S. party is a publicly owned entity),
and in the absence of any other arrangement, that court could
apply the Treaty of Amity as a governing text for any agreement
between the parties.
Traditionally, Iran has resolved its contractual disputes
with foreign corporations through arbitration mechanisms.
Should a dispute arise between Iran and a foreign company, the
following dispute resolution forums may be applied. First, a
dispute resolution mechanism and governing law may be
provided in the contractual agreement between the parties.
Second, a choice of forum could be found in the Iranian Law of
International Commercial Arbitration (“LICA”), which was
passed in 1997 and has been effective and enforced.391 LICA is
based on the UNCITRAL model law.392 LICA adopts the use of
international arbitration if the contractual party to the
arbitration agreement is of non-Iranian nationality.393
With respect to post-sanctions commercial agreements
between Iran and foreign companies, the fundamental question
is what the appropriate dispute resolution mechanism employed
by Iran and its commercial partners would be: adjudication,
mitigation, or arbitration? Post-sanction agreements between
Iran and foreign companies will most likely follow arbitration
mechanisms traditionally employed by Iran in foreign
contractual agreements. Thus, in referring to possible blockages
to the delivery of aircraft purchased by Iran from Airbus or
Boeing, Iranian officials stated emphatically that “[b]oth sides
are committed, and there are scenarios in the contracts for
violation of commitments or in case of force majeure to deal with
those cases.”394 Here, Iran could defer to the international Hague
Arbitration Tribunal, which could serve as a forum for
alternative dispute resolution; Iran has a generally reliable
record of adhering to and enforcing the judgments of

391 See Hamid G. Gharavi, The 1997 Iranian Law on International Commercial Arbitration: The UNCITRAL, Model Law a’ l’Iranienne, 15 ARB. INT’L
85 (1999).
392 Id. at 85.
393 See generally Gharavi, supra note 391.
394 Feliz Solomon, Iran Says It Will Recover ‘Prepayments With Interest’
If Trump Scuppers the $16.6 Billion Boeing Deal, FORTUNE (Dec. 19, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/12/19/iran-boeing-airbus-trump-sanctions/.
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international tribunals. The Hague Arbitration Tribunal’s
verdict, issued almost a year prior to the implementation of the
JCPOA, is a case in point.395 The Iran-Turkey contract was
signed in 1996 between BOTAŞ Petroleum Pipeline Corporation
(“BOTAŞ”), the Turkish national gas company, and the National
Iranian Gas Company (“NIGC”).396 Turkey brought an action
before the Hague Arbitration Tribunal against Iran for nonperformance. Under the agreement between BOTAŞ and the
NIGC, the NIGC would supply Turkey with ten billion cubic
meters of gas annually over a 25 year period.397 Turkey’s petition
related to the NIGC’s alleged non-performance with respect to
the delivery of Iranian natural gas to BOTAŞ.398 In mid-April of
2016, The Hague Arbitration Tribunal entered a judgment of $1
billion dollars against Iran due to the NIGC’s nonperformance.399 According to NIGC officials, Iran will pay $1
billion to Turkey in compliance with the tribunal’s award.
For the aforementioned reasons, any post-sanctions
contractual agreements between Iran and foreign parties will
most likely specify that disputes will be resolved by arbitration.
Considering that Iran has displayed a willingness to comply
with such arbitration awards, international arbitration provides
a reliable means for resolving any dispute that may arise.

395 Verdict on Iran-Turkey Gas Dispute Announced, FIN. TRIB. (Feb. 3,
2016), https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy/35610/verdict-on-iran-turk
ey-gas-dispute-announced.
396 Id.
397 Id.
398 Id.
399 See Verdict on Iran-Turkey Gas Dispute Announced, supra note 395;
see also Anthony McAuley, Dispute between Sharjah’s Crescent Petroleum and
Iran moves to damages phase, THE NATIONAL (Jan. 22, 2017), http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/dispute-between-sharjahs-crescent-petroleumand-iran-moves-to-damages-phase (reporting that Iran has also referred its
dispute with Crescent Petroleum of Sharjah to The Hague Arbitration Tribunal, and that the dispute was widely watched as Iran sought to re-establish its
relationship with international oil companies; also reporting that Iran’s dispute with Crescent involved a contractual agreement, dated 2001, in which the
National Iranian Oil Company was obligated to supply 600 million cubic feet a
day of natural gas from the southern field of Salman to Sharjah).
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VII. Sanctions and the Extra-Constitutional System
Governing Conduct of Transnational Business in
Iran
In an international transaction, the foreign investor will
normally bear the economic risks inherent in commercial trade,
including possible changes in market conditions such as entry of
a competitor in the market, volatilities in prices, exchange rates
or changing financial circumstances. In certain transactions,
provisions are made for adaptation or renegotiation in case of a
significant change in the economic and financial context of the
project. The investor may require the host government to
provide protection on a number of investment related issues
including the tax regime, the applicable law, the customs
regulations for products needed for manufacturing, and the
dispute resolution mechanism. While any investment, domestic
or international, entails certain political and commercial risks,
the risk of international investment by the European and
American companies in Iran is of a different nature.
In some cases the exporters of goods and services to a
familiar country may be willing to ship goods under “open
account” thereby supplying credit to such buyer until the
transaction is completed. In this case, the foreign supplier of the
goods relies on the familiar buyer’s creditworthiness. As an
authority has indicated, “this simplifies the transaction
considerably and may reduce the cost of the third-party
commissions or interest.”400 However, the U.S. or European
investors or sellers may not be willing to rely on the
creditworthiness of the buyer or the host government. There is
a credit insurance mechanism available for such sellers or
investors that provides an insurance policy against nonpayment by the buyer for the goods and services, or lost
investment abroad due to political upheavals. In the U.S., the
mechanism of Foreign Credit Insurance Association (“FCIA”) is
set up to, with the assistance of the Exim Bank, furnish a
political insurance credit to U.S companies.401

400
JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT (AMERICAN CASEBOOK
SERIES) 59 (3d ed. 1977).
401 The FCIA, established in 1961, protects exporters against political and
commercial risks which may result in default by the foreign partner of the
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The political risks of international investment, particularly
in the Middle East, are generally without parallel in a domestic
environment. In the U.S. and Western Europe, the nature of the
risk is primarily related to the prolific and at times anti-business
regulatory atmosphere. However, there are familiar laws and
regulatory systems, which the trader and investor would have to
conduct business within. Above all, there is a jurisprudential
system that makes the outcome of the business-related conflicts
fairly predictable. This is not the case with respect to doing
business with Iran. The following briefly indicates a sample of
organizations that function as banks and provide benefits
including investment services.
A. Unlicensed Financial Institutions
The unlicensed financial institutions (“UFI”) are business
establishments that function as de facto banks. These financial
outfits routinely lend money to individuals or, at times, juridical
persons such as partnerships or small corporations. The rate of
interest by these individuals or financial outfits is substantially
higher than interest rates charged by official banks. Thus, a
major impact of the extra-constitutional banking transactions by
these business entities is contributing to the rate of inflation in
Iran. The usurious interest rates controlled by the UFI, have
decreased the value of Iranian money and greatly contributed to
the inflationary economy. According to the IMF’s Country
Report on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Monetary Policy:
[T]he complex difficulties experienced in the financial system
[of Iran], reflected by high nonperforming loans and
competition from unlicensed financial institutions (UFIs), have
brought real interest rates to very high levels that threaten
macroeconomic stability.402

Another problem with the UFI is their impact upon the
function of the traditional banks. Based on the report by the
IMF, in order to control the hyper-inflation in the country, the
Central Bank of Iran allowed the private banks to engage in
United States Company.
402 IMF 2015 Iran Report, supra note 152, at 14. This report was prepared
by a staff team of the IMF for the executive board’s consideration on December
7, 2015 following discussions with the officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran
on economic developments and policies.
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inter-bank borrowing. The banks would follow the rules aimed
at better aligning market rates with inflation developments,
capping deposit interest rates at 7-22% for maturities up to one
year. According to the IMF Country Report on Iran, “[e]nforcing
this agreement has been difficult due to weak bank balance
sheets
and
competition
from
unlicensed
financial
institutions.”403
B. Corporate Entities Acting to Achieve Political Goals
One of the major issues facing Iran is allotting financial
resources on projects with little, if any, justification for their
economic values. At times, the commercial banks—or even the
Central Bank in Iran—support, or even finance, projects with
very little economic grounds for such a decision. One project
specifically indicated by the IMF as an example of the
government arrears was a huge housing project. According to
the IMF, this project involved issuance of about 108 trillion Riyal
($620 million) that is, about 0.5% of the GDP of Iran. The project,
“Mehr Housing Scheme,” involved construction of 120,000
housing units.404 The IMF report strongly recommended that the
government of Iran issue securities at marketable terms to
repay or restructure these arrears.405 The site of this housing
project was in the southeastern province of Sistan – Baluchistan,
near the Pakistani state of Baluchistan – one of the poorest
provinces in Iran. Clearly, this project was initiated because of
the political considerations and not its economic value.
C. Institutional Inefficiencies and Patrimonial Corruption

403 IMF 2015 Iran Report, supra note 152, at 6 (also stating that “Six UFIs
reportedly represent 15% of deposits.”).
404 See Mohammad Affianian, Mehr Housing Project Adds 120,000 New
Units, FIN. TRIBUNE: FIRST IRANIAN ENGLISH ECON. DAILY (Aug. 12, 2015),
https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-business-and markets/23213/
mehr-housing-project-adds-120000-new-units [hereinafter Mehr Housing Project] (reporting that with the addition of these units, the Mehr conglomerate
announced that “with the addition of 120,000 housing units, Mehr Housing
Scheme is poised to become a 1.5 million strong housing- project.” Reporting
also that an additional 240,000 units were built but not yet connected to water
and electricity).
405 IMF 2015 Iran Report, supra note 152, at 18.
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There are two fundamentally different sets of institutional
entities in Iran; the constitutional powers and the extraconstitutional entities. The extra-constitutional institutions
have a multitude of functions; religious, political and the
informal sector of the economy. These institutions have no
official relationship with the executive, judicial or legislative
branch of the government. That is, they do not function as a
regular bureaucracy in the governmental apparatus. They do
however, have a big impact on foreign trade.
For a foreign investor, political risk includes interference by
the host government with the operation of business. Such
interference has significant implications with respect to the
proper role of government in managing and regulating business
affairs.406 Political risks have been measured by the indicators
familiar in the Western investment business environment. In
doing business abroad, the indicators at times considered by the
Western companies may be:
Are there chances of nationalization? What is the imposition of
exchange controls? Of the host state government’s negligence
to provide the foreign investor with adequate political security
and financial protection against insurgent attacks? What
would be the chances of failure of the host government to treat
the investor fairly and equitably? How reliable is the state in
terms of its political stability?407

These investment parameters pose valid questions for
foreign investors concerning the reliability of host governments.
Such standards do not, however, apply to investment milieu of
Iran. In its totality, the government of Iran has ministries,
governmental organizations, and state agencies with a rather
sophisticated bureaucratic system of administration with a
vertical form of managerial organizations. Further, politically,
Iran is the most stable country in the Middle East. It has also
406 Stephen J. Kobrin, Political Risk: A Review and Recommendation, 10
J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 67, 77 (1979). The author has provided numerous political
risk citations and articles from the 1960s and 1970s. See also Symposium: Investment in Emerging Markets: The Challenges of Infrastructure Development:
Article: Political Risk and International Investment Law, 24 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 477, 481 (“existing data, as well as the inherently multi-causal complexities of modern society, will often impede the calculation [of political risk]
with any real accuracy of a probability that political event x will happen and if
it happens that it will impose cost y on a certain project with probability z.”).
407 Yackee, supra note 406, at 487.
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the highest educated and professional class of individuals,
particularly in the urban environment. These are all positive
factors for international investment and commercial
transactions in Iran.
Iran’s predicament, for a Western company, lies elsewhere.
While Iran has embraced modernity in its governmental
bureaucracy, there are also powerful extra-constitutional
institutions that live and operate side by side with the
traditional governmental bureaucracies. Such duopolistic
system of governance has created serious issues for the decisionmaking and economic development of the country. In major
structural economic decisions such as rules of privatization,
distribution of capital, and major contractual state-tenders, the
extra-constitutional institutions exert their influence.
The most powerful and formidable extra-constitutional
institution in Iran is the IRGC.408 The IRGC’s constitutional
raison d’être is Article 150 of the Islamic Constitution, which
states that the “Sepahe Engelab” was intended “to pursue and
continue its role in safeguarding the Revolution.” This is, of
course, an ideological and not an administrative or commercial
mission. Nevertheless, the IRGC’s activities in the economic
sphere have been expansive. The IRGC is probably the most
powerful economic entity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. As the
former U.S. Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, famously told,
“it is increasingly likely that if you are doing business with Iran,
you are doing business with the IRGC.”409 It has reportedly ties
to over 100 companies with its annual revenue exceeding $12
billion in business and construction. The IRGC also has
associations with a number of banks in Iran. These banks are
either directly owned by, or affiliated with, the IRGC.410

408 See Mathew Douglas Robin, Explaining the Economic Control of Iran
by the IRGC, UNIV. OF CENT. FL STARS (2011), http://etd.fcla.edu/CF/
CFH0004119/Robin_Matthew_D_20135_BA.pdf. For the history of the IRGC,
see Alireza Nader, The Iran Primer, The Revolutionary Guards, UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE OF PEACE, Aug. 2015.
409 Amir Teheri, Who Are Iran’s Revolutionary Guards?, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
15, 2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119509278241693687.
410 See Designated IRGC and Designated Iran Linked Financial Institutions, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center /sanctions/Programs/Documents/irgc_ifsr.pdf (current as of Sept. 24, 2012). These
banks include: Persia International Bank PLC, Post Bank of Iran, Arian Bank,
Bank of Industry and Mine of Iran (commonly known as Bank Sanat va

107

108

PACE INT’L L. REV.

[Vol. 29:1

Additionally, the IRGC has a bank under its own name, “Bank
Sepah.”411
In its study of the Iranian economy, the IMF concluded that
bolstering the Iranian economy “will help better detection of
illegal proceeds including those related to tax evasion and
corruption.”412 The IMF has considered such shortcomings in
Iran’s economy to be rooted in the unofficial sector of Iran’s
economy and as “the structural weakness on the policy
framework, taxation, and bank balance sheets.”413 For a Western
company, commercial association with extra-constitutional
entities or quasi-governmental organizations in Iran, would
mean ignoring the standards for conduct of business as set by
Western countries’ rules of doing business abroad such as the
rules set by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and by the IMF,
Exim Bank, the OECD, and Transparency International.414
Considering the highly complicated political structure of
Iran, compounded with the juxtaposition of extra-constitutional
forces in that country, it is safe to say that the political risks of
investment in and trade with Iran are not comparable with the
domestic environment in the U.S. or Western Europe. For
domestic investments in the U.S., there is usually a “regulatory
risk.” In such a risk environment, the government, through
fiscal and commercial policies unfavorable to conducting
business, may change the rules of the game in a way that will
Maadan), Bank eh-Ansar, associated with “Ansar Institute,” an ideological organization whose main banking activity is to provide interest free loans, the
Export Development Bank of Iran (Bank Tose-eh Saderat Iran), EuropaeschIranische Handel Bank (German Iranian Bank), and Future Bank B.S.C.
411 Id. Bank Sepah started its operations on May 4, 1925, 54 years prior
to the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Currently, it is one of the most influential
financial institutions in Iran and the Middle East. Bank Sepah has nearly 1800
domestic branches and a few branches in Europe. See The Profile of the First
Iranian Bank, BANK SEPAH, http://www.banksepah.ir/English/default1077.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
412 IMF 2015 Iran Report, supra note 151, at 18.
413 Id.
414
For judicial framework of Iran see, MAJID MOHAMMADI, JUDICIAL
REFORM AND REORGANIZATION IN 20TH CENTURY IRAN chs. 5-6 (Nancy A. Naples
ed., 2008). For quasi-governmental organizations in Iran, see STEVEN O’HERN,
IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD 115-133 (2012); GOLKAR, supra note 27, at 1–
107. For the role and the function of the Revolutionary Guards and the
strength and weaknesses of the U.S. policy in Iran, see ABRAHAM D. SOFAER,
TAKING ON IRAN: STRENGTH, DIPLOMACY, AND THE IRANIAN THREAT chs. 1-4
(2013).
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adversely affect the economics and the profitability of the
investment. Nevertheless, in domestic investments, there are
tested jurisprudence, verifiable statutory regime, and familiar
regulatory tools that would permit the investing company to
make a calculated and reasoned judgment as to the regulatory
risks prior to making an investment commitment.
D. The Impact of Commercial Transactions on ExtraConstitutional Institutions in Iran
As important as the commercial agreements concluded
between Iran and a number of Western companies may be, their
real significance should be seen from a different perspective—
integration of Iran’s financial activities, in its traditional sense,
into the global community. The commercial transactions will
make possible integration of Iran’s vision, in law and policy, with
those of the world community perspective. This point needs a
brief explanation.
Throughout the post-Islamic Revolution, two types of
institutional establishments have functioned in Iran side by
side. The first type is the traditional official bureaucratic
establishment. These are government ministries, state-owned
banks and publicly owned commercial entities. Such official
establishments have initiated fairly developed laws, regulatory
rules, policies, operational frameworks and bureaucratic
procedures and programs. The second type, as was mentioned
earlier, is forces of extra-constitutional power, ideological
establishments, and, at times, seemingly invisible policies and
operations that hold significant political and financial command
and domination in the country. Extra-constitutional is best
defined as those authorities and forces that are not specified in
the Iranian constitution or, if there is a reference to such powers,
their present authority and domain inordinately exceed the
original constitutional mandate. Of the multiple extraconstitutional or non-governmental entities, only one such
organization has been mentioned in the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic. That is, under Article 150 of the Constitution
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, “[t]he Islamic Revolutionary
Corps that was formed in the first days of the victory of this
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Revolution shall remain active in order to continue its role as the
guardian of the Revolution and of the fruits of its victory. . .”415
There were no subsequent laws that would specify in detail
or give further operational authority to the IRGC. Historically,
the raison d’être of establishing the IRGC was political and
originally created to assist the police in apprehending counterrevolutionary elements. The IRGC was also assigned to train its
members in moral, and ideological and politico-military
issues.416 Pragmatically, the IRGC has three distinct
institutional features: military, commercial and ideological.
According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, one of the
functions of the Supreme Leader is to have “supreme command
of the armed forces.”417 Institutionally speaking, the Iranian
military has a dual feature: classic military and ideological. The
IRGC’s military outfit is far more expansive than the regular
military.418
The IRGC’s commercial activities started shortly after the
Iran–Iraq War of September 1980 (about a year and half after
the Islamic Revolution) when the late Rafsanjani, then the
President of Iran and a member of the clerical group, encouraged
the IRGC to bolster its budget by taking control of confiscated
factories. By doing so, the IRGC would be economically
independent. Thus, the IRGC became intensely active in the
industrial
mining,
transportation,
agriculture,
road
construction, and import and export sectors. The IR GC’s
financial institutions, and affiliated organizations, are
regulated, presided and operated independently. The IRGC’s
funds are administered and managed separate from the public
funds. The IRGC often undertakes its investment and
FLANZ, ET AL, CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 213, at 65.
The IRGC’s domestic ascendancy over other security institutions was
not preordained. In the chaotic aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, the IRGC
was one of the several security instruments used by the leaders of the new
state against existential threats and, at times, wildly exaggerated challenges,
posed by an array of armed groups. See WEHREY ET AL., supra note 144.
417 QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980] art. 110.
418 Organizationally, the Iran military is divided into two separate entities: the regular army “Artesh” and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps,
IRGC. The classic military also has the Air Force known as the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force and the Navy called Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRN).
The IRGC also has a Navy known as Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy
(IRGCN).
415
416
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commercial activities under the rubric of assisting the
economically oppressed groups and is exempt from any form of
tax payment. In 1990, the IRGC established a juridical entity
called
the
Khatam-el-Anbia
Establishment.419
This
conglomerate has over 800 registered corporations, each in
charge of certain specialized commercial, production, and
investment projects, and is customarily awarded in various
fields including construction of highways, heavy-duty
structures, and offshore construction.
There were a myriad of reasons for bestowing such an
enormous economic power upon the Revolutionary Guards.
First, these organizations are not part of the traditional
governmental apparatus, and, as such, need not report to the
appropriate office of the president of Iran or a government
ministry. Under ordinary circumstances, for the government of
Iran to grant a contract to a private company, such a company
would follow standard bidding procedures. Therefore, the
company in question should factor in the cost of tax or payment
of customs to the government. Those participants of the bids that
have to make such payments are in a disadvantageous position
as compared with companies that do not have to make such
payments. This is a clear example of the patrimonial corruption
where the governmental structure or the regulatory provisions
provide for a selective group, an inherent market power or
procurement system. Professor Susan Rose Ackerman, an
authority in governmental corruption indicates, “a common
abuse [in a bidding procedure] involves procurement orders
written so that only one firm can qualify.”420 Second, of about
25,000 engineers and employees of the Khatam el-Anbia
organization, 10% are reportedly employees of the IRGC.421
Khatam el-Anbia functions as the engineering arm of the IRGC
and engages in several engineering activities, including
manufacturing of pipelines, road and dam construction, mining
operations, telecommunications, and agriculture. About one
third of the imported goods to Iran have reportedly been

Literally meaning the Last Prophet, a reference to the Prophet Mohammed.
420
SUSAN ROSE ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 64 (1999).
421 WEHREY ET AL., supra note 144, at 60.
419
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“delivered through the black market, underground economy, and
illegal jetties.”422
The extra-constitutional organizations of Iran have been
active in many parts of the world with the goal of acquiring
wealth in order to finance their vast bureaucratic organizations.
In Iran, the IRGC has been active in using foreign banks. For
example, the Quds Force, an elite group that supports proIranian militant groups in the Middle East, has used Chinese
banks in transferring funds in that region. According to a
Reuters report, the Shenzhen Lanhao Electronic Technology
Company LTD, “is one of several companies in China that
receives money from Iran through a Chinese bank.”423 The
financial transactions are reportedly conducted through
supervision of Bank Markazi (the Central Bank of Iran), which
has accounts with the Chinese National Petroleum Bank of
Kunlun. Upon transferring these amounts by Kunlun to other
Chinese entities, the Iranian Quds organization can use them
for various acquisitions in other countries including the import
of products to Iran (especially during the period of sanctions) or
use them abroad for financing ideologically oriented groups.424
Sanctions imposed on Iran fortify the economic position of
the extra-constitutional organizations. That is, in the absence of
any competitive commercial organizations, the IRGC will use
(and benefit from) its monopolistic advantage in communication,
banking, or bartered transactions, and will thereby acquire
goods and services not available to official government agencies
or corporations. The regime of sanctions makes foreign products
for the traditional Iranian government organizations
inaccessible and costly. Such products and services become
inordinately expensive for the consuming population. However,
those extra-constitutional organizations that may have access to

422 WEHREY ET AL., supra note 144, at 64. (statement by Ali Ghanhari, a
member of the Islamic Assembly).
423
Louis Charbonneau, Jonathan Saul, & James Romfret, Iran Uses
China Bank to Transfer Funds to Quds-linked Companies, REUTERS (Nov. 18,
2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-sanctions-china-exclusive-idUS
KCN0J20CE20141119.
424 DAVID ALBRIGHT & JACK DISHNER, INST. FOR SCI. & INT’L SEC., CASE
STUDY: IRANIAN ILLICIT FINANCING FOR QUDS FORCE’S OVERSEAS PURCHASES
(2014), http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Bamdad_case_stu
dy_Iran_financial_violations_17Dec2014.pdf.
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foreign products will be in a tremendously advantageous
position vis-à-vis their competitors.
E. Use of the Barter System in International Transactions
in Iran
As a result of imposing sanctions, Iran, in dire need of
available markets to sell its crude oil and petroleum products
and to buy needed products, sought politically accessible
markets. These markets were located mostly in Asia such as
China, South Korea, and Pakistan, as well as in Russia,
Southern Europe such as Turkey and Greece – all with lessdeveloped banking systems than Western European countries,
but willing to enter into oil agreements with Iran. Despite the
U.N. Security Council Resolution,425 China invested in various
Iranian oil and gas projects.426 In the absence of international
banking facilities, one of the major channels of Iran’s foreign
trade was engaging in barter deals. For example, Iran entered
in trade deals with Russia and Pakistan by trading crude oil for
Pakistani wheat, thus evading restrictions imposed by the
electronic banking transfers.427 The barter deals included
Russian companies that helped the Islamic Republic of Iran by
fuel oil available for export and receiving Russian products
instead. The same pattern of non-banking transactions was
followed with a substantial amount of oil delivery to China.428

425 See S.C. Res. 1696, ¶ 2 (July 31, 2006) (U.N. Resolution 1696 that was
imposed after Iran refused to suspend its uranium enrichment program).
426
Erica S. Downs, China, Iran and the Nexen Deal, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION (Oct. 12, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/china-iranand-the-nexen-deal/.
427 Cabinet Okays 100,000 Tons Wheat Export to Iran, THE NEWS INT’L
(May 17, 2013), https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/630526-cabinetokays-100,000-tons-wheat-export-to-iran.
428
Chen Aizhu and Roslan Khasawneh, Commodity traders in barter
deals with Iran post-sanctions: sources, REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-fueloil-exports-idUSKCN0WA13V.
The Kharg, a vessel owned by the government of Iran, was used for delivery of
crude oil to China. On March 21, 2013, the Yuan Yang Hu, a Chinese supertanker, visited the Kharg Island in Iran and unloaded 2 million barrels of the
Iranian crude oil. See Eric Yep, Chinese Oil Tanker Stops in Iran; More Imports
Ahead?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887323646604578401612953165422. Iran has also sold crude
oil to China in exchange for Chinese currency. See Collins, supra note 239.
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In addition to paying in local currencies, bartered
transactions, or gold, a number of Iranian vessels sailed to the
Mediterranean, where they pulled pier side or anchored off the
three Libyan ports of Benghazi, Sirte, and Mistrata.429
Reportedly “at least one of the Iran Revolutionary Guard Navy
(IRISL) ships, the Parmis, departed from Iran’s Bandar Abbas
port, the headquarters of the IRIN and IRGCN (Iranian
Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy), and made intermediate
stops in Dubai and Egypt before proceeding to Libya.” Further,
the Treasury Department’s announcement indicated that IRISL
ships fly a civilian “flag of convenience,” from a number of
different nations, but in reality, they are the functional
subsidiary of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.430
By enjoying a monopolistic position under the regime of
sanctions, the establishment in Iran achieved two goals. First,
extra-constitutional entities gained access to funds not
otherwise available to ordinary Iranian corporations. They used
these funds to buy products abroad that would otherwise be
prohibitively costly. Thus, the extra-constitutional institutions
act as a monopolistic entity. Second, the extra-constitutional
entities accessed resources used to fund ideologically-oriented
terrorists and special-interest groups in the Middle East and
elsewhere.
F. Sanctions Fostering Economic Inefficiency in Iran
The imposition of sanctions on Iran created economic
deprivation, which brought with it an opportunity for the IRGC
to use its military and economic power to engage in business
with countries that were not bound by sanctions. Using its naval
facilities, the IRGC was able to engage in bartered commodity
transactions with those countries.431 Furthermore, certain

429 Claudia Rosette, About Those Blacklisted Iranian Ships Calling at
Libyan Ports, FORBES (Sep. 13, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/claudiar
osett/2012/09/13/about-those-blacklisted-iranian-ships-calling-at-libyanports/
#5ffa2bba12b5.
430 Fact Sheet: Treasury Designates Iranian Entities Tied to the IRGC and
IRISL, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Dec. 21, 2010), https://www.treasury.gov /presscenter/press-releases/Pages/tg1010.aspx.
431 See, e.g, Valerie Parent & Parisa Hafezi, Iran Turns to Barter for Food
as Sanctions Cripple Imports, REUTERS (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www .reuters.com /article/us-iran-wheat-idUSTRE8180SF20120209.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/1

114

2017]

THE NEW ERA OF DOING BUSINESS WITH IRAN 115

groups, through means such as money laundering, “havaleh,”
and commodity agreements, avoided the crucial banking
services, transactional requirements, and facilities such as
SWIFT.432
During the period of Iran’s sanction, the IRGC was in an
advantageous position to engage in international commerce.
That is, sanctions created economic rent for the IRGC, which
enjoyed the monopoly in production, import or sale of goods and
bartered exchanges. Economic rents are the privileges,
opportunities and income gained by beneficiaries of other
contrived exclusivity such as labor unions and corrupt and
paternalistic economic powers. Not being part of an official
governmental
bureaucracy,
the
extra-constitutional
organizations433 are not answerable to the government for their
profits or taxes.434 Thus, in the absence of opportunities for the
private business sector to enter the market, the IRGC was able
to step into the void building a network of companies that came
to
dominate
Iranian
industries
from
energy
to
telecommunications. Such structure, created a systematic
institutional and patrimonial corruption in the country. For
example, in 2010, when the European oil companies had to leave
the South Pars natural gas field in the Persian Gulf, Mr.
Ahmadinejad, the president of Iran at the time, handed the
largest portion of the project, $21 billion in contracts for drilling
pipelines and platforms, to the IRGC. Therefore, the sanctions
placed the IRGC in a monopolistic position of a rent seeker that
could engage in substantial contracts with no alarm for

432 See, e.g., Erich Ferrari, Just Say No: Prohibitions Against Havaleh
Between the US and Iran, Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (June
24, 2010), http://www.paaia.org/CMS//just-say-no-prohibitions-against-hava
leh-between-the-us-and-iran1.aspx. “Havaleh” is an informal system of transfer of money sporadically used in the Middle East and North Africa by individuals and business organizations who, throughout the years, have established
the trust and confidence of their customers. These entities receive funds in one
jurisdiction and pay such funds (minus commission) to the designated representative of the original payer in another jurisdiction.
433 These are organizations such as the IRGC, the Bonyad-e Mostzafan
va Janbazan (Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled), the Emdad Committee for Islamic Charity, and the Deyeh Headquarters.
434 In this respect, these organizations followed Russia’s post-communism
pattern of generating income by practices such as monopoly of imports, loan
for shares, and tax exemption. See, e.g., DAVID HOFFMAN, THE OLIGARCHS:
WEALTH AND POWER IN THE NEW RUSSIA 296−324 (Public Affairs 2011 ed.).
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competition to reckon. Another example is during the reign of
sanctions when the IRGC obtained a mega contract from the
government for construction of a bullet train from the capital
city of Tehran to Isfahan. The project was estimated to be $2.7
billion. A confidential review of the contract showed that, after
lifting the sanctions, there would be possibilities for purchasing
the raw materials directly by the Government, rather than by a
monopolist party, at a significantly lower cost.435
G. International Trade Policy as a Disincentive for Iran to
Undertake Weaponry Nuclear Research
A distinct, but rather skeptical, view in the United States
indicates that the nuclear deal, between Iran and the 5+1
countries, gives an opportunity (a waiting period) to Iran to
convert its nuclear research activities into the weaponry system.
In support of this view, it has been stated for example, that
based on a source inside the International Atomic Energy
Agency (“IAEA”), within a period of between 11 to 13 years, the
Islamic Republic of Iran could replace its 5,060 inefficient
centrifuges with 3,500 advanced centrifuges.436 Therefore, the
centrifuge replacement clause will allow Iran, after replacing
the old centrifuges with the more advanced ones, to start making
nuclear weapons if it so decided.437 Thus, it is claimed that Iran,
being able to deploy these more powerful centrifuges, after 13
years indeed may act from the position of power concerning the
nuclear weapons.438
The above assumption is not logical because it does not take
into consideration the potential impact of Iran’s international
commercial investment and trade during the post-sanction
435 See Benoit Faucon, Stacy Meichtry, & Asa Fitch, Iran’s Government
and Revolutionary Guards Battle for Control of Economy, WALL ST. J. (May 19,
2016)
http://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-government-and-revolutionaryguards-battle-for-control-of-economy-1463584510.
436 See George Jahn, AP Exclusive: Document Shows Less Limits on Iran
Nuke Work, AP (July 18, 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/40ca41aba7a42c
1da13792f07df4b8d3/ap-exclusive-secret-document-lifts-iran-nuke-constr
aints.
437 See U,S. Sen. Foreign Rel. Comm. Next Steps to Achieve a Comprehensive Deal, (June 25, 2015), (Testimony of President David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security) http://www. foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062515_Albright_Testimony.pdf.
438 U.S. Sen. Foreign Rel. Comm., supra note 437.
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period. The fact is that, assuming that Iran will be integrated
into the world community and adheres to the basic requirements
of, and standards set by, the major world commercial and
banking institutions such as the FATF, then Iran’s population
at large will be benefited from such integration. The possibility
of entry into, and integration with, the global market will reduce
the monopolistic position of the extra-constitutional
establishment, which has traditionally dominated the economy
of the Islamic Republic because of the West’s closed-door policy
during the sanctions period. Diminishing the marketing power
of the monopolistic groups will, however, be painstakingly
gradual.
As indicated earlier, imposition of the sanctions on Iran
resulted in inefficiency concerning the production cost. By Iran’s
own estimate, “sanctions were costly for our people. They
increased the cost of transaction in our economy, 10 to 15
percent.”439
Another impact of sanctions has been the hyper inflationary
economy. One reason for hyperinflation was that as a result of
sanctions, very few corporate establishments were able to charge
consumers and receive the economic rent from large projects.
According to the Governor of Bank Markazi, a significant
economic achievement of President Rohani, has been to reduce
the annual inflation of Iran to 12% from the prevailing
inflationary sanction era rate of 40%.440 After sanctions lifted,
economic competition between formal Government agencies and
extra-constitutional institutions will undoubtedly be part of the
post-sanction “trade war” inside Iran.441
See Iran on Nuclear Deal: “Nothing Has Happened,” THE IRAN PRIMER
(Apr. 15, 2016), http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2016/may/23/iran-nuc leardeal-%E2%80%9Cnothing-has-happened%E2%80%9D.
440 Id.
441 The competing interest between these two institutions in Iran has
been, thus far, maintained imperceptible. Nevertheless, it seems that the official ministries and agencies have not been eager to defend the economic interests of the extra-constitutional organizations in Iran. In this respect, the
avowed position of the Central Bank of Iran, during the administration of President Rohani, has been that the Western corporations could always undertake
a thorough “know your customer” study before committing themselves to any
particular commercial counterpart in Iran. “We are talking about know your
customer here and you should know the customer of your customers so that
you can have complete coverage for the bank that is providing the service.” In
other words, the official government agencies in Iran are not going to exert any
439
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There is no doubt that imposition of sanctions in the past
greatly increased the market inefficiency concerning the cost of
products and services for the ultimate consumer in Iran. A byproduct of such market inefficiency has been a major cause of
structural and institutional corruption in that country. Even the
Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, after officially dismissing
the estimates by Transparency International concerning the
existence of a rampant corruption in Iran as “politically
motivated,” has admitted that:
[Sanctions] increased the cost of transaction in our country –
10 to 15% increased cost of transaction. This is based on
general research we conducted . . . [T]his itself can lead to
corruption. And when you don’t have a transparent banking
system, and it cannot provide the services needed for
legitimate business practices, then transactions will be
diverted to a nontransparent channel, through exchange
bureaus or [through] some people who have expertise in this
kind of nontransparent types of transactions.442

Therefore, economic sanctions imposed on Iran have led in two
different, and opposite, directions: on one hand, sanctions
benefited the groups that were part of the extra-constitutional
structure of the Islamic Republic; on the other, sanctions created
inefficiencies in Iran’s economy, such as an inflationary market,
lack of access to resources with competitive prices, and an
expansion of institutional corruption.
VIII. Iran’s Integration in the International Trade
Community
A. The Impact of the Regional Organizations Concerning
Commercial Transactions with Iran
Throughout the sanctions period, the extra-constitutional
non-governmental establishment in Iran has benefited from
prolific unofficial trade activities through barter deals, direct

influence or condition or defend the IRGC’s interest. See A Conversation with
Valiollah Seif on the Future of the Iranian Economy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (April 15, 2016) [hereinafter A Conversation with Valiollah Seif],
http://www.cfr.org/global/conversation-valiollah-seif-future-iranian-economy/p37733.
442 A Conversation with Valiollah Seif, supra note 441.
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dollar transactions, undeclared trade operations, exemption
from payment of customs fees, and preferential treatment with
respect to certain groups. These activities have resulted in the
origination of invisible transactions not subject to generally
accepted standards, such as the sharing of financial intelligence
and information that identifies beneficial owners of front
companies.443 In the long run, Iran’s business transactions with
European and American companies will weaken the economic
power presently exercised by Iran’s extra-constitutional
establishment. Such change, in turn, will help professionals and
highly educated young people in Iran to conduct business based
on their skills and financial abilities, and not through the
structural nepotism traditionally exercised within Iran’s extraconstitutional organizations.
An outstanding example of the well-established
institutional principles and rules, developed as a result of
conducting business based on adhering to customary rules of
international commercial transactions, is the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”). As an
international economic and commercial forum, the OECD
provides principles and establishes procedures on its members
for export credits and policies with respect to good governance.
These issues include anti-corruption measures, sustainable
lending policies, and environmental and social due diligence.444
Even countries outside of the OECD, which are engaged in
commercial transactions with the OECD’s member-countries,
are directly affected by the principles governing the member
countries’ commercial transactions and banking activities.
Iran is not a member of the OECD community. However,
throughout the negotiations between Iran and the 5+1 countries
concerning the containment of nuclear weapons, the OECD was
a keen observer. In fact, the OECD Secretary-General Angel
Gurria, supported the initial understanding reached between
Iran and the 5+1 countries concerning the development of
atomic energy by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The SecretaryGeneral considered the JCPOA Agreement as “a boost for the

443 See SARAH CHAYES, THIEVES OF STATE: WHY CORRUPTION THREATENS
GLOBAL SECURITY 198-201 (Norton 2015).
444 These rules are decided under the auspices of the working party on
Export Credits and Credit Guarantees.
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chances of lasting peace and security in a highly unstable
region.” Specifically referring to the relationship between Iran
and the OECD members, the Secretary-General of the OECD
was emphatic that “[t]he understanding [between Iran and the
5+1 countries] is also an important opportunity, and if followed
by other positive actions, could lead to the gradual normalization
of relations between Iran and the international community,
which would allow for its re-integration into the world
economy.”445
The above-mentioned statement by the Director of the
OECD is not merely a diplomatic nicety expressed by the head
of an important global organization. By its own Convention, the
OECD is legally obliged to “promote policies designed to achieve
the highest sustainable economic growth . . . in member
countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus
contribute to the development of the world economy.”446 Some of
the major issues that the OECD member countries must adhere
to (and which will have significant impact on doing business
with countries such as Iran) follow.
1. Monitoring Credibility and the Degree of Corruption
in Various Countries in the World
The OECD sends fact-finding missions to a vast variety of
selected countries in order to examine their state of policing and
containing corruption and business related corrupt practices. It
is important to note that countries under the OECD’s
observation are not limited to OECD members. The resulting
report by the Secretariat of the OECD contains issues such as
“Steps Taken by the State Parties to Implement and Enforce the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions.” For example, in 2014 the
OECD, studied the position of, or sent missions to, a vast
number of countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, in order
to observe those countries’ degree of adherence to anticorruption rules.

445
OECD’s Gurria welcomes Iran nuclear deal,
www.oecd.org/countries/Iran/Gurri-welcomes-Iran-nuclear-deal.htm.
446 See id.
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2. Observing Regulatory Disciplines Including AntiCorruption Measures
In terms of regulatory discipline of its members, the OECD
has a forum for exchanging information on members’ credit
systems, export credits and business activities, relating to good
governance principles such as anti-corruption (specifically antibribery measures), environmental and social due diligence as
well as the sustainable lending policies by the member countries.
3. Following the Financial Disciplines Concerning
Export Credits
The OECD provides a legal forum for maintaining,
developing, and monitoring financial disciplines with respect to
the export credits by the member countries.447 These rules and
principles apply directly to the member countries. It is
important to note that such principles have also been applied to
non-members such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa.448
Adhering to the export credits disciplines provided by the
OECD is, of course, mandatory to the member countries.
However, adherence to any of the OECD principles of doing
business abroad, de facto or de jure, by any non-member country
would be advantageous to that country’s international trade. For
example, such adherence by a non-OECD country eventually
will enhance the OECD export credits to that country. Under the
rules of the OECD conventions, member countries should make
consultations “in the framework of the [OECD’s] Committee on

447 See The Export Credits Arrangement Text, OECD, http://www.oecd.or
g/tad/xcred/theexportcreditsarrangementtext.htm (last updated Feb. 4, 2016).
These rules are within the “Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits.”
448 See Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Turkey, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. (2014),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/TurkeyPhase3ReportEN.pdf [hereinafter
Anti-Bribery Convention in Turkey]; see Better Policies for Development: Better
Policies for Better Lives, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. (2011),
https://www.oecd.org/pcd/48110465.pdf; see Export Credits Work at the OECD,
Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred /about.htm
(last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
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International Investment and Multinational Enterprises at the
request of a member country.”449
B. Application of the OECD Rules Concerning Doing
Business with Iran
The principles and conventions briefly mentioned above are
incontrovertible rules which the OECD member countries
adhere to. In their business transactions with non-OECD
members, such as Iran, the members should, under the OECD
rules, follow such long-established commercial precedents. The
OECD was established in 1961 – almost 18 years prior to the
Islamic Revolution of Iran. At present, 34 OECD member
countries worldwide exchange information and analyze them in
an effort to maintain a joint policy. Many of these countries are
neither European nor North American. For example, Japan,
economically an important country, joined the OECD in 1964.
As was briefly mentioned above, the OECD has developed
elaborate principles concerning conduct of investment and trade
by its member-countries. In doing business with a non-OECD
country, a member-country will have to adhere to the timehonored policies and rules as established by the OECD members
collectively.
Considering the above explanatory note, the conclusion is
inescapable that the code of conduct, principles, rules,
commercial traditions, and financial regulations governing the
OECD are applicable with respect to trade agreements between
OECD member countries and Iran. In implementing its
investment and commercial transactions with France, Italy, the
U.K., and the United States (among many other countries), Iran
will have to modify, if not totally eliminate, some of its
precedential commercial practices that prevailed in the Islamic
Republic during the era of sanctions.
As a result of the post-sanction commercial transactions
between Iran and a number of European countries, an issue may
be raised by Iranian authorities engaged in business
transactions with OECD member-countries: Iran, being outside
See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Declaration by the Governments of OECD Member Countries and Decisions of the OECD Council on
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises National Treatment International
Investment Incentives and Disincentives, Consultation Procedures (1979).
449

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/1

122

2017]

THE NEW ERA OF DOING BUSINESS WITH IRAN 123

of the OECD’s orbit, may not have to abide by the OECD’s
prevailing rules. The fact is that Iran’s non-membership in the
OECD community will not affect the applicability of the OECD’s
long-established principles with respect to corruption,
favoritism, and preferential treatment in conduct of
international trade. The U.S. and European companies engaged
in doing business with Iran will have to follow the OECD
principles concerning banking, nepotism and corrupt practices.
In this respect, Iran’s non-membership in the OECD could not
be used as a subterfuge to avoid this organization’s rules
concerning conduct of international business.450
Even in a number of cases, non-OECD members, not being
able to obtain full credit and economic support from the trading
partners, had to seek the OECD’s support on anti-corruption
business practices. For example, in 2015, the government of
Ukraine, a non-member of the OECD, unable to attract
sufficient foreign investment, entered into an Action Plan with
the OECD “for strengthening co-operation to help tackle
corruption, improve public governance and the rule of law, boost
investment and foster a dynamic business environment.”451
Iran’s financial credibility, and its ability to restrain its
institutional and patrimonial corruption, will have an important
impact internationally in terms of Iran’s ability to obtain
sufficient bank credits for its international commercial
transactions and to conduct trade agreements with Western
countries.
According
to
Transparency
International’s
Corruption Perception Index, Iran’s index of corruption in 2015
was 136, one of the highest on the globe, equal to the corruption
index of Nigeria, Kyrgyzstan, Cameroon, Lebanon and Russia.452

450 In fact, an important issue for not admitting Turkey into the EEC
community has been the problem of nepotism, preferential treatment and particularly corrupt business practices in that country. See OECD, Phase 3 Report
on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Turkey, October 2014.
451 See OECD and Ukraine to Step Up Co-operation on Anti-Corruption,
Rule of Law and Business Environment, Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev.
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-and-ukraine-to-step-up-co-operation-onanti-corruption-rule-of-law-and-business-environment.htm (last visited Jan.
24, 2017).
452 See Corruption Perceptions Index 2014: Results, TRANSPARENCY INT’L:
THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST CORRUPTION, https://www.transparency.org/
cpi2014/results.
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Despite lifting the nuclear-related sanctions, the extraconstitutional institutions, if they continue to dominate Iran’s
economic scene, will pose two major impediments concerning
expansion of foreign investment obtaining necessary credits and
entering into joint venture agreements with major European or
American companies.
The first impediment will be Iran’s ability to obtain
adequate financial credits for its basic investment and
commercial transactions. Until the time that structural reforms
in Iran (in terms of eliminating patrimonial and institutional
corruption) effectively take place, the ability of Iran to obtain
financial and banking credits to effectively conduct its
commercial transactions will be extremely limited. Even at
times, Iran will have to pay for such investment activities
mainly in the form of cash rather than credit. For a large state
like Iran, with dire infrastructural, building and repairing
requirements that have been accumulated since the imposition
of sanctions, such financial deprivation will result in draining
the country’s financial resources.
The second impediment to Iran’s international trade, or
attracting foreign investment, will be Iran’s diminishing ability
to acquire necessary insurance for international investment
projects. That will result in a high cost of commercial or
investment insurance for Western companies that would like to
do business with Iran. There will be very little, if any, insurance
guarantees for capital investment by Western companies that
are planning to invest in Iran or the cost of such investment
insurance will be excessively high. In the absence of adequate
credit, the only and exceedingly costly available investment
would be to charge the government of Iran for the requisite
investment insurance costs. Another alternative may be to invite
foreign investors to Iran on the basis of investment costs,
including insurance, to be borne by the government of Iran –
both are unattractive alternatives. Business with foreign
companies on the basis of cash and with little access to
international credit or investment insurance would be, of course,
a highly inadequate alternative.
C. The JCPOA’s Contribution to Regional Security
The JCPOA accord is highly controversial in the United
States. From the Western governments’ point of view, the
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essential purpose of entering into the JCPOA accord with Iran
was to enhance political security in the Middle East; providing
trade opportunities for Western commercial companies was a
secondary goal. According to U.S. Secretary of Defense James
Mattis, however, the actual outcome amounts to a regional arms
race, evidenced by the fact that Saudi Arabia has reportedly
surpassed Russia as the third largest military weapons spender
in the world.453
During the implementation of the JCPOA accord, it was
clear that Iran’s political objectives were not necessarily
comparable with Western parties. Even President Obama, who
viewed the Iran nuclear accord as his landmark foreign policy
achievement, characterized Iran’s response to the JCPOA as
“respecting the letter but violating the spirit of the
[A]greement.”454 General Firouzabadi, Chief of Staff for the
Iranian armed forces, contemptuously remarked that “[w]e
studied the details of the nuclear agreement, and we don’t have
any information about its spirit.”455
Nevertheless, the JCPOA accord has ardent defenders in
the United States. The agreement’s proponents acknowledge
that the Iran nuclear agreement is not ideal, and concede that
“the U.S. arguably paid too much for too little.”456 However, they
contend that undermining the nuclear accord with Iran, or being
perceived as having done so, “would isolate Washington, not
Tehran. Reconstituting the worldwide regime of sanctions that
existed before the agreement would prove impossible. The U.S.
would quickly face the unpalatable choice between watching
Iran cross the nuclear threshold or starting a war in an effort to
stop it.”457
Conclusion

2016 Defense Markets Report Defense Products: A Market Assessment
Tool for U.S. Exporters, U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, at 19 (June 2016),
http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Defense_Top_Markets_Report.pdf.
454
Middle East Security Challenges, C-SPAN (Apr. 22, 2016),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?408571-1/general-james-mattis-middle-east-security-challenges (statement of General James Mattis).
455 Id.
456 Richard Haass, Don’t Make Any Sudden Moves, Mr. Trump, WALL ST.
J., January 19, 2017, at A19.
457 Id.
453
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On March 2016, during the time-honored celebration of
Nowruz, Iran’s New Year, the people of that country started with
new hope for Iranians, of breaking the sanctions, and of
embarking on long awaited commercial transactions and
investment with Western countries. As pernicious as the regime
of the economic sanctions was to the ordinary middle-class
Iranians, it served well for a well-placed minority that belonged
to the extra-constitutional institutions. Through a powerful and
sophisticated network of patrimonial, structural and
institutionally-based corrupt practices, these institutions have
used a highly structured medium. Such medium included, but
was not limited to, money-laundering, bartered commodity
exchanges, custom exemptions, and trade deals with countries
not bound by the constraints of sanctions. For this group,
sanctions provided an unparalleled economic bonanza.
It was only three months after lifting the nuclear-based
sanctions, the United States Supreme Court approved President
Obama’s executive order, to block “all property and interests in
property of any Iranian financial institution, including the
Central Bank of Iran, that are in the United States.”458 This
decision ignored the time-honored principle of the separation of
powers under the U.S. Constitution and blindly approved the
former president’s executive order with ample adverse political
implications in Iran. While the United States, through a joint
accord, committed itself to lift the nuclear-based sanctions, the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision condoned those sanctions that
were not nuclear-based. In his strong and eloquent dissenting
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that the Court’s
majority decision “was an unconstitutional interference with the
judicial function, whereby Congress assumes the role of
judge.”459
In terms of U.S. regional security concerns, reconstituting
the worldwide regime of economic sanctions against Iran would
run counter to the interests of the Iranian people, and would not
serve the political and economic interests of the U.S. in the
Middle East.

458
Exec. Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012); Bank
Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1310.
459 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1310.
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For U.S. companies, issues concerning trade with or
investment in Iran are not limited to the political horizon. Once
a company has decided to establish a commercial or contractual
relationship with Iran, it will quickly become clear that the
labyrinthine Iranian legal system differs vastly from other
systems to which U.S. companies are accustomed. These
differences relate to Iran’s contract laws, which derive from a
combination of the Napoleonic Code and religious and
ideological principles. Further, to be officially enforceable, a
considerable number of contractual agreements between
publicly owned Iranian companies and foreign corporations will
likely require approval of the Council of Guardians, which
exercises judicial review over laws passed by the Islamic
Assembly. Moreover, any accord between Iran and a foreign
company should be in the form of a contractual agreement rather
than a concessionary one.460
The political and economic impact of continued sanctions is
clear and inevitable. By maintaining nuclear-based sanctions
against Iran, the U.S Treasury Department will serve the
interests of two seemingly unrelated groups. First, it will serve
the ideologues and extra-constitutional class in Iran, who have
persistently claimed that U.S. policy has always been against
the interest of the Iranian people, especially economically
disposed groups. Second, it will serve the interests of non-U.S.
companies, particularly those in Europe, which will rejoice in the
fact that they will not compete with U.S. corporations for a share
of the Iranian market. In fact, these European companies will
provide products and services to Iran in place of U.S. companies,
which will find themselves handicapped by the Treasury
Department’s massive regulatory prohibitions.
Nevertheless, in order to draw the maximum benefit for the
Iranian economy from the post-sanctions environment of zeal,
eagerness, and exuberance prevalent in the country (and to a
lesser degree, in the international commercial community), Iran
requires structural reforms to its international trade and
investment policies. The first step for such reforms requires that
Iran limit extra-constitutional organizations’ ideologically

460 See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980] art. 81 (prohibiting concessionary
agreements with foreign persons).
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inspired powers, as well as their manifestation and exercise.
Moreover, Iran must tame the ideologically motivated voices in
many of its governmental structures. Iran needs to engage in
trade with, and attract investment capital from, Western
countries. Its domestic product is insufficient to meet the
growing needs of its economy and its highly educated,
enlightened, and vibrant urban population.
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